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ABSTRACT 
THEQLOQY AMD BfclfllJICaTICH 
The falsification principle has been used to challenge the meaning 
of religious statements on the ground that i f they are meaningful then they 
must exclude some possible state of af f a i r s , and therefore be f a l s i f i a b l e . 
Much contemporary christian dogmatics has attempted to answer this challenge 
by Insisting that religious statements have no logical relations with 
factual claims and thus the meaning of such theological claims have no 
connection with the possibility of these olaims being f a l s i f i e d . 
Insofar as this side-stepping of the falsification challenge i s an 
attempt to i n s i s t that God i s transcendent, i t i s I n part j u s t i f i e d . For 
i f statements about Ood could be reduced, without loss of "fr»"1"g to 
statements about the world, then the word "God" would be identical with 
some series of natural events, and God could not i n any sense transcend the 
world. 
But the complete detachment of factual claims from religious olaims, 
which I s made by much recent ehristoeentrie dogmatics, can be maintained 
only at the price of making religious belief totally mind dependent, any 
religion however, that olaims. that God has revealed himself at a particular 
time, i n a particular plaoe, cannot avoid making olaims referring to God 
which are logically related to statements of fact t h i s i s particularly 
true of Christianity i f i t seriously olaims to be a historical religion. 
For to claim that Jesus died on the cross for the sins of the world entails 
the statement that Jesus died on a cross. Thus, i f i t i s not true as a 
matter of historical fact that Jesus died on the cross, i t logically cannot 
be true that He died on the cross for the sins of the world. 
i l 
THIS ypEB^fnc 
The dispute about whether theological language i s meaningful arose 
acutely with the logical positivist movement i n the middle and late 1920's. 
This challenge was given a new sharpness by the explicit application of 
the principle of fal s i f i c a t i o n to theological language i n the early 1950*8. 
The debate, revived, and to some extent directed by Professor A.G.N.ELew 
i s s t i l l a very l i v e and controversial philosophical issue. 
The area covered by the relation of theology to the falsi f i c a t i o n 
principle i s a vast one* I w i l l attempt to deal with an issue which i s 
logically prior to falsification, that i s , i n what sense i f any, religious 
statements are f a l s i f i a b l e : for philosophers are primarily oonoerned with 
the conditions under which religious statements are f a l s i f i a b l e and not 
the practical action of going out to conduct the necessary falsifications* 
Indeed, where theological statements are closely related to factual 
beliefs, such as historical or sociological claims, the statements taken from 
these subjects, which would provide a falsification of a theological claim 
must be established as true or false by professional historians and 
sociologists eto. The philosopher i s thus concerned with the meaning of 
religious statementss and this involves an investigation of how far the 
principle of f a l s i f i a b i l i t y i s connected with their meaning, and i f they 
are logically related to other types of non-theological statements* The 
philosopher i s not interested so much i n the truth of theological 
statementsi for unless theological statements are meaningful, they cannot 
possibly be true* 
I t i s impossible, even within these limits to discuss every aspect of 
the f a l s i f i a b i l i t y of theological statements* I wish to consider the 
claim of so much theology, that i t i s possible to counter the falsi f i c a t i o n 
principle by making theological statements oompletely unrelated to any 
statements of fact* This theological isolationism i s particularly 
I l l 
characteristic of the ehrlatoeentrio theology In much contemporary 
dogmatics. I w i l l therefore be primarily concerned with the question of 
how, i f a t a l l , theological statements are logically related to factual 
statements. She answer to this prior question w i l l throw light on how 
far, the meaning of theological statements depends on whether they are 
f a l s i f l a b l e . 
This thesis i s a revision of a thesis submitted i n July 1971* 
I now find myself unable to sustain some of the claims made about the _^ 
relation of statements describing the creation and resurrection to the 
falsif i c a t i o n of theological statements. I have therefore deleted the 
former sections on these topics, and tried to c l a r i f y my arguments about 
the relation of statements of faith to statements of fast. 
P A R T I 
THE LOGICAL PQSITTVTfi'P Hff ATJ/fiMrar.. 
1. 
CHAPTER I 
THE LOGICAL POSITIVIP^ CTATT.«WB 
I . The Ch«n««fl« 
The Logical Positivists were not the f i r s t empiricists to challenge the 
meaning of religions statements. David Hume i n the eighteenth century 
demanded that any statement which i s to be considered meaningful must be 
either a statement of a matter of fact, or a statement about the relations 
between ideas* A statement which i s neither of these has no cognitive 
value. Thus Hume suggests that metaphysics and divinity are meaningless 
combinations of words, and should be burnt at once. He writest 
" I f we take into our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, 
for instance; l e t us ask, Does i t contain any abstract reasoning concerning 
quantity or number? No. Does i t contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit i t to the flames, 
for i t can contain nothing but sophistry and i l l u s i o n . 
The Logical Positivists, who formed the Vienna Circle i n the 1920s 
and 1930s adopted a similar attitude to metaphysios and theology. 2 
Hence A.J. Ayer condemns a l l statements containing the word "god" as 
meaningless, because such statements are neither verifiable by sense 
experience, nor are they true by definition. He assertsI 
"To say that "God exists" i s to make a metaphysical utterance which 
cannot be either true or false. And by the same criterion, no statement 
which purports to describe the nature of a transcendent God can possess Sny 
l i t e r a l significance. 
1. David Hume: Emquirles concerning human understanding and concerning the 
principles of morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford. p.l65 
2. For the history of the Vienna Circle see: Victor Kraft: The Vienna Circle. 
Eng. trans. Chicago University press 1953* 
3> A.J. Ayer. language, truth and logic. 2nd ed. 19^ 6 p.115* 
2, 
The Logical P o s i t i v i s t s 1 challenge differs from that of Hume, however, 
because they state i t i n logical rather than psychological terms; . 
propositions and states of a f f a i r s are the key terms, rather than impressions 
and ideas. The aim of the Logical Positivists was to produce a philosophy 
of science, or a science of philosophy which would put an end to the chaos 
of competing philosophical systems so common to traditional philosophy, and 
to provide the fi n a l philosophy, i n which, given tine, a l l disputes would be 
solved. Thus the great leader of the Circle, Merits fichlick made the claim: 
"We now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point i n 
philosophy, and we are objectively Justified i n +JHniHw g that an end has 
come to the fruitless conflict am systems. We are i n possession of methods 
which make every such conflict i n principle unnecessary. What i s now 
it 
required i s their resolute application." 
She Logical Positivists thought they possessed an epistemologieal tool 
which would end once and for a l l philosophical disputes, and banish meta-
physics forever from philosophy. This was their famous verification 
principle. This principle stated that the meaning of a statement i s i t s 
method of verification.^ 
More precisely, they argued that two types of statement only possess 
cognitive meaning! F i r s t l y , empirical statements which are true either 
because they describe states of a f f a i r s we can observe, or i n combination 
with other statements which describe what we can observe, entail a statement 
which describes a state of a f f a i r s we can observe, which i s not entailed 
solely by the statements we bring i n to make the deduction; Secondly, 
tautological statements, such as the statements of mathematics and logic, 
which are true i n virtue of the definition of the terms involved i n the 
statements concerned. 
k. Morits Schliok: "The *"T"<"e point i n philosophy" Brkermtnls. Vol. I 
I93O/3I. Beprinted i n A.J. Ayer: Logical Positivism SLencoe I l l i n o i s 1959 
P. 
5. Merits Scblick: Oesammelte Aufsatze 1926-36. Vienna 1938 p . l S l . 
The Logical Positiviats were thus primarily concerned with developing a 
criterion whereby statements could be judged to be meaningful or meaningless* 
The question whether or not a particular statement i s meaningful i s 
obviously a more fundamental question than whether the particular statement 
i s true. For a meaningful statement may or may not be true, but a meaningless 
statement can be neither true nor false. Thus for example, the statement 
"John i s a black man", may be either true or false; but the statement "this 
square has two sides" i s meaningless, because i t i s a s e l f contradiction, and 
so i t can be neither true nor false. The primary concern of Logical 
Positivists i s therefore with the meaning of statements rather than with their 
truth. As Schliok stated i 
"Science should be defined as "the pursuit of truth 1 1, and philosophy as 
••the pursuit of meaning"** 
2. Verification and ffaww-ing 
The Logical Positivists challenged theology on the ground that the 
statements i t contains are meaningless. But this challenge can have a rea l 
bite only i f the Positivists themselves can make clear what i t means to say 
the meaning of a statement i s i t s method of verification. This they failed 
to do; i n fact the meaning of the verification principle was refined and 
changed, but agreement was never reached on a satisfactory statement of the 
principle. 
At f i r s t many Logical Positivists argued that the meaning of a statement 
i s identical with i t s method of verification. Thus to know the meaning of 
a statement i t must be possible to discover a set of circumstances, a, b, c, 
etc., such that i f these circumstances exist the proposition describing them 
w i l l be true; i f not the proposition w i l l be false. Sohlick at f i r s t 
argued that statements describing states of a f f a i r s i n the world are 
a 
6. Schlick. Op. c i t . p.126 
.4. 
meaningful, because the words used i n any such statements can be ostensively 
defined. He wrote: 
"The act of verification i n which the path to solution f i n a l l y ends i s 
always of the same sort: i t i s the occurence of a definite fact that i s 
confirmed by observation, by means of immediate experience. I t always 
comes to an end i n actual pointings, i n exhibiting what i s meant, thus i n 
real acts; only these acts are no longer capable of, or i n need of further 
explanation"^ 
Ostensive definition however does not really help to explain the meaning 
of a term. Suppose someone asks me to explain what a Gothic arch i s . I 
could take him to York Minster and point out an example. But this pointing 
would not by i t s e l f make unequivocally clear what a Gothic arch i s . For my 
friend may think that my pointings are directed at the colour of the stone 
or to the type of stone. 
In order to overcome this difficulty of the ambiguity involved i n simple 
ostensive definition, some Logical Positivists retreated from the position 
that experience verifies and i s thus the meaning of a proposition, and 
instead adopted the belief that i t i s propositions thai verify, and 
propositions are therefore the meaning of the other propositions which they 
verify. Thus Neurath argued that propositions are verified or f a l s i f i e d , 
not by appeal to experience, but by their consistency or lack of consistency 
with the body of statements of unified science i n existence at the present 
time. He wrote: 
"When a new sentence i s presented to us, we compare i t with the system 
at our disposal, and determine whether or not i t conflicts with the system. 
I f the sentence does conflict with the system we may regard i t as useless 
(or f a l s e ) — — one may on the other hand accept the sentence, and so change 
the system that i t remains consistent even after the adjunction of the new 
sentence. The sentence would then be called 'true , n^ 
7. flohlick: "The turning point i n philosophy" Op. C i t . p«5<t 
8. Otto Neurath: "Erkenntnis" vol. I l l 1933/53. Ayer. Op. c i t . p.203 
5 
Neurath's position has diffioulties of i t s own. I t i s clearly an 
abandonment of a rigid empiricist criterion of meaning, and a retreat to a 
form of the coherence theory of truth* I f coherence with the body of unified 
science i s made the sole criterion of the meaning of a statement, i t i s 
logically possible that two equally coherent systems of unified science might 
be discovered, and there would be no good reasons for adhering to one such 
system rather than the other* She Idealist proviso might be added that i t 
i s possible for there to be only one coherent system of propositions* But 
there seem to be no reasons, apart from aesthetic ones, for + . M « i H n g that 
only one logically coherent system i s possible* 
A further difficulty for Neurath i s t h i s : i f we can understand the 
veryifying propositions without actually verifying them, them why are we 
unable to understand the original propositions i n exactly the same way? I f 
however, we need to verify the verifying propositions, and then to verify the 
verifying verifying propositions, we have produced an infinite regress of 
verifying procedures* The only way out of such a dilemma i s to say that some 
propositions can be directly verified; that the truth of some propositions can 
be read off directly from their structure or form* The di f f i c u l t i e s of this 
position were just the ones Neurath's coherence theory of the meaning of 
propositions had hoped to avoid, 
Budolf Oarnap attempted to provide verifying statements when he Introduced 
nBeports n, or "Protocol" statements* He draws a crucial distinction between 
the material and formal mode of statements* l a the material mode "protocol 
Statements", "describe directly given experience or phenomena"} but i n the 
formal mode they are defined as "statements needing no justification, and 
9 
serving as the foundation for a l l the remaining statements of soience" 
fie thinks that philosophers, at least, should abandon the material mode of 
speech because i t inevitably gives r i s e to pseudo-problems such as hew 
protocol language i s related to the language of physios, or how protocol 
9* B. Garnap* The Unity of Science, p.^5. 
6, 
statements are related to ordinary language statements describing the 
material world. 
At this point Garnap i s producing ultimate verifying propositions by 
stealth: he supposes that protocol statements are guaranteed because they 
refer to "the given*1; but they can serve as the basic sentences of science 
only on the condition that we forget altogether their relation to the given, 
and treat them simply as statements. Thus i n -the Logical Syntax of Language. 
Carnap w i l l allow no ultimate protocol statements, the truth of which i s 
determined by their correspondence, or lack of correspondence with the facts. 
Truth means i n the material mode the fact that a proposition i s adopted by 
natural scientists i n the present cultural epoch. ' In the formal mode truth 
i s "the system which contains the sentence] a l l sentences of a given language N 
are accepted by scientists a', a", a"' etc." This coherence theory of 
meaning i s very similar to that of Neurath, and is.open to exactly the same 
objections. 
In the beginning the Logical Positlvists had identified meaning and truth. 
The various d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by this Identification resulted i n the' 
relationship being defined more loosely. This i s well illustrated by the 
distinction which was drawn between v e r l f i a b i l i t y i n practice, and ve r l f i a b i l i t y 
i n principle. At f i r s t the Logical Positivists argued that a statement i s 
meaningful i f , and only i f , we can actually carry out the necessary observations 
or tests which constitute the verification of the statement. Thus I can 
verify the statement that there are t i n mines i n operation i n Cornwall, by 
going there and seeing the t i n mines. But many statements which are obviously 
not nonsensical, cannot be verified i n practice. For example the statement 
"there I s o i l under the surface of Venus" cannot be verified i n practice at 
the present, because man has not the technical capacity yet to d r i l l for o i l 
on Venus. Ve can however state what observations are i n principle necessary 
to verify the statement that there i s o i l under the surface of Venus. 
We know what i t would be l i k e to send a rocket to Venus, and we also know 
what i t i s l i k e to d r i l l for o i l . Thus this statement can be verified i n 
principle, and this i s sufficient to establish that i t has meaning. As 
Schlick wrote: 
"We c a l l a proposition verifiable i f we are able to describe a way of 
verifying i t , no matter whether the verification can actually be carried out 
or not. I t suffices to say what must be done, even i f no one w i l l ever be 
able to do i t . " 1 0 
Thus meaning i s no longer identified with the actual process of 
verification, but rather with human beings ab i l i t y to imagine the process of 
verification. 
The claim that meaning and verification are identical was attenuated even 
further when the distinction was drawn between strong and weak verification. 
A proposition i s verifiable i n the strong sense, i f and only i f i t s truth 
can be conclusively established i n experience. Thus I can strongly verify 
the statement there are twenty books on my bookcase, simply by counting the 
number of books lying on my shelves. Universal affirmative statements such 
as "arsenic i s poisonous" cannot, however, be verified i n the strong sense. 
For the statement refers to a l l examples of arsenic, past, present and future, 
and i t i s impossible to observe the behaviour of arsenic i n the remote past 
or the distant future. Therefore, i f i t i s insisted that • statement has 
meaning i f i t can be verified strongly, then a l l universal generalisations, 
Including many sci e n t i f i c laws, must be classi f i e d as meaningless. 
In order to avoid reducing science to a collection of meaningless laws 
some Logical Positivists formulated the weak verification principle. 
Aceording.3to this principle a statement i s verifiable i f i t i s possible for 
experience to render i t probable; or i n other words i f "some possible sense 
experience would be relevant to the determination of i t s truth or falsehood" 1 1 
10. M. Schlick: Gesammelte Aofsatze. Op. oi t . p.18? 
11. A.J. Ayer. language, truth and logic. Op. C i t . p . l l of. also pp.37 f f . 
8 
Here a n A verification are no longer being identified; they are merely 
being described as "relevant" to each other. .But the term "relevant" i s so 
vague that i t i s hard to pin down exactly what relationship i s being said to 
exist between them. 
I t i s d e a r from the above discussion that the relation between meaning 
and verification underwent a series of metamorphoses at the hands of the Logical 
Positivists. Their failure to agree about the meaning of "meaning" led to a 
more radical question being asked about the nature of meaning. Were the Logical 
Positivists correct i n assuming that they could find "the" criterion of meaning? 
For to ask the question "what i s meaning?" i s to ask a theory loaded question. 
I t presupposes that meanings exist i n some sense. The Logical Positivists seem 
at times to have been mislead by the dogma that to mean i s to name. 
According to this doctrine, a word has meaning i f i t names a particular entity: 
thus the ward "London" i s meaningful because i t names the city of London: i n a 
similar way, i t has been argued a general noun such as the word "dog" i s 
meaningful because i t names something i f not a l l dogs, at least some 
sort of subsistent dogQness. In a l i k e manner to assert that "to mean i s to 
verify" presupposes that there are meanings which are independent of the 
statements said to be meaningful, and these monnlngn verify or f a l s i f y a 
particular statement. The Logical Positivists in fact seem to have moved 
from the dogma that words are meaningful because they name something to the 
dogma that statements are meaningful because they name something. 
In other words the Logical Positivists identification of meaning and 
verification i s based on the unquestioned assumption that there i s one single 
a l l embracing answer to the question "how are sentences meaningful?" Or 
"what do sentences mean?" There seem to be three reasons for supposing that 
this i s a logically improper question. F i r s t l y such questions can be asked 
only on the false assumption that they are factual questions. 
Secondly, such questions assume a l l sentences have something i n common 
which can be described as their meaning. 
9. 
Thirdly such questions assume that meaning involves reference to extra 
linguist io entities. None of these assumptions are j u s t i f i e d by the Logical 
12 
P o s i t i v i s t s . 
3. Falsification and meaning 
Karl Popper tried to overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n the ver i f i c a -
tion principle by substituting for i t complete f a l s i f i a b i l i t y In principle. 
Popper was never a member of the Vienna Circle, but he published the f i r s t 
edition of flThe Logic of Scientific Discovery"1** as a volume i n the series 
entitled Schriften zur Wissenschaftllche weltaufassung. and as a result his 
name became closely associated with the members of the Vienna Circle. 
In this book, Popper argues that universal laws cannot be deduced 
logically from particular observations of experience. Scientific method i s 
not an inductive method which requires some kind of justifications i t i s 
always a deductive method. The psychological process by which the scientist 
arrives at a general law which i s his hypothesis i s logically irrelevant. 
Thus Popper writes: 
"A l l that matters i s that particular statements are materially implied by 
universal affirmative statements, and that the particular statements i n question 
are fa l s i f l a b l e or Imply statements that are f a l s i f i a b l e . universal statements 
are never derivable from singular statements, but can be contradicted by 
singular statements. What characterises empirical method i s i t s manner of 
exposing to falsification i n every conceivable way, the system to be tested. 
I t alms not to save the l i v e s of untenable systems, but to select the one that 
i s by comparison the f i t t e s t , by exposing them a l l to the fiercest struggle 
for survival. The method of fals i f i c a t i o n presupposes no Inductive Inference, 
but only the tautological transformations of deductive logicy whose validity 
^ Jk ' not i n dispute." 
- j — T — — 
13* Original t i t l e "Logic der Forsohungn 
2km K. Popper. The logic of s c i e n t i f i c discovery. Hutchinson 1959 pp. kl-l*2 
10 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper w i l l not allow the use of 
basic or observation sentences to which a theory or law must be reduced i n 
order to be meaningful. To search for an ultimate ground for a theory or 
law i s looking for a metaphysicians fairy' tale. The basic statements which 
w i l l f a l s i f y a theory are a matter of convention, and therefore which 
Is 
statements are accepted as basic atfe determined by the theory i n question, 15 
and the purpose for which i t i s to be used. Thus he reports: 
"Coming to an agreement on basic statements i s l i k e other kinds of 
application to perform a purposeful action guided by various theoretical 
considerations. The connexions between our various experiences are explicable 
or deducible i n terms of the theories we are engaged i n testing. Theory 
dominates the experimental work from i t s i n i t i a l planning, to the finished 
16 
touches in the laboratory" 
Popper unlike the Logical Positlvists was not interested i n putting 
forward a general criterion for the meaning of a l l statements. Thus he 
claims: " I was never interested i n the so called problem of meaning; on 
the contrary i t appeared to me a verbal problem, as a typical pseudo-
problem. I was interested only i n sc i e n t i f i c demarcation."^ In other 
words Popper i s primarily Interested i n aiw-Mwgn-ifiring s c i e n t i f i c statements 
from the statements of metaphysics and other subjects l i k e astrology. But 
unlike the Logical Positivists, he does not condemn metaphysics as meaningless 
and nonsensical, for some metaphysical theories have led to useful advances 
18 . i n s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. Some Metaphysicians, and many astrologers J?,L, 
15* In h is later writings however Pepper i s much less an instrumentalist, 
of. "Three views concerning human knowledge" Reprinted i n Conjectures 
and Refutations Boutledge. 2nd. ed. 1965. pp. 97 f f . 
16. Popper. Logic of s c i e n t i f i c discovery. Op. c i t . pp. 106-107 
17. "Philosophy of science: A personal report" Reprinted i n CA.Mace. 
Brit i s h philosophy i n the mid-century. 1st ed. 1957- Allen and Uhwin 
p. UA. 
18. Cf. Pepper: Logic of Scientific Discovery. Op. c i t . p.278 "Three views concerning human knowledge" Op. o i t . 
11. 
however attempt to confirm that statements they make by appealing to empirical 
evidence. For example, an astrologer might claim that everyone born i n 
December i s sexually promiscuous. There are many peoples^lives which w i l l 
confirm t h i s f but astrologers are most reluctant to put such a statement to the 
test of f a l s i f l a b i l i t y . I t i s just the willingness of the scientist to put 
his theories to the test of f a l s i f l a b i l i t y which distinguishes his subject 
from non-scientific enterprises. 
km The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism 
In spite of the violent attack made on metaphysics by the Logical 
Positivists, some aspects of their philosophy bear ^  close resemblances to 
traditional metaphysical theories. 
F i r s t l y , Logical Positivism has close a f f i n i t i e s with rationalism. 
This i s shown particularly clearly by their insistence that there must be an 
absolutely certain base for knowledge; unless statements can be reduced to 
incorrigible statements describing sense contents, there can be no certain 
knowledge. In fact the P o s i t i v i s t s 1 distinction between the ultimate and the 
derivative i s clearly prefigured in Seventeenth Century rationalism. As 
Beichenbach said of Carnap: "His theory ma y be regarded after a fashion, as 
a modern fulfilment of Descartes' quest for an absolutely certain basis for 
science; and indeed Carnap's theory i s reminiscent of Descartes' rationalism 
i n more ways than one"3"' 
Secondly the Logical Positivists do not provide an empirical account of how 
statements happen to be meaningful. The statement that the meaning of a 
statement i s i t s method of verification cannot be verified by sense experience. 
They are rather defining an empirical sentence as one which i s empirically 
verifiable — they are proposing a definition of the term "empirical" and on 
the basis of this definition they attempt to limit the range of meaningful 
19. "Logical empiricism i n Germany" Journal of Philosophy. March 1936 p.14-9. 
12. 
sentences. At this point they clearly assume that a l l words mean in the earns 
way, that the rules determining the use of words work according to one rigid 
formula. But, who are philosophers to decree i n advance the types of 
statement which are meaningful? 
Thirdly, the Logical Positivists have assumed that s c i e n t i f i c statements 
,L,are the Standard type of meaningful statements. But this i s to take up a 
metaphysical position based on the beliefothat s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s the 
only genuine type of knowledge. 
5- The Attack on Theology 
Classical Positivists BBW theology as a branch of metaphysics s as such 
i t must be ruled out as meaningless without taking the trouble to examine i n 
detail the claims i t makes. Ayer i s one of the few Positivists who considered 
theology to deserve more than slighting footnote. > 
Ayer dismisses any kind of the ontologioal argument for God's existence, 
by appeal to the empiricist dogma that a l l existential statements are synthetic. 
No 'a p r i o r i ' statement can be anything but analytic and thus tautologous: 
thus no factual knowledge can be acquired by mere reasoning alone. 
Ayer, then denies that there i s any empirical way to knvwledge of God. 
Theological statements must be either observation statements, or be reducible 
to observation statements, i n which ease they are nothing over and above 
descriptions of ordinary phenomena in the world; or theological statements 
refer beyond the range of observation statements, i n which case, they are 
metaphysical and therefore meaningless. " I f the sentence, 'GOB exists' 
entails no more than that certain types of phenomena occur i n certain 
sequences, then to assert the existence of a god, w i l l be Bimply equivalent to 
asserting that there i s the requisite regularity i n nature • - . i f 'god' i s a 
metaphysical term, then i t cannot be even probable that a god exists. For to 
say that 'God exists' i s to make a metaphysical utterance whioh cannot be 
or ft!*".20 
20. Language, Truth and Logic. p.115 
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Ayer's position i s not that of agnostic or atheist: the agnostic claims 
there i s insufficient evidence to verify the statement "there i s a God", and 
the abheist that there i s enough evidence to f a l s i f y the statement 'God 
exists'. Positivists think that neither theism nor atheism i s capable of 
being true for both sets of statements are nonsensical: theological 
propositions are not genuine propositions at a l l . 
I n s i s t s are misled by the grammatical form of the statement "God exists" 
into thinking that because "God" i s grammatically a proper name, there must be 
an entity which this name names. But the word "God" does not operate i n the 
same way logically, as proper names such as " t h i s " or "that". The word "God" 
has a connotations such as " a l l powerful", " a l l knowing", "the lather of Jesus 
Christ"; whereas a logically proper name denotes, but never connotes. Thus: 
"the mere existence of the noun i s enough to foster the i l l u s i o n that there i s 
a real, or at any rate, a possible entity corresponding to i t " ^ * 
Religious experience i s also useless as evidence for God's existence. 
The possibility cannot be ruled out 'a priori* that some persons may have a 
sort of intuitive knowledge of God: we can wait however, until the religious 
believer produces the propositions he claims to have learnt by intuition, and 
t 
thenseee i f they stand up to the test of experiencial verification. Such 
propositions w i l l either be solely about the believer's psychological 
experience, i n which case they are mind-dependent, and not relevant to the 
validity of the argument; or the propositions w i l l refer to a being who \/ -A transends the believer's experience, i n which case they are nonsenacal 
metaphysical statements. " I t follows that those philosophers who f i l l their 
books with assertions that the intuitively know this or that moral or religious 
"truth", are merely providing material for the psycho-analyst. 
Ayer's treatment of the philosophy of religion i s highly metaphysical. In 
the s i x pages which he devotes to the subject i n T>nff"»re« Truth and Logic. 
21. Ayer, op. c i t . p.ll6 
22. Ayer, op. c i t . p.120 
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not one reference i s made either to the great writings of any one of the World 
religions, e.g. She Upanishads, She Koran, She Bible, or to any significant 
ancient or modern work on philosophical theology. He refuses to look at what 
i s actually said and done by religious believers when they worship, pray, 
or philosophise. Thus Passmore writes: "There i s to my knowledge no 
Positi v i s t writing which analyses at a l l thoroughly the doctrines Positivism 
condemns. This anti-historical, anti-scholarly tenancy i s another legacy of 
scientism" 2^ This class of "experiences" i s to be discounted 'a p r i o r i ' . 
But Ayer gives no c r i t e r i a for deciding which classes of experiences are to 
be allowed to count as possibly genuine experiences, and which not. 
Classical Positivism was dead by the early 19A0s. In Bagland and the 
United States, "Linguistic Analysis" has developed through the influence of 
the early positivists. But the linguistic Analysts see the positive function 
of philosophy, not as the saying of the unsayable i n order to fa c i l i t a t e the 
elimination of Metaphysics, but the task of analysing statements to see where 
they f i t i n the map of knowledge. Bach statement i s examined on i t s own 
merits to see what i t means: hence the Positivist programme of laying down one 
criterion for meaningful informative statements i s explicitly abandoned. 
The tendency to define meaning i n terms of use did crop up in marly Positivism 
however, at points where a rigid form of the verification principle was l i k e l y 
to exclude sets of statements which had to be included, .e.g. statements of 
the laws of science. Schlick writes: "Veriflability which i s the sufficient and 
necessary condition of meaning i s the possibilitynof logical order; i t i s 
created by constructing the sentence i n accordance with the rules by which i t s 
terms are defined. The only case i n which verification i s (logically) 
impossible i s the case where you have made i t impossible by not setting any 
rules for i t s verification. " ^ 
23. John Passmore. "Logical Positivism I I I " Australian Journal of 
Philosophy. Vol. mi. 19W. p.8 
24. Quoted J . Passmore: A Hundred years of Philosophy. Pelican ed. p.572 
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She Positivist quest for an absolutely certain and Indubitable base for 
a l l human~knowledge i s dead. She early rigid criterion of meaning s t i l l seems 
to linger on - a sort of background music rather than a symphony listened to 
carefully. Current English philosophy i s absorbed by the doctrines of the 
later Wittgenstein, which tends to be summarised by the slogans "don't ask for 
meaning, but ask for use1*, "Every statement has i t s own logic". Yet there i s 
a tendency to admit this broad criterion of meaning until i t appears to give 
meaning to statements which a particular philosopher does not wish to accept; 
e.g. some religious or metaphysical statements, and then the linguistic analyst 
f a l l s back on some form of the verification theory of meaning to exclude these 
"language games". 
Professor A.G.N. Flew i n his polemic against religious belief seems to 
hover between meaning i s v e r i f i a b i l i t y and meaning i s use. In discussing the 
freedom of the w i l l , Flew i s prepared to admit that the free-wpill language 
game i s played: "free-will" has a use in ordinary language. Further, any 
concept which has a use In ordinary language must have been used on at least one 
occasion ostensively, otherwise the use of the word i n question could never have 
been taught. "A paradigm case of acting freely, of being free to choose, would 
be the marriage of two normal young people, when there was no question of the 
parties 'having to get married', and no social or parental pressure on either of 
them?...." I f this i s not what the phrase free-will means than " i t i s hard to 
see what meaning these expressions have, and how, i f at a l l they could ever be 
25 
taught, understood, or correctly used." 
I f Flow's paradigm ease argument i s correct, a word or phrase which has a use 
in a common language, must denote at least one object, otherwise this concept 
could not have been taught. But i f so, then miracles must happen, witchcraft 
must be possible, and there must exist several different gods. Flew in fact, 
produced an ontologioal argument for the existence of every concept. 
25. "Divine Omnipotence and human freedom": New Essasy i n Philosophical Theology, 
pp. I*fr9, 151. Cf. "Philosophy and language": Essays i n Coneftftual Analysis,p. 1 
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26 l a his paper on Theology and Falsification Flew refuses to admit that 
Theology, because i t forms a language game of i t s own, with many of i t s words 
i n ordinary everyday use, ever produces any paradigm cases. He demands that 
i f theological statements are to be meaningful, they must be directly or 
indirectly f a l s i f i a b l e . I f nothing can be described as relevant falsifying 
evidence for the statements "God exists" and "God loves mankind", then 
w 
Christian Theism i s l i t e r a l l y meaningless. "Nojfc i t often seems to people 
who are not religious as i f there was no conceivable event or series of events, 
the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to 
sufficient reason for conceding "There wasn't a God after a l l " , or "God does 
not really love us then".... " I f there i s nothing which a putative assertion 
denies, then there i s nothing which i t asserts either; and so i t i s not 
really an assertion. "*^ 
This i s a c l a s s i c a l positivism i n one of i t s most naive forms. One or 
two statements are taken (e.g. "God exists" or "God loves mankind"), and i t 
i s assumed that these simple statements represent what the whole body of 
Christian doctrine asserts, and hence what i t denies. I t i s not easy, 
however, to pin point what form of the Positivist theory of mowing Flew i s 
recommending. In faot he seems to have taken over a f a i r l y primitive form 
of the verification principle. For, ^whatever counts against a proposition 
i s part of i t s meaning, a proposition i s meaningless unless i t proponent 
w i l l admit that i n certain circumstances i t can be f a l s i f i e d . Flew i n fact 
seems to be identifying meaning and falsification i n much the same way that 
the early Positivists identified meaning and verification; and any such 
identification i s open to the same objections. 
Surprisingly, i n his a r t i c l e on "Theology and fa l s i f i c a t i o n " Flew does 
not take account of the complexity of Karl Popper's analysis of the 
28 
falsification principle. Popper does not put forward the falsification 
26. Op. c i t . p.96. f f 
27. Op. c i t . p.98 
28. Cf. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, passim. 
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principle as a criterion of meaning; and so for Popper i f a statement i s not 
fa l s i f i a b l e , i t does not follow that i t i s meaningless. He admits that some 
of the statements of metaphysics, although not themselves fal s i f i a b l e , have 
led to important s c i e n t i f i c discoveries the results of which are f a l s i f i a b l e . 
In the same way some statements of theology are not fals i f i a b l e ; but i t would 
seem to follow from this, not that such statements are meaningless, but simply 
that they are not sci e n t i f i c statements. For Popper put forward the principle 
of falsification not with the intention of using i t as a criterion, for 
distinguishing meaningful from meaningless statements; but rather i t was 
intended to be a principle to demarcate sc i e n t i f i c from non scien t i f i c 
29 
statements. So on this basis, the fact that some theological statements 
cannot be f a l s i f i e d w i l l not show that they are meaningless: i t w i l l show only 
that they are not sci e n t i f i c statements——-a somewhat harmless conclusion. 
Flew also seems to be unclear as to whether he i s interested i n the 
f a l s i f i a b i l i t y of theology or the falsification of theology. I f , as Flew 
claims, theological statements are meaningful, i f , and only i f , they are 
fal s i f i a b l e , then he i s invoking a form of f a l s i f i a b i l i t y i n principle, very 
similar i n kind to v e r i f i a b i l i t y i n principle. In this instance in order to 
show a theological statement i s meaningful, a l l a believer has to do i s to 
point to what he considers i s a logically relevant statement, which i f true, 
would contradict the theological claim he i s making. In the same way, in 
order to show the statement that there i s o i l under the surface of Venus i s 
meaningful, a l l that need to be done to show this statement i s falsifiable i n 
principle i s to point out that we can imagine a situation that w i l l f a l s i f y i t . 
For example, o i l rigs being erected on Venus, and yet their d r i l l s never 
striking o i l . But, on Flow's principle of f a l s i f i a b i l i t y , the f a l s i f i a b i l i t y 
of a statement i s no indication of i t s truth or f a l s i t y . For example we can 
state what w i l l f a l s i f y the statement that there i s o i l under the surface of 
Venus: but this statement can only be shown to be true or false i f actual tests 
29j; Cf. above, pp. 8 f f . 
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are carried out i n practice, and o i l i a not found under the surface of Venus. 
Similarly, even i f flew i s right i n asserting that there i s a dose connexion 
between the n r r f - g and f a l s i f i a b i l i t y i n the case of theological statements, the 
fact that they are fa l s i f i a b l e , i f they are, w i l l show only that such 
theological statements have meaning, not whether they are true or false. 
6. The response 
The Logioal Positivists and their recent followers have challenged 
theologians to explain how theological statements are meaningful, i f they have 
any meaning a t a l l . This challenge raises two questions: F i r s t l y , i s the 
demand that theological statements should be verifiable or fal s i f i a b l e relevant to 
theological statements? For ^ t h e o l o g i c a l statements^are not fact-claiming, 
or cognitive statements i n some sense, then they could possess a «—"*«»g of 
some sort, without being verifiable of f a l s i f i a b l e . I w i l l examine a number of 
attempts by theologians to argue that theological statements are of a logically 
different type from ordinary factual statements, and therefore i t i s inappropriate 
logically to i n s i s t that they should be verified or f a l s i f i e d . Secondly, i f 
theological statements are, i n some sense fact claiming, i n what ways i f any, 
are they verifiable of falsifiable? 
In this thesis I w i l l attempt to answer these two fundamental questions. 
P A S T U 
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"The w"1«g of a statement i s determined by the procedures through which 
i t can be empirically verified or f a l s i f i e d " . Whatever the logical status 
of this statement may be, i s i t an appropriate demand to make of theologioal 
statements? I s i t a type error being committed i n demanding empirical 
falsification of theologioal statements? I f religious statements are of a 
logical type which i s "wholly other" from a l l types of nan-religious state-
ments or assertions then a category mistake i s being committed every time any 
attempt i s made to verify theologioal statements by means of empirical checking 
procedures. Further, i f theologioal statements are logically of a different 
type from a l l other non-religious statements, then.there may be no logical 
relations at a l l between theologioal and nonc theological statements. 
The position often.known as Fideism i s an attempt to provide an answer 
to the logical positlvist challenge to the meaning of theological language, 
by denying that empirical verification or falsification procedures are 
appropriate to theologioal language. The Fideiet claims the only knowledge 
man can have of God I s knowledge God Himself graciously gives to man. Since 
the doctrine of justification by faith only i s true, man can know God solely 
with the aid of God's-grace, and never even dimly by use of his own reasoning 
powers and logical techniques. 
Fideism I s a theologioal position which i s as old as the. Reformation and 
has roots i n both the Hew Testament and the Fathers. . No passage i n the Hew 
Testament that I know of can be interpreted i n such a way that i t can mean only 
that no reasons can be given for believing i n God because God's grace alone 
can give a person such belief. Several Hew Testament passages suggest a 
fid e i s t i c attitude. A typical example i s Collogaiang: "See to i t that no 
one makes .prey of you by philosophy and empty deceit according to the human 
tradition, according to the elemental s p i r i t s of the universe, and not 
acoording to Christ* 
1. Colosmians 2s8 B.B.V. text. 
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Xrenaeus and Tertulllan of the early Latin Fathers are both deeply 
suspieious and at times hostile to contemporary philosophy. Irenaeus 
restrioted the funotion of theology to the mundane.task of expanding and 
2 
clarifying the doctrines set out by the scriptures. Tartullian went further 
s t i l l and adopted a f u l l y Hedged Fideiat position. He claimed that the 
o antral beliefs of the Christian faith ware certain because they were Impossible 
3n reply to Maroion, Tertulllan wrote: "what is.unworthy of Sod w i l l do for me... 
t . • • 
the son of God was born; beoause i t i s shameful, I am not ashamed: and the son 
of God dies; just beoause i t i s absurd i t i s to be believed; and he was buried 
and rose again; i t i s oartain because i t i s impossible."^ 
She f u l l flowering of the Fideist position had to wait for the Reformation. 
There i s a frequent tendency i n Beformation theology with i t s concentration on 
the doctrine of justification by faith alone, to assert that there are no 
logical relations between statements about God and statements about the world: 
apart from God's self-revelation i n Jesus Christ, which i s made known to man 
by God's grace, nothing can be known about God. She image of God i n man, or 
i n l e s s Angustinian terminology, the rational and moral powers of man, have 
bean destroyed by the f a l l , and can be used i n suoh a way that they substitute 
idolatrous concepts i n the place of the God the l i v i n g and the true. 
Luther wrote: ''reason^ i s the devils greatest whorej by nature and manner 
of being she i s a noxious whore; she i s a prostitute, the devils appointed 
whore, whore anted by soab and.leprosy who ought to be trodden underfoot and 
destroyed, she and her wisdom.. • • • • . Shrew dung i n her face to make her ugly. 
4 
She i s and she ought to be drowned i n baptism." 
Winterer may be the n a l r i t i e s to which fideiatio apologetic descends i n 
popular presentations of Beformation theology, Luther's position i s not the 
2. Irenaeus: Ad. Baer. 2.26. i n J.N.D. Kelly: Early Christian Doctrines, p.U 
J . Translation of Be carne Christi:,. Quoted i n Barnard Williams» 
"Tertullian'e paradox" New Bessys *» Ph^^ophioal Theology, p.190 
fc. Irlangan ad. Sftatliohe Warke 16 pp.lfc2-l48 
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simple rejection of the possibility of any rational knowledge of God which the 
passage quoted above might suggest* Luther distinguishes three different ways 
i n which rational arguments can be developed. . 
F i r s t l y , natural reason when applied to the "earthly kingdom", to objects 
and concepts i n this world, i s being used i n the legitimate sphere, the sphere 
for which God created i t to be used. Because of the adequacy, of natural 
reason when applied within the bounds of sense, God found no need, Luther 
suggests, to teach us how to build houses, make clothing, marry, wage wat, etc. 
i n the scriptures.^ 
Secondly, i f natural reason taken by i t s e l f i s used with concepts 
applicable i n the heavenly kingdom only, reason i s trespassing on the domain 
of faith. "But i n Godly a f f a i r s . . . . .where man must do what i s acceptable with 
God and be saved thereby, here nature i s absolutely stone blind, so that i t 
6 
cannot even oatch a glimpse of what those things are." 
Thirdly, Luther thinks reason can be correctly employed with concepts 
taken from the heavenly kingdom, i f hpnan reason i s regenerated by faith, and 
i s always the humbe servant of the Word of God. . Luther wrote: "Without faith, 
reason i s no use and can do nothing but when illuminated reason takes i t s 
thoughts from the Vord.**^ 
She Bsf armors, despite their radical application of the doctrine of 
justification by faith only to Medieval Theology never explicitly concentrated 
the purgative powers of the doctrine onto theories of epistemology. This has 
been done i n the twentieth century by three leading Protestant theologians, 
T i l l i o h , Byltmann and Berth. 
ZUlioh formulates this graoe^oentred epistemology into what he c a l l s the 
"Protestant Principle". This forbids the identification of anything ultimate, 
ofanything that i s divine, with anything that i s part of thi s world. Nothing 
5. Cf. Poatil for Spiphany on Isaiah IX, 1-6, from Poatils 1552 
6. Postlls.. 15521 Postil for Spiphany on Isaiah LZ, 1-6 
7» Quoted BJL. Gerrish: Grace and Benson. Chapter 1 
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which i s not divine must be given divine status s neither the Church nor . the 
sacraments must be confused or identified_with Ood Himself; i f they are, they 
become idols, a substitute for the true-utterly transcendent and gracious God. 
T i l l i o h claimsi "Protestant theology.protests i n the name of the Protestant 
Prinoiple against identification of our. ultimate concern with any creation of 
the C&uroh including B i b l i c a l , writings Insofar as their witness to what i s 
really ultimate concern i s also a conditional expression of their own 
s p i r i t u a l i t y . " 8 
Similarly, Bultaann asserts that i f the doctrine of j unification by faith 
only i s tree, the claim that man .can know anything , i n any. sense of God 
independently of God's special revelation i s false. This i s because, i f man, 
by efforts of his own reasoning comes, to know God, however imperfectly, then 
man would have performed one action independently of God's gracious help, and 
wouldthus not be j u s t i f i e d by faith alone.. As Bultaann puts i t t There i s 
no difference between security based on.good works, and security built on 
obeotifying knowledge..... faith in. God, l i k e f a i t h i n justification refuses 
to single out qualified and definable actions as holy actions* Correspondingly 
faith i n God, l i k e faith indorsation, refuses to single out aulldLfied and 
o 
definable realms from among the observable r e a l i t i e s of nature and history." 
In Chapter Two I w i l l disoyss Karl Berth's claim that the doctrine of 
justification by fa i t h only implies the logical irrelevance of any verification 
or fals i f i c a t i o n procedures i n religions languages I am however, attempting 
a limited task! an examination of the consequences of the olaims Berth makes 
about the relation of his epiatemologioal theories to the doctrine of j u s t i -
fication by faith alone. I must point out most emphatically that I w i l l 
examine what the early Berth has to say. on the relation between reason and 
faith, and I w i l l only Introduce brief discussions of points of his l a t e r 
theology, insofar as theme throw light on the position Berth adopted when he 
8. Systematic Theology. Vol. . I , pp.l&JQ; Hisbet ed. 
9* Jesus Christ and Mythology, p.84 
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wrote the f i r s t volume of Church Dogmatics- I concentrate my discussion on 
Barth i s a theological parallel at many points to the attitude and position 
of the Logical P o s i t i v i s t s . Secondly, Church Dogmatics volume I Part I i s 
perhaps the clearest and best argued attempt In contemporary Dogmatics to 
escape from the demand that theological statements can be meaningful i f , and 
only i f , they can be verified or f a l s i f i e d . I fully realise that Berth's 
attitudes to the relation between reason and faith, and historical criticism 
and faith, change considerably i n the later volumes of Church Dogoatios. I 
am thus attempting to assess the epistemologioal significance of Berth's use 
of the doctrine of justification by faith i n his early theology. I am not 
attempting a complete or systematic exposition of Berth's whole theology. 
Earl Berth's attempt to evade the (unwinds of the fals i f i c a t i o n principle, 
fiaeism' because i t attempts to deny the necessity for any type of falsification 
of religious statements, whilst retaining the revelation of (tod i n Christ 
Jesus as the sole norm of faith. 
Several contemporary Br i t i s h analytical philosophers share with Barth 
the desire to evade the challenge of the f a l s i f i c a t i o n principle i n religious 
language, but differ from him i n so far as they have no desire to restate 
the Christian faith i n Neo-Orthodox terms. This type of TJftdeism may be 
called 'Left-wing' i n that i t often recommends a radical alteration of what 
has traditionally been thought to be the fact claiming content of the 
Christian faith. 
F i r s t l y , left-wing fideism i s non-cognitivist i n character. Zhis 
means that those defending the position claim that religious statements are 
of a logically different type, and have no direct logical relations with any 
sort of fact claiming or descriptive statements. Indeed, religious state-
ments are not really statements at a l l , but are assertions, or prescriptionsx 
the early Barth for two i; F i r s t l y because this position of the early 
the only type of Fiedlsm i s not His position may be called 'Bights-wing 
2k. 
whatever the function of .religious language nay be, i t does not describe what 
i s the case i n any sense. 
She second feature of left-wing fideism i s that i t i s reductionist i n 
character. The moves towards non-oognitivism and reductyxnism are closely 
related: The languages of the New Testament, of the Greeds, of the Burly 
Church Fathers, and of much Liturgy and Prayer, although they contain diverse 
non-cognitive elements, seem at f i r s t sight to preanppose cognitive claims 
about the nature of God and the person of Christ. I t i s hardly surprising 
that when the prima facie fact claiming statements of theologioal discourse 
have to be eliminated because of the .left-wing fidaig/t programme, some form of 
reduotionism almost inevitably ensamsg Such statements as ' I believe i n God 
the Father almighlm maker of heaven and earth', have to be reduced to 
statements l i k e , ' I commit myself to an agapeistic way of l i f e , and I can love 
my neighbour better here and how, i f I think about the story of the world's 
creation by God'. 
A common feature of such reduction programmes i s that they tend to be 
selective: Braithwaite chooses for his philosophical analysis only those 
Christian claims which can easily be reduced to moral assertions, or stories 
whiohnillustrate a faithful commitment , to a moral programme. Bnaithwaite's 
lecture ignores not only modern forms of worship and prayer i n the Christian 
Churches, but most of the prima facie fact statements made i n the 
New Testament; e.g. "Believe me, that I am i n the Father and the Father i n 
me"11 Similarly, one looks i n vain for any discussion i n this lecture of the 
doctrine of the homoousion, or the doctrine of the Trinity. 
In Chapter Three, I w i l l discuss i n detail the problems involved in the 
left-wing fidelst account of the nature of religious assertions. I w i l l 
r e s t r i c t my discussion to D.Z. Phil Hps' book, The Concept of Prayer This 
i s because Phillips i l l u s t r a t e s d e a r l y the two main features of left-wing 
10. In his famous lecture on An Bmparicist Hew of the Nature of Religious Belief 
11. John l * t : l l B.S.V. 
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fideism; i t s non^cogiiitive oharacter, and i t s reductionist programme. But 
further than this, P h i l l i p s attempts what few noa-oognitive philosophical 
theologians have so far attempted: he t r i e s to analyse i n detail one of the 
most important components of Christian l i f e and worship: that of Prayer. 
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C H A P . I K H TWO 
BIGF'1 - WTiia JTHUSJiflC 
1. r^tfr*1" pg-lection of 'Natural Theology1 
Barth saw for the f i r s t time i n hia sec and edition of his commentary 
on Banana, the danger, only too clearly manifest i n the l i b e r a l Protestant 
theology of the Nineteenth Century, of theology being reduced to anthropology. 
The l i b e r a l Protestants were only too ready to regard the Word of God as a 
sub-species of the word of man, as the word of man spoken loudly. The Word 
of God was viewed as something that most be tamed to express the respectable 
moral and social code of the present age. 
Berth's study of Anselm led.him to realise that his Ghristliche Dogmatize 
l a Batworf*" was subject to the very criticism which he had applied to 
Liberal Protestant theology t the arguments of the Ghristliche Dogmatik were 
so embedded i n existentialist philosophy, i n particular that of Kierkegaard, 
that the word of man had become a presupposition for the understanding of the 
Word of God. Berth's study of Anselshows Berth's determination to break 
o f f his theology completely from every form of philosophy. Sod i s not a 
being among beings; a someone or something which can be manipulated and 
operated on by a two valued logic, or by any human set of categories no matter 
how subtle, or a l l comprehensive. "God exists, i f he does exist - I s a 
unique manner that befits him as the only one who ultimately really exists."^ 
Statements about God and about the world are both logically and materially 
of a t o t a l l y different type from one another. There i s neither some 
psychological point of contact between God and man, such as the image of God 
i n man, nor any logical similarity of form between God's speaking and man's 
speaking. Any material and/or logical relations which may once have existed 
between God and man were annihilated by the f a l l . "There i s nothing inane 
1. I Die Lehre vom Worte Got test Hunchen 1927 
2. And also..his. lecture. .'Schioksal and Idee i n der Theologie', of.; 
Theologjshe Pragen and Antworten, Gesammelte Vortrftge 3, Zurich 195$ 
3- Anselm; Fidaii ~- ^ ^ n ^ . ^ p # 9 g 
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world which i s simile to human reason,, as such and per ae, which i s 
necessary to i t and which quite Independently of anything outside of i t s e l f * 
i s also a medium for knowledge of God* That there should be such media 
requires the existence of the Church, revelation and f a i t h . Insofar as man 
i s viewed i n himself and apart from the Church, Qod i s i n fact an objeot 
which he neither knows directly nor i n d i r e c t l y . n 
Therefore Berth concludes that , knowledge or awareness of Qod does not 
occur by means of any material or human medium. Man i s addressed by God 
as Be i s i n himself t God i n pure act. "line object of the enquiry stands 
over against him who enquires not as ' i t 1 , not even, as 'he', but as 'thou* 
as the unmeditated 'thou1 of the Lord.""' 
Barth's attack on the attempt to pass from.anthropology to theology, 
to i n f e r knowledge of God from knowledge, of man, i s not restricted to his 
attack on Liberal Protestantism. He also attacks the claim of traditional 
Bonn theology that because of some similarity of being between God and man, 
man's knowledge of himself and of his world, provides an analogy, a clue as 
to what God's being i s . l i k e . For example, Aquinas' doctrines of the 
analogy of attribution, and the analogy of proper proportionality, *1 though 
presenting an objeot . of belief whioh i s precariously poised between T^vrM^lm 
ana anthropomorphism, does assert that man can get to a knowledge of God, by 
taking a careful look at himself and at the world. In Church Dogmatics I , 
p t . Z, Barth dearly rejects any such attempt to crib, cabin and confine God 
by the norms or standards of . a philosophy, whether thi s be f or 
existentialism. Such an enterprise i s the setting up of an. i d o l other than 
God as the true object of worship.. The doctrine of the analo'H* « ) M « ±B 
for Banth the paradigm of the anti-Christ, from which.all scientific theology 
must be cleansed. " I f theology allows i t s e l f to be called, or calls i t s e l f 
a silence, i t cannot at the same time take over the obligation to submit to 
km Ansalm: Fides: p.117 
5. Anselm: Tides: p.l5L 
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measurement by canons valid for other sciences."^ 
Barth's univocal rejection of natural theology i s pin-pointed i n his 
debate with Brunner.^ Brunner claims that Berth presents a conceptual 
rejection of natural theology, i n rather the same way that a r i g i d l y 
behaviourist psychologist might reject the claims of a Ireudian depth 
psychologist: he regards Barth's views on natural theology as a sta&ght-
formrd negation of the major assertions common to most natural theologians. 
BarthjSays Brunner, rejects a l l logical and material relations between God and 
the world: Qod can be known only through his grace manifested i n Christ Jesus. 
This implies that (Sod's image i n man was eradicated t o t a l l y by the f a l l , and 
as a result, creation and revelation are cut asj^mder. No ordinances of 
preservation such as the necessity of state , rules about marriage can be seen 
g 
i n creation. There i s no point of contact, between God and man outside God 
i n Christ. The new creation i s not an addition to, or perfection of the old, 
but i t s destruction, and replacement by something new. 
Brunner then affirms a l l the propositions which he says Barth denies. 
He distinguishes the formal imago del i n man, which he claims i s not destroyed 
by the f a l l , and the material imago _dai i n man, which the f a l l annihilates. 
The formal image of God i s man's humanity, and therefore his responsibility 
before God! man as a matter of fact sins, but his a b i l i t y to regognise him-
self as a sinner, presupposes his. formal awareness of what he has fallen from, 
the God to whom he i s responsible, even during his l i f e i n sin. Shis formal 
imago dei i s the imprint which God has.left on creation, and i t f a c i l i t a t e s 
man's recognition of divine ordinances, such as matrinony and the state. I t 
also enables man to understand God's address i n Christ Jesus. Brunner 
oonoludes: "In the long run, the Church can bear the rejection of theologja 
na t u r a l l y as l i t t l e as i t s misuse. I t i s the task of our theological 
6. Church Dogmatics I , p t . I . , p.9 
7* Bag. trans. 'Mature and Grace' by Brunner; and the reply, 'No' by Barth. 
trans. Pvter Fraenkel; Geoffrey Bles. 1946 
8. Ankntefungspunkt 
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9 generation to find the way back to a true tfaeologia naturalie." 
Berth's *Nein* to. Brunner i s one of anger* Brunner's formal imago del 
i s not, Berth writes, purely formal.' I t i s true that man even as a sinner i s 
responsible before Qod: ..but to go on from this formal statement to suggest 
that Qod can be known by man through man's own efforts, i f he ta&a a good 
look at the world, i s a denial of the Justification sola fide. Creation i s 
the work of God's grace through Jesus Christ, and can only be seen aright by 
those who already have f a i t h i n him. There are not two graces, one inferred 
from creation, the other giv*n i n Christ: there i s no two storey building with 
analogia entis at the bottom, and analogia f i d e i b u i l t on at the top.- I f we 
are j u s t i f i e d at a l l , we are j u s t i f i e d through f a i t h i n Christ alone. "Bo 
believers s i t i n the councils of Qod?...... On the basis of instinct and 
reason one may proclaim one thing to be an 'ordinance of creation', another, 
another thing, ..... according to the l i b e r a l , conservative, or revolutionary 
inclinations of each. Can such a claim be anything other than the . rebellious 
establishment of some very private Weltanschauung as a kind of Papacy."^0 
Brunner's denial of the h i s t o r i c i t y of the Virgin Birth, i s Berth suggests, 
a symptom of his denial of the Sola Fide: i t i s the denial that Ood i s solely 
responsible for the salvation of man through the incarnation. Luke 1:35 i s 
for Berth the norm of a.grace osntred theology. "And the Ang^ n»lfl to her, 
•She Holy S p i r i t w i l l come upon you, and the power of the most high w i l l 
overshadow you; therefore the child to be bom w i l l be called holy, the ate 
of God'."11 
2. Jesus Christ i s the sole source of our knowledge of Qod: 
The d i f f i c u l t y i n writing about Berth's theology i s that everything of 
importance has to be f i t t e d under the heading, Jesus Christ. Berth does not 
say that the statements of natural theology are false.... t h i s would be to play 
9* Matmal Theology, p.59 
10. Matnral Theology, pp. 86-8? 
11. IUB.V. Text. 
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a kind of negative natural theology but rather Jesus Christ i s the sole 
medium through which we have, knowledge of Qod. A l l meaningful statements 
about Qod are reducible to statements about God's actuality In Christ Jesus-
God i s not a being at the apex of some abstract human metaphysical system: 
He i s insofar as He acts, and His acts are the revelation of His Word 
through Jesus Christ. 
How, exactly i s God revealed i n Jesus Christ? God reveals Himself to 
man when, where and how,. He freely chooses to do so.. God cannot be 
constrained or manipulated by man to provide his gracious revelation, when 
man feels he would l i k e to have.it. God's act of revelation cannot be pin-
pointed by any human experiment. "Seal proclamation .thus means God's Word 
preached, and God's Word preached means man's language about God on the basis 
of God's self^objeotificatlon. which i s neither present nor predictable, nor 
relatable to any design, but i s real.solely i n the freedom of his grace, 
i n virtue of which from time to time, he w i l l s to be the object of t h i s 
language."12 
God i s thus not identical with any feature of the world through which He 
reveals Himself: rather.He has the freedom to display. Himself when and where 
He chooses. I b i s means that the Word of God i s never frozen, or certainly 
present i n anyone, or anything i n . the world. The scriptures.cannot be 
identified with the Word of God; they reoord past encounters of man with God's 
Word, particularly with God's Word i n Jesus Christ. God may reveal Himself 
i f He wishes to, i n and through the words of the Bible, but the Bible by 
i t s e l f , and Independently of the action of God's grace cannot be the Word of 
God. God may as a matter of fact choose to speak his Word at the same time 
and place i n which the words of the Bible are proclaimed, but He doesn't 
have to. "Revelation i t s e l f i s nothing else than the freedom of God's 
gtace."^ 
12. Church Dogmatics I . p t . I . , pp. 102-103 
13* Church Dogmatics.I. p t . I . , p. 132 
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Berth's concentration on Qod being nothing over and above bis acts, and 
God's action being the result of His freedom to aot i n any way He chooses, 
leads to an ambiguous view about the importance of the historical claims 
made for Christ i n the New Testament. On the one hand, Barth wants to say 
that God's revelation i s both a veiling, and an unveiling: even i n Jesus 
Christ God's communication with man i s indirect, i n the sense that Jesus of 
Nazareth cannot be seen to be the Son of God by mere inspection of his body 
and actions. Thus Barth tends to regard the Bible as consisting of 'Sagas', 
which may or may not be historically true, and which contain the Word of God, 
only when God w i l l s them to do so. On the other hand, Barth underlines 
the importance, i f the doctrine of Justification Sola fide i s to be, taken 
seriously, of belief in. the actual historical ooourrence of the Virgin Birth, 
and the empty tomb. There i s a conflict here between Barth's wish to 
stress the Word of God as something completely i n God's control, and the 
actuality of the incarnation, i n which God allows Himself i n Jesus Christ 
to be at least, i n part, under the control of man. This ambiguity results 
from Barth's belief i n the " i n f i n i t e qualitative distinction between time 
and eternity, alike i n i t s negative and positive meaning; Qod i n heaven, you 
on e a r t h . G o d and man are t o t a l l y different: to preserve God's trans-
oondehoe over against man, his quality of being "wholly other", Barth must 
stress the radical discontinuity between anything that God i s and anything that 
man i s : but, i f t his discontinuity i s pressed to extremes, i t leads to a 
denial that the Word of God was over incarnate i n the world at a l l . Barth 
at th i s point seems to place a greater emphasis on Christ's unity with the 
Father, than an his being 'very man'. 
God's logical and material difference from every other object i n the 
world makes i t necessary for any attempt at theology which i s to be 
scie n t i f i c , to be determined by the object of which i t claims to be a 
Ik. Barth: Epistle to the Romans: Preface, English Trans. Hoskyns, p.10 
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science, and not by the. standards and norms of any other science* God i s 
the subject of theology, a being who cannot be used or operated on, i n the 
way that ordinary objects, i n the world can be operated on. "The subject 
of revelation i s the subject which remains indissoluble subject. Ve cannot 
get behind this subject. I t cannot become an object."3""* 
Qod i s never referredtto as an object i n the ordinary sense of the word. 
In Church Dogmatics, Barth uses the word "Oegenstand" rather than the word 
"objekt". "Qegenstand" suggests something or someone which stands over 
against something or somebody. "Objekt" i s used to designate something 
that can ooae under c r i t i c a l , b u t y ^ s i v e investigation: i n t h i s case the 
knowledge relation i s one of a c t i v i t y on the part of the subject, and 
into man's area of sin,, and stands.over against him as his ccmoander. God 
i s therefore not.revealed directly, but indirectly, under the cover of 
ordinary objects, which are different from God himself. 
Barth i s thus claiming that the sole norm, of theology i s the God whom 
we know i n his revelation through Christ Jesus. Thus no philosophical or 
metaphysical preamble to f a i t h i s of any use. No inference can get from 
man's words to God's Vord, from man's being to God's being, from man's acts 
to God's acts. To attempt any such Inference i s to judge God by standards 
alien to his nature, to treat him as though He were "Objekt", rather than 
"Gegenatand". Natural theology deals with abstract possibilities about 
what God may be like,, and.how his revelation i n Jesus may be possible. But, 
for Barth, God's revelation I n Christ i s not an abstract possibility, but 
an actuality, and i n face of such actuality a l l speculative possibilities 
must cease. " A l l universal concepts suppress the essential featuse that 
the Word of God i s a r e a l i t y only by i t s own decision. That the Word of 
God is- a decision' means that there I s no concept of the Word of God except 
passivity on the part of the object. 
that God's r e a l i t y to man i s one of end 
"Gej&en* tand" i s a word which indicates 
ounier i n which God has come down 
15. Church Dogmatics I , p t . I . , p.^38 
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the name of God, which we love, fear,and adore, because i t i s identical 
with the Bearer of the n^ne.1*1^ 
God' speaks bis Word through Jesus Christ i n a pure act. Barth seems 
at times to reduce Christ's revelation i n the world to the acts of Chrisfs 
speaking to a series of individuals. No universal notion can embrace or 
describe God's a c t i v i t y . A man either receives God's gracious Word, or he 
doesn't. "Neither precedence..of an anthropological possibility, nor the 
subsequence of a r e a l i t y i n the Church can be considered as the point from 
which to contemplate and to understand the path to dogmatic knowledge, but 
solely the present instant i n which Jesus Christ Himself speaks and i s 
heard, when the l i g h t divine i s created i n our hearts."^ This revelation 
of God i n Jesus Christ i s the sole ojb/terion of dogmatics and of the 
proclamation of the Church. Jesus Christ i s the "essence1?, of the Church. 
When Christ- sanctifies the being of man into the being of the Church, He 
makes their language of proclamation into God's Word. The Church does not 
have the sole possession of God's Word: i t i s not an i n s t i t u t i o n that has the 
righ t to control God's Word, i n the way, for example, that the Convocations 
have the right to control the Church of England. God's Word i s not just 
another piece of Church property: any actual Church i n s t i t u t i o n can as a 
matter of empirical fact reject God's revelation i n Jesus Christ as their 
norm, and by t h i s oease to be a medium through which God can reveal his Word. 
Barth's concentration on the actuality of God, leads to another point 
of tension within his theology. Because Christ i s the concrete universal, 
the Word of God as pure actuality, Barth at times says that God i s nothing 
over and above the particular acts i n which he reveals His Word to any 
particular individual. God i s God for me, only insofar as I acknowledge 
that God i n His freedom has made the words of man preached to me to become 
His Word. Once the actuality of the atAoic act of God's revelation i s 
16. Church Dogmatics I . p t . I p . l 8 l 
17. Church Dogmatics I , p t . I pp.¥t-l£ 
past, nothing remains behind i n the material or events i n which God reveals 
Himself. The events cannot i n any sense be divine u n t i l the next atomic 
act of God's revelation. No material i n the world can be a medium for, or 
mediate^God's revelation. The Words of the Bible are not the Word of God 
and have no logical connexion with the Word of God, except when God chooses 
to make them his Word. For example, even i f i t i s the case that the Passion 
narratives i n the synoptic gospels do describe accurately the events i n which 
Jesus Christ, the Son of God, was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, 
these descriptions by themselves do not t e l l us anything about God. The 
narratives can only t e l l us something about God, i f and when God freely 
decides to make the words of the narratives His Word. " I f we wish really 
to regard the revelation from the side of i t s subject, God, then we must 
understand that this subject, God, the Bevealer, i s identical with his act 
i n revelation, identical also with i t s effect."3"** 
But, how do I know when God i s revealing His Word to me? Berth says 
that I know this only by God's grace. To claim to know God's revelation 
by any other criterion than by the fact that i t i s God who through His grace 
i s revealing Himself to me, i s to deny the concrete actuality of God's 
revelation, to attempt to know God by my own works and not by God's grace. 
"The r e a l i t y of the Word of God i n a l l i t s three forms i s based only upon 
i t s e l f . So,, too, knowledge of i t by men can consist only i n acknowledgment 
of i t . " 1 9 
A l l knowledge of God depends on His revelation; as a result of th i s , 
the seemingly human terms we use of God such as 'Bather', 'Son', and 
'speaks', depend for their meaning not on the use these terms have i n 
ordinary language, but the use they have i n their description of God. Thus 
for Berth, the primary use of these symbols, i s not that they l i t e r a l l y 
describe human situations and states of af f a i r s , and are then applied by 
18. Church Dogmatics-1. p t . I p.3*K) 
19. Church Dogmatics I , p t . I p.2J3 
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analogy to Qod: rather they apply primarily to God, and from thence are used 
symbolically of human situations and states of a f f a i r s . This i s the 
Despite his concentration on the events of God's present revelation 
of His Word i n Jesus Christ, Barth also regards God's saving acts i n Jesus 
Christ,,not as something that occurs merely here and now, or even only i n 
this historical l i f e and death of Jesus Christ, but i t i s something Qod 
through Christ planned from eternity. In the relationship of Father, Son 
and Holy S p i r i t i n the Trinity, Qod planned the salvation of the world 
through His Son. The relationship within the Trinity of Father, Son and 
Holy S p i r i t i s not a relation known by. analogy with human relationships, 
but i s the paradigm of a l l human relationships. This is.the analogia 
relationis, which i s another aspect of the analogia f i d e i : the two notions 
together are Barth's alternative to the analogia entis. For Barth, the 
ordo essendi and the ordo cognoaoendi. are one and the same, and both start 
with God's saving act i n Jesus Christ. In the Boman doctrine of the 
analogia^ entis, i n the ordo essendi, God i s the prime analogue, and He as 
Creator i s oa^yiny responsible for the meaning which the descriptions we 
use of aspects of the world have. Because God created the world, our 
love i s an imitation a participation I n his love, our wisdom an 
imitation and a participation i n His wisdom. Han cannot however see 
himself from God's point of view, and the ordo cognoscendi, man's love 
and man's wisdom have to be used as the primary analogue of God's love 
and God's wisdom, i f we are to have any knowledge of God at a l l . Barth 
refuses to allow this separation of the order of knowing from the order 
of being: God i s not what man's symbols may possibly attribute to him. 
God's actions are the models of which a l l human actions are themselves 
only symbols. "God alone as He whom He i s by Himself, i.e. as the 
analogia fide i _ which i s one of the concepts Barth uses to replace the Soman 
Analo entis. 
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eternal father of the eternal Son, l a properly and adequately to be called 
Barth's theology I s thus unlvocally Chrlstocentrlot a l l knowledge of 
God and a l l genuine religious actions can be acquired or performed only i n 
God's grace through Jesus Christ. There are no short cuts to God by means 
of human reason or religious experience: Christ alone i s the norm and 
criterion by whom everything and everyone i n the world i s to be judged i f 
i t i s to be seen aright. "There i s a way from Christology to anthropology; 
there i s no way from anthropology to Christology. "^* 
Natural theology has been called 'The sick man of Europe1, but this 
sickness unto death i s not solely the result of the p o s i t i v i s t assertion 
of the impossibility of metaphysics. Barth's theology i s both a sort of 
posi t i v i s t theology, and i s also an answer to the logical p o s i t i v i s t 
charge, that theological statements are meaningless because they are not 
verifiable by sense experience. Both forms of Positivism display similar 
logical and epistemological stresses and strains. 
Both Barth and the logical Positivists are obsessed by the problems 
of epistemology. The Positivist olaims that a statement i s meaningful i f 
i t i s reducible without loss of meaning to a protocol, or basic statement, 
which i s a direct description of what I perceive. Barth says that 
meaningful theological statements are reducible without loss of meaning to 
basic or protocol statements verifiable by my experience of God's gracious 
revelation of Himself i n Jesus Christ. Any statement which i s not 
reducible to a protocol statement about God's revelation i n Christ Jesus 
i s meaningless rather than false. Barth and the f e s i t i v i s t s share a 
l a t h e r . " 2 0 
( 3. (Jfcr t h and Logical Positivism: 
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similar attitude towards metaphysics. Idealist philosophy i s not the 
contradictory of logical positivism, i n the sense that i f the statements of the 
logical positivists happened to be false, the statements of the Idealist might be 
true: Idealism i s rather meaningless because the statements of which any such 
system may be composed cannot be reduced to protocol statements and verified 
by sense experience. Similarly, natural theology end Barthian theology are 
not two trilogies, the statements of which formally contradict the one the 
other. (Only Brunner and Bland Blanshard are naive enough to think t h i s ) . 
Bather, Berth argues, the generalities of natural theology are meaningless 
conceptual constructs, which cannot be reduced to protocol statements about 
Sod's revelation i n His Son, and are, as a consequence, meaningless. ftBy 
natural theology, I mean every (positive and negative) formulation of a system 
which claims to be theology; i.e. to interpret divine revelation whose 
subject differs fundamentally from the revelation of God i n Jesus Christ, 
and whose method, therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy 
Scripture. Such a system i s contained not only i n Brunner's counter theses, 
but also i n the theses ascribed to me For they represent even though 
negatively, an abstract speculation concerning a something that i s not identical 
with the revelation of God in.Jesus C h r i s t . " ^ This passage i s the Theological f ut 
equivalent of Russell's injunction, "wherever possible logical constructions 
are tonbe substituted for Inferred e n t i t i e s . " 2 ^ 
Berth i s thus a theological phenomenalist: just as for the phenomenalist 
statements about the being of objects are translatable without loss of meaning 
into statements about the appearances of objects, so for Berth, statements 
about the being of God are translatable without loss of meaning into statements^ 
about the acts of God. " A l l we can know of God according to the scripture 
testimony i s His aots." 2^ I think i t i s more appropriate to ««n Berth's 
23. Natural Theology, pp. 74-75 
Zk. Mysticism and Logic. Penguin ed. p.14-8 
25. Church Dogmatics I . p t . I . p.426 
theology phenomenaliet rather than analyse i t i n oeoasionalist terms. There 
seem to be points at which the occasionalist comparison does not f i t . For 
example, according to the occasionalism of Malebranche, God i s the only real 
cause of anything; so, on the occasion of my w i l l i n g X, God causes my body 
to act i n accordance with my wall; on the occasion of my body having certain 
sensations, God causes my mind to have the corresponding ideas. 
But, i n what sense can Barth be called an Occasionalist? In a sense, 
the presence of God's revelation i s the occasion of man receiving grace. 
I t i s unclear however, what the analogue i s i n Barth for the mind-body problem. 
Further there i s no permanent metaphysical God i n Barth who can be the 
occasional cause of revelation. For God i s made identical with His action: 
therefore we can know nothing about Him over and above His action. 
There i s a similarity between the conventionalist theory of necessary 
truth, and God as the giver of Gracious truth i n His revelation through Jesus 
Christ. . For Ayer, the basic laws of logic are not so much true as prescriptions 
for the use of language: p v -p and -(p.-p) are 'true 1 because this i s the 
accepted usage by a l l people who use, say European language forms. Likewise 
for Berth, God i s not subject to necessary and unalterable laws of formal logic 
such as p v -p, and -(p.-p)) He, as i t were, gives any meaning His revelation 
may have by His act of grace i n revealing Himself i n His Word. Any logical 
consistency God's acts of revelation may have, are logical consistencies He 
has imposed by His own free acts. What as for a Positivist a human 
Conventionalist theory of necessary truth , i s for Barth, a divine conventional-
l i s t theory of necessary trut h . 
Logical Positivism and Barthian Theology are faced by similar logical 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
F i r s t l y , i f the meaning of a statement i s dependent on i t s being 
translatable into statements about God's revelation i n Jesus Christ, how do 
I know that this central statement i s meaningful? To say that i t i s meaning-
26. titf. Jerome Hamer: L'oocaslonwlisme theologique de Karl Barth: etude sur 
sa methods dogmatiqna. 
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f u l because God through Jesus Christ graciously enables us to know that i t i s , 
i s to argue i n a ci r c l e . Many different philosophical systems exhort us 
to adopt absolute presuppositions which are equally as a l l embracing as this 
statement. Why.believe that a l l meaningful statements are reducible to 
statements about Cod's self revelation i n Jesus Christ rather than His 
revelation i n Buddha, or Karl Marx? 
Secondly, Barth, as did the positivists, seems to get tied up with the 
problem of solipsism. I f a l l statements are reducible to protocol state-
ments about my own experiences, then I cannot have knowledge of anything 
which i s outside myself. The problem occurs i n Barth's theology more 
subtly, but nonetheless really. I can know god only because God's grace 
through Jesus Christ causes me to have knowledge of God. Does this mean 
that I have knowledge of God, or that God knows Himself through me? Is 
there a use of 'to know' i n which I remain t o t a l l y passive as the knowing 
agent, and the object of knowledge causes i t s e l f to become known? I think 
Barth can get out of my charge here, i f He i s w i l l i n g , as doubtlessly he 
would have been, to say there i s a use of the verb 'to know', which i s 
appropriate to God only, and which differs from a l l other types of knowing: 
this i s the sense i n which what i s known i s causally responsible for bringing 
the act of knowing i n the knowing agent. This move can only be taken, i f 
the phrase 'to know' i s said to be used i n the case of God i n a way which 
bears no relation cit, i t s use i n the phrase ?X know I am reading from a 
typewritten page*. Barth takes this move: i t i s hard to see how any 
meaning can be attached to his use of 'to know1. 
Even i f I l e t Barth escape with his eccentric use of the verb 'to know' 
I think he gets caught up i n solipsism at another point. I f God's 
revelation i s episodic, as Barth claims, and no act of His revelation i s 
either logically or causally related to any other act, then believers seem 
to be t o t a l l y isolated from each other i n their knowledge of God. I can 
know God, when He speaks to me in His Word; you can know God when He speaks 
to you in His Word and the light divine i s kindled i n your heart. But I 
cannot know when God reveals Himself to you, and you cannot know when God 
reveals Himself to me: unless of course God i s courteous enough to t e l l me 
in a revelation that He i s now revealing Himself to you. I t i s hard to 
see how for Barth, believers can communicate about their episodic knowings 
of God. 
Thirdly, Barth i s propounding a theological atomism analogous to 
Wittgenstein's logical atomism i n the Traotatus. For Wittgenstein, the 
world consists of a series of atomic facts which are logically unrelated 
to each other, and so are contingent. Likewise for Barth, the Word of 
God i s revealed to man as a series of atomic acts of self revelation 
through Jesus Christ. These acts of God are logically unrelated, i n that 
I cannot infer or predict from an experience of the Worn of God revealed 
now, any future features of aspects of God's self revelation. The logical 
atomist rejects the coherence theory of truth on the ground that the world 
just does not consist of a series of internally related statements, which 
can only be known to be unambiguously true when every statement about the 
world has been examined, and the necessary connexions between these 
statements made clear. The world consists of logical atoms describable 
by atomio statements, none of which are internally related, one to the 
other. Barth similarly rejects the idealist coherence theory of truth, 
and the doctrine of internal relations. God i s just not the somt of 
being whose acts entail each other, who can only be understood fully, when 
everything i s known about Him. The reality of God i s the particular 
contingent acts of His revelation. 
But, i f the acts of God in Jesus Christ are concrete particulars, 
can they be described or understood, or known in any ordinary sense of these 
words at a l l ? Likewise, i f the world consists of atomic facts, i n 
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isolation, where does our use of general statements come from? How i s i t 
possible to make general statements of the form ' e l l A are B', rather than 
of logical atomism1 Bussell Invented the notion of 'general facts' i n an 
attempt to explain our use of general statements, but this notion f i t t e d i l l 
into a system where a l l statements were supposed to be reducible to state-
ments about particular atomic facts. In the same way, Wittgenstein i n the 
atomic facts are made ere individuals or universale. Max Black writes: 
" I t would certainly be a mistake to identify objects with what we commonly 
c a l l 'individuals', or to suppose that theyccannot be at a l l l i k e what we 
commonly c a l l 'relations'. Since objects constitute the substance of the 
world, i t i s natural to think of them as timeless (of. 2.027), and so to 
imagine them as resembling 'universals' rather than 'particulars', but both 
of these traditional terms ere inappropriate. A l l we can really know about 
these objects i s that they e x i s t . " ^ Although 'gegenstUnd' i s the most 
common word for object i n German, I don't think i t i s coincidental that both 
Wittgenstein and Berth use th i s term. In Berth's case, God's self-
revelation i n Jesus Christ, i s neither particular nor universal, and thus 
seems to share a similarity i n logical status to Wittgenstein's 'objects'. 
Berth restored transcendence to theology i n a way " ^ i " ' to that i n 
which the logical atomlsts restored transcendence to philosophy. The 
atomic facts of the atomlsts are something over against the percipient; a l l 
meaningful statements are reducible to statements about atomic facts; and 
an atomic proposition i s true or false, insofar as i t s elements correspond 
to or picture the atomic fact i t describes. In contrast to this the 
Nineteenth Century Br i t i s h Idealists had tended towards a form of immanantism 
according to which tr u t h depended on a statement's cohering with a whole body 
only the particular 'X here and now'? In his 'Lectures on the philosophy 
Tractatua, i s uncertain whether the objects (gegenstaud) out of which 
27* A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatua. p.57 
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of statementSf rather than i t s corresponding with what i s r e a l . Barth 
restored the notion of transcendence in theology insisting on the 
realism and actuality of God over against man. God i s known when he makes 
Himself known, and i s not reducible to some human notion, such as man's 
sense of absolute dependence. God i s never God because man's thinking 
makes Him so, but only because God's gracious acts make i t so. I pointed 
out i n the l a s t paragraph that both Barth and Wittgenstein use the German 
word '^egenstond" to refer to a certain sort of object. In both authors, 
this word i s used to refer to something or someone which stands over against 
somebody, rather than something which can be passively manipulated and used 
for experiment. 
Earth's theological phenomenalism runs into similar d i f f i c u l t i e s to 
those which trouble ordinary phenomenalism. I f statements about God are 
reducible to statements about God's acts of revelation i n Jesus Christ, 
then Berth's writings should display nothing of God's operations over and 
above God's acts here and now. But Churoh Dogmatics I t pt. I , does 
contain elements not compatible with this phenomenalist programme. For 
example, Berth's analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity does contain a / 
concept which prima facie i s not deducible from the acts of God i n his 
revelation. Further, i f the record of the. l i f e of Christ i s the Word of 
God only when God chooses to make i t so, then the Virgin Birth, and the 
empty tomb, which Barth claims are implied by the doctrine of Justification 
Sola Fide, are elements i n the Dogmatics which are not reducible to acts of 
God's revelation through Christ Jesus in the present. 
Natural theology may, at present be i n i t s death throes, but i t i s 
f 
-duejjo'the i n i t i a t i v e of theologians, as much as of philosophers, which has 
brought about the sickness. In this, Barth, despite his claims to d i s t i l 
the Word of God pure, i s very much an example of twentieth century thought 
and cultur e . ^ 
28. For another but shorter relation of the early Barth to the logical 
positivists see N.H.G. Bobinson "Karl Berth's Empiricism*1 Hirbert Journal 
1900-51 Vol. if9 
km The Logic of Chriat 
The confrontation between the verification principle, and the doctrine 
of justification by faith only raises more sharply the traditional questions 
of how theology i s related to philosophy, of how grace i s related to reason* 
(a) What i s Berth rejecting when he re.ieots natural theology? 
Traditionally the relation of philosophy to theology has tended to f a l l 
into one of two categories: i t has been revigjonary or descriptive. 
Philosophy f u l f i l s a revisionary role i n relation to theology vhenxdt 
seeks not only to lay bare and clarify the content of God's revelation, but 
also to change some of the features of the supposed revelation i n the 
interests of a particular philosophical theory* The method employed i n 
Hegel's Lectures p M 1 osophy of religion i s a good example of a 
philosophical method attempting to revise the content of revelation. The 
esohatologioal elements of traditional Christianity are, Hegel suggests, 
made irrelevant by the philosophical core of Christianity, which i s the 
identity of Ood and man. Knowledge of s c i e n t i f i c fact, and knowledge of 
religious truth are logically totally unrelated to each other: religious 
i f f 
truth i s inseparable from the consciousness of truth. There for God/be 
'incarnate of the Virgin Nary by the Holy Ghost 1, i s for man to be conscious 
of him as so incarnate. For Hegel, the truth-conditions of Christianity 
are a l l resident i n the consciousness of the believers and the Church. No 
scientific hypothesis, or historical enquiry has any logical relation with 
religious belief, and i s incapable of providing any verification or 
falsification for i t . 
Tblsnia the intellectual tradition against which Berth reacted: 
revelation has no authority or norm of i t s own; human reason i s the sole 
judge of what i s true or false, relevant or irrelevant i n religious or 
secular beliefs. Thus for Hegel, "Philosophy unfolds only i t s e l f when i t 
unfolds religion; and when i t unfolds i t s e l f f ' i t unfolds religion." 2^ 
29- Quoted: P. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. VII., p.239 
The Liberal Protestant tradition from Schleiermacher to Bultmann and beyond 
took over this notion that special revelation i s something which man come of 
age can supersede and dismiss. Berth 1s humorous passage about Schleiermacher 
i s true of the whole movement. "As an apologist of Christianity, 
Schleiermachef really played up on i t as a virtuoso plays up on his fiddle: 
he played the notes and a i r s which, i f they did not cause his hearers to 
rejoice, could at least be acceptable to them. Schleiermaoher did not 
speak as a responsible servant of Christianity, but, l i k e a true virtuoso, 
as a free master of i t . " ^ 
Philosophy f u l f i l s a descriptive role i n relation to theology when 
i t sees i t s function as laying bare the metaphysical conditions within which 
an autonomous theology i s possible. Some modern interpreters of Aquinas 
argue that he i s a descriptive metaphysician i n this sense. I f this claim 
i s correct, Barth i s certainly mistaken to lump together, as i f they were 
one qualitatively identical entity, Nineteenth century l i b e r a l protestant 
theology, and the analogia entie of the Soman Catholic theology. 
The intellectual background of this aspect of Boman theology i s hardly 
that of Hegel, but rather that of Plato, Aristotle and Augustine. 
Aquinas does not seem to eliminate special revelation, or to reduce i t to 
general revelation: the knowledge of the world and of Qod, logically cannot 
according to Aquinas, conflict with what we know of God through special 
revelation. I f knowledge of God acquired through special revelation, and 
knowledge of Ood gained by human reason appear to conflict, t h i s i s the 
result of a misunderstanding on man's part, either of God's revelation, or 
of His creation. God i s c a u s a l l y responsible for general revelation 
because He i s the Creator, and Sue special revelation because of His action 
i n Jesus Christ: He cannot contradict Himself. 
For Barth, on the other hand, statements about the world cannot 
30. Barth: From HouBseau to RLtschl: Eng. trans, of Die Protestantiache 
Theologie im 19 Jahrhundert, S.C.M. 1959, p.527 
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contradict statments about Qod's revelation i n Jeans Christ, because there 
are and can be no logical relation between the two sets of statements. Any 
apparent contradiction i s the result of man's making an idol out of his own 
philosophy. 
I s Aquinas, as the Barth of Church Dogmatics I , pt.I. claims, a 
l i b e r a l Protestant before his time? Does Aquinas by his use of the five 
ways and the analogia entis attempt to produce faith i n revelation solely ' 
by the use of human philosophical reasoning techniques? Does he try to 
reason from the abstract possibility of God's existence to the concrete 
actuality of God i n Christ? 
Aquinas i s popularly pictured as a philosopher who attempts to prove 
the ^ i e t e n c e of God by use of philosophical arguments. A.G.N. Hew claims: 
"Many of the greatest philosophers - Aquinas, Descartes, Leibnitz and 
BerKeley among them - have presented what they considered to be proofs."' 1 
But this i s a distorted and inaccurate view of what Aquinas i s doing. Bis 
starting point i s always faith and revelation and not human philosophy. 
F i r s t l y , Aquinas i s keen to stress the transcendence of God. God i s 
not one being among other beings i n the world: He cannot be caught in philo-
sophical conceptual nets. Thus: "All our intellect conceives of God f a i l s 
to represent Him. Also that which God i s i n Himself always remains hidden 
from us, and the highest knowledge we can have of Him in this l i f e , i s to§ 
know that He i s above everything that we can conceive about Him."'2 
Secondly, he very definitely makes philosophy the handmaid of theology 
and not yj.ce versa; the starting point for a l l theology i s the revelation 
given by God. "So sacred scripture, which has no superior science over i t , 
disputes the denial of i t s principles; i t argues on the basis of those 
truths held by revelation which an opponent admits, as when debating with 
31. God and Philosophy: p.12 
32. De Veritate q.2.a.9« 
^tatea^gfefi/heretics i t appeals to received authoritative texts of 
Christian theology, and uses one a r t i c l e against those who reject another* 1 1" 
Thirdly, i n the same section of the Summa, the arguments of philosophy 
are said to provide notmore than "extraneous arguments from probability."^ 
Philosophy can by analysis of theological concepts, help to c l a r i f y 
(tod's revelation to man, i t cannot i n the nature of the case become a 
substitute for God's grace. Season can c l a r i f y and rebut the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
unbelievers may bring against faith i n God's revelation: but i t can never 
replace revelation. I f an opponent believes that God's so called revela-
5 
tlon i s no revelation, philosophical argument cannot bring about a conver-
sion. For, "Our faith rests on the revelation made to the prophets and 
apostles, who wrote the canonical books, not on revelation, i f such there 
be, made to any other teacher."^ 
Barth half sees what Aquinas' method really i s - but half doesn't see. 
In "Schicksal und Idee i n Der Theologle' 1,^ Barth quotes with approval 
Aquinas' insistence i n the gumma Theologica that God i s the object of 
theology only insofar as He i s identical with the subject. For, " A l l 
things are dealt with i n Holy Teaching i n terms of God, either because they 
are God Himself, or because they are relative to Him as their origin and 
end." 3 7 
Both the "Five ways" and the analogia entis occur within the framework 
of a grace centred theology. The "Five ways" do not produce, independently 
of faith, God Himself: they t e l l us only "What men c a l l God". These > 
arguments are not intended to be a substitute for God's revelation, but 
rather lead, as Victor White points out from a negative to a positive 
agnostioism from saying, ' I do not know' to saying 'there i s an 
33. gumma Theologica: l a I 8; New Domini nan Translation, Vol. I , p.31 
3*». Ibid: p.JL 
35. OP. C i t . 1 1 8 ; pp.31-33 
36. In Bheologjahe Fragen und Antworten:Qesammalte Vortragef 3-Zurich 1957 
37. gumma Theologica 1 1 7 ; Op.clt. p.27 PP-57-58 
38. Cf. Victor White: God the Unknown, passim 
Similarly, the doctrine of the analogia entis does not make God into 
a Being of the same type as beings i n the world. The doctrine of the 
analogia entis does not use language to describe God metaphorically. A 
metaphor, such as the "road i s a ribbon of moonlight" i s used l i t e r a l l y , i n 
the sense that to qualify the metaphor k i l l s i t s effectiveness. To say 
"the road i s a ribbon of moonlight - but not quite" i s to say nothing. 
Analogy rather, starts with God. In saying God i s good, we are not making 
God into the same sort of thing as a good man, but are rather trying to 
make clearer the normal meaning of the word 'good1; that i s the meaning 
i t has when i t i s attributed to God, and by analogy with whom we apply i t 
to persons i n the world. 
Aquinas method does not seem to be far removed from Berth's. With 
Barth, Aquinas can say: "But i t i s God's miracle, when that happens, neither 
nature, nor the a r t of the theologian, but grace which one cannot count upon 
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which one cannot seize for oneself, which one can only receive." 
(b) Descriptive Metaphysics as a necessary condition of I think that Barth i s partly right and partly wrong i n giving a 
purely descriptive function to philosophical theology. In demanding the 
complete autonomy of theology, Barth i n the end seems to deny any autonomy 
to philosophy and so to any human thought or reflection. 
I believe that some type of descriptive metaphysics i s a necessary 
condition of any understanding, or knowledge, or personal relationship, i n 
any meaningful use of these terms. To say that both the material and 
logical divides between God and man are so great that we cannot know, or 
understand, or have a personal relationship with God i n any ordinary sense 
of these words, i s surely i n the end saying that we just don't have 
knowledge, or understanding, or personal relationships with God. 
39. "Schicksal und Idee in Der Theologie" Op. c i t . p.58. Translated with 
the assistance of Mrs. Susan Mole. The German original i s as follows: 
religious knowledge: 
das geschisht, weder Natur nech "Aber es i s Wunder Gottes, wenn 
kunst des Theologen sondern, Gnade, mlt der man nloht reehnen 
die man sieh nicht nehmen, die man nur empfaggen Kann" 
But what sort of revisionary metaphysics am I claiming i s a necessary 
presupposition of our understanding of God's revelation? P.T. Geach, i n 
a Symposium entitled "On what there i s " , pin-points the issues I wish to 
discuss. He writes: "For the conceptual scheme i s not a matter of free 
choice* Certain concepts l i k e existence and truth, and thing and property, 
are used, and cannot but be used i n a l l rational discourse whatsoever, and 
ontology i s an attempt to scrutinise our use of them." Although I am 
unhappy about some of Geach'B terminology, particularly his use of 'concept' 
which i s a systematically ambigmous expression i n epistemology, I wish to 
argue along his general approach. I regard W.V.O. Quine as wrong when he 
indicates that he thinks a l l conceptual schemes are a matter of convention, 
a matter of which i s the easiest way to talk about certain types of entities* 
Quine says, "Our acceptance of an ontology i s ••••••• similar i n principle 
to our acceptanceoof a scie n t i f i c theory, say a system of physics: we adopt 
at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into 
which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged. 
Quine i s right in that say physicalist and phenomenalist theories of the 
nature of re a l i t y may be inter-translatable, and the use of one rather than 
the other may result from a matter of linguistic convenience: but the fact 
that they are inter-translatable presupposes that a similar logical structure 
i s being used both by the phenomenalist and by the physicalist. I f , for 
example, the phenomenalist used a logical structure based on -(p. -p) and 
p v -p, and the physioalists used a logical structure such as p. -p and -(p v -p) 
then the inter-tranalatability would not be possible. 
At the logical lev e l , I think that any form of communication, whether 
this i s communication of the Word of God, or communication between man and 
man, presupposes the exclusion of some possibilities.•*•• to exclude no 
kOm PJUS. sun. 1951, p.l36 
Jfl. Quine: From a Logical Point of View: Harper Paperback, p.l6 
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possibilities i s to include everything, and therefore to say nothing, 
p. -p " I an writing this essay, and I am not writing this essay at one and 
the same time", i s a statement which provides us with no cognitive 
information about what I am doing. Communication i s not a necessary 
feature of l i f e : as a matter of conti/gent fact, some human beings communi-
cate by means of verbal language, others don't. Human beings speak to 
each other: pigs, i f they ever communicate with each other at all^only 
squeal. But, i f I wish to make a statement having cognitive content, I 'must 
exclude some pos s i b i l i t i e s . For example, i f I want to indicate, or refer 
to the colour pink, I must exclude green, blue, purple, etc. 
Dr. F. Waismann points out that many valued logics are possible. 
I can grade a statement as 0%, 10$, 50$, 661$, 92$ or 100$ true, rather 
than just true or false. But any such graded set of truth values rests on 
and presupposes two valued logic. This i s because, within the many valued 
systems of logic, no statement can be both 10$ true and 66$ true, or 50$ 
true, and 100$ true, at one and the same time. As J.O. TJrmson puts i t : 
"We might have a multi-valued logic...... so l e t us have a generalised 
law of contradiction. Let us say, 'In an n- valued logic, no propositions 
may have more than n-1 true values'. without i t , the area of 
reference of the statement i s unlimited, and no meaning can be attached to 
i t to do a certain kind of thing, I must follow a certain 
course of procedure. And this i s a logical 'must'; i t i s not l i k e saying 
that to serve good boiled potatoes you must put s a i t on them but 
the fact that we could not do the communicating without rules, does not 
if3 
seem to me to be just an empirical fact." 
I t i s interesting that Barth, as I pointed out earlier «IHTI+JHTI B A 
theological verafgn of the conventionalist theory of necessary truth. 
42. In his papers on "Alternative logics", P.A.B. 19*t6, and i n "Ver i f i a b i l i t y " 
Logic and Language. Vol. I p.117 f f . 
k}. Symposium: "Are necessary truths true by convention"; P.A.S. Sup. 19^7 
pp.115 and 116 
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According to Berth, God has complete freedom and cannot be constrained or 
limited by any human system of thought. God i s therefore not bound by any 
laws of logic: the word of man becomes the Word of God only when, where and 
how God will s i t to do so. There i s no reason why ill-formed formulae 
such as v pq z. or ( ) (pq) p C.v) should not become the Word 
of God, i f God willed that they should. 
Berth seems confused here. I t i s hard to see what he means i n 
saying that God i s absolutely, or completely free. "Truth of revelation 
i s the freely acting God, Himself and quite alone", he writes. The 
word "freedom", l i k e the word "similar" and the word "have", takes on 
different meanings i n different contexts of i t s use. I can have a bank 
balance, have a gramophone record, have a deep prayer l i f e , and have a wife. 
But "have" does not mean the same thing i n these different contexts. I 
don't have a bank balance i n the same way that*I have a wife. "Have" 
does not own a meaning i n isolation: i t only takes on meaning when I state 
in what sense I have something. Likewise two things cannot just be 
"similar": they must be similar in some respect. "Freedom" behaves 
logically i n a li k e manner to "similar" and "have". Freedom i s not a 
thing whioh something has: to be free i s to be free i n respect of something 
else. Jones can be said to be free i n respect of having #aat divorced his 
wife. A convict can be free i n the sense of having just been released 
from prison. But what does Berth mean when he says that God i s free? 
God i s free without any restrictions logical or material. Barth would 
probably retreat at this point and say that God's freedom i s not human 
freedom, and i s not even remotely like i t . But what i s this i n the end 
but to say we don't know whether God i s free or not free? 
Berth's concentration on the utter freedom of God as pure act, leads 
in the direction of a denial of the incarnation, on which he purports to 
lay so much stress. I f God i s absolutely free, and I only know Him 
Vf. Church Dogmatics I . pt. I . , p.16 
51 
insofar as I know His gracious revelation through Jesus Christ, then this 
freedom implies His inability to limit His freedom i n order to perform 
certain tasks. In order to reveal Himself to man at a l l , God must limit 
Himself, in the sense of restricting Himself to one particular course of action 
rather than another* A fortiori, the supreme s e l f limitation of God i s the 
incarnation: surely God i n Christ, once he has committed himself to the 
policy of becoming incarnate to save man, i s bound by his own policy. 
A god who was absolutely free i n his actions i n the sense of being totally 
capricious, would be unintelligible. A pre-condition of understanding i~-
God's actions at a l l , i s that they are to some extent self-consistent: 
that they express statements which are not self-contradictory. I f God 
in His revelation was free i n the sense that His revelations were totally 
qualitatively different one from the other, His actions would be unintel-
l i g i b l e . God would have the same cognitive significance which Plato 
attributes to Heraclitas 1 doctrine of perpetual flux; God would not be 
identifiable as one thing rather than another.•••.He could not even be 
named. "Socrates, since there i s nothing constant here either, - the 
flowing thing does not flow white but changes, so that the very whiteness 
i t s e l f flows and shifts into another colour, i n order that the thing may 
escape the charge of constancy i n that respect..... can we ever give i t 
the name of any colour and be sure that we are naming i t rightly?" 
I am suggesting here that i f revelation i s as 'actual' as Barth asserts, 
then this actuality, i f i t i s to be at a l l i n t e l l i g i b l e presupposes a 
a similarity of structure between the logical form of God's address to man, •+-
and that of man's address to man. This i s far from being a restriction on 
God's freedom; His freedom i s not restricted by His inability to do what 
i s logically nonsense. Further this logical structure common to God and 
man logically could not have been destroyed by the f a l l . I f this 
k5. Theatetus. p.l82 d. 
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annihilation had occurred, we oould.never know about i t or discuss i t , 
because a l l means of communication or coherent thought would have been 
wiped out with i t . 
Barth also wants to deny any autonomy to philosophy at the material 
level, despite himself: I say despite himself because his whole theology 
with i t s emphasis on the contingency of the Word of Qod i n Jesus Christ 
presupposes an ontology: i t i n fact presupposes the logical possibility 
of the contingency of events. The Word of God revealed through Christ 
Jesus i s not part of a whole series of statements, one of which can be 
derived from the other, and i n which singular statements cannot be under-
stood fully, without knowledge of the whole class of statements to which 
i t i s logically related. There are no internal relations between the 
almost atomic acts of the Word of Qod, revealed i n Christ. The l i f e , of 
Jesus Christ i t s e l f i s radically contingent In that Christ as the God-nan 
might have been other than he was and might not have existed at a l l . The 
logical status of the statement, 'Jesus of Nazareth died on Calvary' i s 
the same as 'John Jones i s now writing an essay.' There i s no logical 
contradiction i f either of these statements i s negated. 
This assertion of the radical contingency of certain events i t s e l f 
presupposes a descriptive metaphysic. The logical atomists such as 
Biissell and Wittgenstein, thought that they were doing metaphysics, but 
doing i t better than the Nineteenth Century B r i t i s h Idealists. The 
atomists regarded the world as consisting of atomic facts, which were 
externally but never internally related. Likewise Barth i s doing a sbst 
of descriptive metaphysics In regarding the incarnation of Christ as a 
radically contingent singular event. 
Berth's use of the notion of radical contingency, makes his theologi-
ca l standpoint inconsistent with any metaphysical system which denies the 
possibility of using singular affirmative statements. V.V.O. Quins, i n 
53. 
Methods of Logic and From a logical point of view, does just this when he 
pushes 8088011's theory of descriptions to i t s logical l i m i t s . Quine 
argues that singular statements are unnecessary and superfluous i n a 
language, and can be eliminated by paraphrasing any sentence which contains 
a ff1"g»Vl*** term Into the explicit notation of quantification and truth 
functions. "The whole category of singular terms i s theoretically super-
fluous'' and "there are logical advantages i n thinking of i t as theoretically 
46 
cleared away." She conclusion Quine draws i s that i f a l l singular terms 
are eliminated, " a l l reference to objects of any kind, concrete or abstract, 
i s narrowed down to one specific channels variables of quantification. We 
can s t i l l say anything we l i k e about any one object, but we say i t always 
through the idiom of quantifications "There i s an object X such that 
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and 'every object X i s such that ' 1 1 This elimination of singular 
or particular referring statements implies that reference to God's revela-
tion through Jesus Christ as a unique and contingent event i s logically ^ 
impossible. At this point Berth's theology, and human philosophy seem to 
be standing i n a logical relation: i f Berth's realism i s true, Quine's 
position i s false, and vice versa. 
She consequence of Quine's theory i s peculiar: the problem i s that for 
any given universal term to be comprehended, some g ^ g ^ r term must be 
known ostensiveiy by direct confrontation, and as such some demonstrative 
element must be present i n the language. "Language without y^g" 1*" terms 
would be exclusively Platonic. I t would not be able to dispense with 
singular terms: but the only singular terms would be names of universals. 
We cannot take seriously the ostensible interpretations of symbolic forms of 
language; i . e . 'There i s something which F 1 etc., where F i s a predicate 
of particulars unless the language i s admitted to presuppose the use of 
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sin pilar terms to refer to particulars." 
46. Methods of Logic p.2U 
47. Methods of Logic p.224 
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At the ordinary f i r s t order, level of truth and f a l s i t k , i f Barth wishes 
to stress contingency as he does, this seems to require a metaphysics of a 
r e a l i s t type, even i f of a very sophisticated type* For to say 'X i s a 
contingent proposition' i s to say that i t s truth value depends on what 
happens, and not on some logical necessity or definition. The logical 
atomists produced a verification system, acoording to which the truth value 
of an atomic proposition consisted i n i t s corresponding with the facts. 
There are many di f f i c u l t i e s i n the correspondence theory of truth, not 
least that of specifying exactly what i t i s that i s supposed to correspond 
with what, and also what the relational term 'corresponds' means* Never-
theless, any event, or set of events, such as the l i f e and death of Jesus of 
Nazareth, which i s claimed to be a contingent past event, requires some 
such verification procedure. To assert that Jesus i s at one and the same 
time very man and very God, i s to claim that Jesus i s part of human history 
i n a similar way to that i n which Frederick the Great i s part of History. 
And to be part of history i s to be subject to the same empirical d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of investigation which any other historical research throws up* To deny 
that Christ i s part of human history, i n the sense that his l i f e evades and 
escapes historical d i f f i c u l t i e s of investigation, i s ;i& the end to deny 
that he was very man. I f realism goes, the possibility of God's 
contigent revelation i n Christ goes with i t . 
Berth's mneasiness about allowing philosophy any autonomy i n i t s 
portrayal of the God who we believe became very man, results from his 
failure to take seriously his own doctrine of creation* We may grant, 
that creation as much as the incarnation i s the result of God's grace* 
The doctrine of creation i s not to become the forecourt of the temple 
where Jews and Gentiles may enter freely, the portico, where Natural \, V 4 
theology gets i t s f i r s t idolatrous foothold. But i f , as Barth olaias, 
God i n Jesus Christ i s from eternity within the fellowship of the Trinity 
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the purpose and end of creation, why cannot creation i t s e l f reveal God 
through Christ? I t i s here that Berth's denial that there are any logical 
relations, however tenuous between God and nan, seems to amount to a denial 
of the incarnation* God can save individuals through his revelation i n 
Jesus Christ, but can he, according to Barth, ever save the world? I s not 
Berth's Word of God so much the Word, that i t i s never the Word made flesh? 
God's very willingness to beoome man i s surely a demonstration that He does 
not despise allowing Himself to be limited by the restrictions of the world 
which He created, when He chooses to so limit Himself* 
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C H A P T E H T H R E E 
LEFT-MUG FIDBIBM. A CBITIBOE OF WOM-OOQW33?iyiBM 
1. fonnp»' Epistemology 
(a) The logical nature of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist diapute 
How i s i t possible to decide whether or not the oognitivist or the 
non-cognitivist provides the correct epistemological analysis of religious 
statements? I f the appeal i s made to what prima facie religious 
believers say and do i n their Creeds and their worship, their doctrinal 
systems and their popular apologetic, then the Christian religion would 
seem to be one which makes factual claims at several different levels 
about the nature of God and the person of Christ. 
The dispute i s not as simple as this. I t i s not about what the 
languages of, for example, the major Christian Churches'Volaim about the 
factual or non-factual status of key religious assertions; i t i s rather 
what the correct analysis of religious assertions i s to be, i f they are 
to be genuinely religious. Phillips argues that religious assertions 
are 'sui generis 1, and therefore totally unlike any other statement or 
assertion i n any other language game. For P h i l l i p s , the task of the 
philosophical theologian must be to c l a r i f y the unique nature of theolo-
gical utterances, by cleansing them from the superstitious husks which 
they have caught by being contaminated by non-religious language games. 
Thus despite Phillips claims that he uncovers the 'depth' grammar 
of religious utterances, the cognitiyisl^on-cognitivist dispute i s not 
an empirical disagreement: the question being asked i s not, 'Do religious 
statements or assertions as a matter of fact contain cognitive elements?' 
rather i t i s the question, 'Are statements or assertions which have some 
fact claiming elements, the most appropriate sorts of statements by means 
of which to make religious assertions, to formulate prayers, to write 
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liturgies, to construct dogmatic systems? 1 
The oognltivist^non-cognitivist dispute i s thus a dispute as to what 
sorts of statements or assertions are most appropriate to provide a system 
of projection for the nature of God as described i n say Christian worship, 
prayer and doctrine. Just because the question which Phillips i s attempting 
to handle i s , 'Which system of projection must be used to describe the God 
who i s the most worship worthy?', and not i n the end, 'What language about 
God do ordinary believers usually use?', he pervasively confuses concepts 
and the things concepts refer to. I b i s disease i s one which i s generated 
by the use of the ontologioal argument which attempts to reach reality 
from a concept alone. I t i s hardly surprising that Phillips major 
question (although one which he doesn't see clearly) i s 'Which concept of 
God i s the most worship worthy? (However odd a question this may be). 
Findlay i n his Ontological disproof of God's existence i s like-wise 
obsessed with the problem of the nature of the most worship worthy God. '*** 
The question as to the worship-worthiness of a God i s , not merely 
a factual question. I t can be restated as 'Which god ought I to worship'? 
The cognitivist w i l l obviously answer: The god whose existence i s a 
logical possibility. The non-cognitivlst w i l l answer: The god to which 
specified religious attitudes are the most appropriate. 
But how do I decide which god i s the most worship worthy? The 
attempt to answer this question involves not only the factual quest!on of 
what various concepts of God there are, but also the evaluative question 
of which god ought to be worshipped. However i f this question i s to be 
answered, i t i s clear that the answer w i l l Involve attempts to persuade 
others that a given concept of God i s the best one, and attempts to 
comment lone concept of God rather than another, 
(b) Persuasive definition 
Phillips claims that his methods are strictly, empirical i n that he 
1. Flew and MacMntyre. Hew Essays i n Philosophical Theology. pp.i*7ff 
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i a looking to see how religious language i s actually used and providing 
an "r"* 1 ynl e of this usage. A closer inspection shows that P h i l l i p s 1 
thesis i s not as metaphysically innocent as he would have us believe. 
The t i t l e of the book indicates a nom-«npirical approach. In face of 
the great varieties of different types of prayers i n different religious 
traditions, to suggest that there i s "TOP1 concept of prayer, which i s 
the only genuinely religious type of prayer i s to prejudge the issue. 
The concept of prayer i s a work of metaphysics gone rampant i n that 
Phillips uses an acceptable form of the injunctions 'every statement has 
i t s own logic', and 'don't ask for meaning ask for use', 1A order to 
foist on his reader a highly metaphysical form of these injunctions; 
with the help of the latter he attempts to retain the emotive connotations 
and imagery associations of the word 'Prayer', whilst redefining i t s 
descriptive meaning. Phillips^ programme i s i n fact a massive exercise 
in persuasive definition. 
The weaker form of the 'meaning equals use1 thesis i s that a single ^ 
univocal criterion of meaning cannot be used to appraise the meaning of 
every statement no matter what the context i n which i t i s uttered, with-
out gross distortion of the meaning of those statements which belong to 
a different logical family from the ones which form the model for the 
univocal meaning criterion; e.g. i n Descartes' case such a model was 
the langaage of pure mathematics. In so far as Phil l i p s i s using this 
weaker form of the thesis to c r i t i c i s e flew, Hepburn, and Huns'a univocal 
use of such words as 'exist', 'real','all powerful' etc. he i s quite 
correct i n his objections v 
Phillips also uses the slogans 'every statement has i t s own logic', 
and 'don't ask for meaning ask for use' to make a stronger claim: this 
i s the claim that i f a statement or set of statements, have a use, i f a 
language game i s played, then the reality of the concepts employed i n 
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the language game, are ju s t i f i e d by the fact that the language game i s used. 
Thus he writes: "To say, 'This i s the true God* i s to believe i n Him, and 
worship Him.1,2 Or again Ph i l l i p s endorses Halcolm's statements "In those 
complex systems of thought, those 'language games', Sod has the status of 
a necessary being. who can doubt that? Here we must say with 
3 
Wittgenstein, 'This language game i s played'. 
fiaillips method i n the Concept of prayer i s thus very good meta-
physics: he begins with an ?a p r i o r i ' proof of God's existence. Ghee 
the ontologlcal. argument has shown what God's nature must be l i k e , the 
types of prayer used i n ordinary religious devotion can be redefined so 
that they w i l l be appropriate to what Phil l i p s considers to be the only 
worship worthy concept of God. 
(o) What does P h i l l i p s ' stronger thesis prove? 
The problem about the use of the stronger form of the thesis 'don't 
ask for meaning ask for use', i s that i t tends to prove too much for 
Phil l i p s ' purposes. I f the use of a language game j u s t i f i e s a belief i n 
the reality of the concepts described by the language game, then this 
argument provides an ontdogical proof for the existence of every concept 
used i n any language game. I f the playing of the Hebraic-Christian 
language game j u s t i f i e s belief i n a Christian God, then the same can be 
said for the Hindu God, the Buddhist God or i n the case of Theravada 
Buddhism, the non-existence of God. 
The strong meaning equals usage thesis i s thus metaphysical i n that 
i t demands that the existence of a concept can be conjured out of i t s 
definition i n use. This contrasts with the weak form of the thesis 
which i s an injunction to get away from a univooal theory of meaning, 
whether this be the verification theory, or an essentialist theory such 
as the strongSneaning equals usage* theory. To say i n the weak sense 
2. The Concept of Prayer, p.1^9 
3* The Concept of Prayer. p.l8 
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that meaning equals use i s to recommend a careful investigation of the 
'sitjjf lm leben' of a statement, before deciding i t s meaning. 
The 'a p r i o r i ' character of the strong meaning equals usage thesis 
i s illustrated by Peter Winch both i n 'The idea of a social science and i n 
Understanding i n a Primitive Society. Winch claims that the concept of 
•real i t y 1 , the concept of 'truth*, the concept of 'logic' In a given 
society or universe of discourse i s wholly determined by the language 
game in which these concepts are used. For example, to suppose that 
the modern s c i e n t i f i c outlook has shown Azande witchcraft to be nothing 
but Buperstit^fion, i s to ignore the employment of witchcraft language 
game by the Azande people* The problem which Winch builds round himself 
i s that i f there i s no oommon logical form, no common concept of truth 
and reality which crjSss-cross^and interlocks with a l l the diverse possible 
language games how can different cultures such as those of Modern Western 
society, and that of the Azande tribes ever communicate a t a l l ? Ba.cn 
has i t s own language game, but each game subsists, granted that they have 
no common logical form, i n splendid isolation. 
This 'isolationist' language game theory i s 'a p r i o r i ' because once 
a language game i s seen to be played, the c r i t e r i a of each such games) 
ffa^meani ngfulness and reality*are purely Internal and hence comparative 
culture and comparative religion are logically impossible. As A.K. Louoh 
puts i t * 
"Winch wishes to reject the comparison of Christian baptism with 
other instances of r i t u a l purification. The grounds of his rejection of 
these interesting comparisons are clear enoughs i f he i s to explain 
baptism 'a pr i o r i ' , the r i t e must be deducible from a set of conventions, 
or espoused theory, i . e . Christian theology and r i t u a l . I f the historian 
were to find the roots of Christian baptism i n earlier r i t e s of purifica-
tion, his thesis would entail assertions of temporal, and perhaps causal 
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sequence, which would require empirical research. To say that an action 
i s a convention i s to say among other things that i t i s not idiosyncratic, 
and this i s a truth that can be discovered only by observation. I t i s 
surely not discoverable by lex^graphy or grammar alon^T"1* 
A further problem for the strong ^ meaning equals usage' thesis i s how 
a language game i s to be delimited. I f every statement has i t s own logic 
does this mean, there i s no common logical form between any two statements, 
so that no two statements have any logical relation the one to the other? 
More seriously, i f each language game has c r i t e r i a of truth and reality 
internal to i t s e l f , what grounds are there for dividng language games up 
Into science, religion, aesthetics and so on? Why not divide them further 
into physical soienoe and chemical science, into Catholic and Protestant 
religion, and yet further into Anglican, Methodist and Pentecostalist, 
each with i t s own se l f justifying language game? Where i n faot i s the 
process of division to stop. / 
The strong form of the meaning equals usage thesis also implies that 
belief and understanding are identical, because the reality and truth of 
the belief are claimed to be internal to the belief i n question. I t i s 
hard to see what this assertion amounts to. I t suggests that to believe 
X as.1to understand X and that i t i s logically impossible to believe X and 
not to understand X. Further an unbeliever can never come to understand 
what a Christian believes without becoming a Christian; a Christian can 
never come to understand what the Azandes believe about Witchcraft, without 
coming to believe what they believe. This move therefore gets r i d of 
any problems of verification or falsi f i c a t i o n by a definition; for i f 
belief and understanding are identical, then once I believe X I understand 
that i t i s true and the problems of how I can know a proposition to be true, 
which I f i r s t understand without knowing i t s truth, oannot be raised. 
I t i s easy to see what i t means to say that i n the case of some 
statements belief and understanding are simultaneous; I can understand 
km A. L. Louch. "The very idea of a social science" Inquiry vol. 6. 1963 pp.280 and 283 
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and believe at one and the sane time the statement that I am now typing 
with a black ribbon on white paper. But the fact that my belief and 
understanding are simultaneous i n this instance, does not make them 
identical. I could be deluded about my sitting here typing: I might be 
either dreaming, drunk , or under the influence of drugs. 
This point raises another issue about the stronger thesis: How can 
i t account for illustions and delusions. I f my understanding X and my 
believing X are not merely simultaneous, but are identical, can I ever be 
said to suffer an illusion? Certainly i f this thesis i s correct there 
can be no concept, however open textured of rea l i t y and unreality, of 
truth and falsehood; the concept of rea l i t y and unreality are internal to 
the language game which i s being played, Ph i l l i p s writes: 
"One cannot contrast something called 'hallucinatory prayer* with 
something else called 'normal prayer'• One cannot contrast hallucinatory 
experiences of the Virgin Mary with normal experiences of the Virgin Mary."' 
The internal c r i t e r i a which determine the r e a l i t y or unreality of the 
vision are the compatibility of the vision or prayer with the religious 
tradition i n which the vision or prayer i s claimed to have taken place. 
"One may claim to have had a religiously significant vision, but 
whether the vision has such religious significance i s determined by the 
religion within which the vision i s experienced, or at least, byjthe 
religion which influences the vision."^ ' 
This position oommits Phillips to saying that i f a prayer or vision 
occurs within a given religious tradition, i t i s genuine: i f however the 
prayer or vision does not occur within a religious tradition, i t i s by 
definition not a prayer or not a vision, and hence cannot be an hallucination. 
To say this i s to deny the ordinary use of 'normal1 and 1 hallucinatory*. 
5. Op Ci t . p.33 
6. Phil l i p s Op. o i t . p.36 
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in religious language. Surely some prayers are normal, others odd; 
some visions 'normal', others 'hallucinatory.' A vision of the virgin 
Mary could well be genuine, i f i t was seen by a good Christian i n the 
course of his daily prayers* But surely every vision of the Virgin Mary 
seen by a good Christian i n a sound Christian tradition i s not necessarily 
genuine? I t i s not self-contradictory, as i t must be i f P hillips i s 
correct I n identifying belief and understanding, to say, ' I thought I had 
a vision of the Virgin Mary i n chapel this morning, but i t was really a 
hallucination.' The fact that there i s a language game in which genuine 
visions of the Virgin Mary are described, presupposes c r i t e r i a other than 
that of compatibility with existing traditions for distinguishing genuine and 
non-genaine visions. To say there i s a concept of what i t i s to have a 
vision of the Virgin Mary, implies that the concept of what i t i s to have 
such a vision i s i t s e l f based on what i s taken to be a vision or set of 
visions of what the Virgin Mary really i s l i k e . I f not, then i t i s hard 
to see how the language games of visions of the blessed Urgin ever got 
off the ground. Of course a l l visions of the blessed Sirgin Mary may be 
illusory; the concept may have no re a l i t y . But i f the rea l i t y of the 
concept i s to be taken seriously, i t i s hard to see how the distinction 
between genuine and hallucinatory visions can be ignored. 
Phillips makes a similar definitional victory i n refusing to allow a 
distinction between 'Normal' and 'odd', or 'self-deceiving• acts of prayer. 
He writes: 
"In prayer what i s said can only be said directly to God. This i s an 
analytic statement, since what i s said i s God's language as i t were*"^ 
This statement i s true only i f i t i s made so by definition. Suppose 
someone says, ' I pray every night, but I never pray to God, but to the 
Virgin Mary.' Phil l i p s would presumably reply to such an instance, that 
7. Op. Cl t . p.52 
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may be what i s said at an empirical level i s . what we would normally c a l l a 
prayer, but since i t i s not addressed to Qod, my definition of prayer 
w i l l not allow such an instance to count as prayer. 
F i r s t l y there do seem to be situations i n which i t i s possible to 
say a person has prayed, but has not prayed correctly. In South America 
i t seems to be the case that some naive Soman Catholics regard local saints 
as a substitute for Odd, and they pray to them for particular blessings and 
benefits. These South Americans are not merely asking their saints to 
pray and intercede to God for them, (which i s the Orthodox doctrine of the 
intercession of the Saints), but are making petitions directly. to the saints 
Now an Orthodox Christian may c a l l these prayers superstitious, but i t i s 
not logically self-contradictory as Phi l l i p s argument requires to c a l l them 
prayers. 
Secondly, surely the Orthodox doctrine of the intercession of the 
Saints, i s an example of prayers which are prayers not made to God. The 
Christian prays to a saint, that he may intercede with God en the believer's 
behalf. J.H. Newman i n Tract IC suggests that i n the intercession of the 
saints, God i s continually reminded by the saints of the importance of the 
it 
contingent particularly of the created order. I am unhappy about saying 
that God either can be or needs to be reminded about anything. I think 
that the doctrine of the Intercession of the saints i s designed to stress 
God'8 determination to show his concern for the particularities i n the 
world, despite his omnipotence. I t i s not surprising that Phi l l i p s who 
has no interest i n God's relation to contingent particulars should ignore 
this form of prayer. I f Phillips i s willing to take any notice of the 
'depth' grammar of religious belief at a l l , he cannot deny that this 
language game i s played: i s i t not then a falsifying instance of his claim 
that prayer i s only prayer when i t i s prayed to God? 
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A further consequence of this reduction of understanding to belief, 
i s that our knowledge of God i s restricted to "knowing how". Religious 
kniwledge for Phillips i s not a "knowing that" the world i s of such and 
such a nature, and that i t i s related to God i n such and such a way: 
r&ther i t i s "knowing11 how to play the religious language game, a 
"Knowing how" to pray, and how to pray aright. He writes: 
"To say SThis i s the true God' i s to believe i n Him, and worship 
Him"** 
There are clear examples of people who know how to do something, 
without their being able to explain the 'knowing that' involved. A 
great novelist i s none the les s great.if he i s unable to explain i n 
propositions the method or technique of writing a great novel. Alter-
natively many people can drive a car and know how to handle i t on the 
road, without having the faintest idea of the effect their driving the 
oar has on i t s mechanical parts. 
' r Phill i p s strong meaning equals usage thesis however i s claiming more 
than that many people can know how to pray to God without knowing the 
correct philosophical analysis of the relation of a man who i s praying to 
the God to whom he prays. He i s saying that i f I know how to pray, 
neither I . nor anyone else needs to get worried .about what i t i s to know 
the rules, regulations and theories about God's relation to man i n 
prayer. Just as belief and understanding are identical i n P h i l l i p s , so 
are the "knowing how" and the "knowing that" of prayer. 
This throws light on the way Phillips gets r i d of the possibility 
of the misuse of prayers, and of the possibility of hallucinatory visions; 
I f "knowing how" and "knowing that" are identical, no conceptual 
criticism of a "knowing how" i s possible. But surely "knowing how" i s 
i n the end parasitical for i t s justification on knowing that: I know 
8. Op. c i t . p.1^9 
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that to make my car go faster or slow down, and can take my foot off the 
accelerator and put i t on without thinking about what I am doing when I 
do this. Bpt my knowing how to operate the accelerator presupposes that 
someone knows that depressing the accelerator increases the flow of petrol 
to the engine and BO increases the frequency of the explosions i n the 
cylinders. 
Similarly i n the case of prayer; many Christians know how to pray to 
God! but this presupposes that at least some Christians spend their time 
t.MniHn e about what sort of a God i t i s who i s interested i n our prayers, 
and who cares sufficiently about his creation to l i s t e n to the supplica-
tions of his creatures. 
Phillips allows no account of what we can know about God to be given: 
understanding and belief are identical, so to know God i s not to know 
something about him, but to believe i n him. The question about what sort 
of God i t i s that P h i l l i p s exhorts us to believe i n , i s a question the 
possibility of which i s ruled out by the identification of "knowing how" 
and "knowing that". P h i l l i p s seems to. think that the more unintelligible 
and obscure he makes his concept of God, the more this concept approximates 
to the true God. 
2. Prayer and ordinary language 
The Concept of Prayer claims to be an examination of the ordinary 
use of prayers on their home ground. Phil l i p s i n s i s t s that 'depth1 
grammar reveals that God i s a logically necessary being. A l l religious 
activity must be restricted by the nature of the God towards whom this 
activity i s directed. Berth similarly argues that the nature of dogmatics 
must be determined by the object i t studies ( i . e . God). But Earth's 
God i s free to reveal himself, or to refuse to do so whenever he sees f i t . 
The God conjured into existence by the ontological argument has not got this 
absolute freedom: he i s a logically necessary being, and i n the nature of 
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the ease i s unohangiag and unchangeable. Phi l l i p s refuses to allow any 
type of prayer to be genuine prayer which i t i s not appropriate to offer 
to a logically necessary being: He attempts to reduce a l l types of prayer 
which w i l l not be appropriate to his concept of God, to types which are 
appropriate. Phi l l i p s acoepts prayers of confession and thanksgiving 
as genuine prayers, but subtly changes the meanings these types of prayer 
possess i n ordinary usage. 
Prayers of confession are normally used i n a situation where a person 
or congregation ask God to forgive them for their sins. The believer i s 
then given God's forgiveness, either by a minister, or by his personal 
awareness that God has forgiven him. God alone has the power to forgive 
sins, and his central means of forgiveness was his atoning action through 
Jesus Christ on the cross. The common sense idea of confession i s clearly 
brought out i n the Prayer Book communion service. 
"We earnestly repent, and are heartily sorry for these our misdoings; 
the remembrance of them i s graev/ous unto us; the burden of them i s 
intolerable. Have mercy upon us, have mercy upon us, most merciful 
Bather; for thy Son our Lord Jesus Christ's sake, forgive us a l l that i s 
q 
past; and grant we may ever hereafter serve thee i n newness of l i f e . " 
For Phillips, the forgiveness appropriate to an act of confession 
does not seem to be an act on God's part; i t i s a means of getting to know 
oneself. Thus "in coming to know God one comes to know oneself"^ 
Belief i n God i s a necessary condition of self-understanding, but God i n 
no way participates actively i n this process of self-forgiveness- I t i s 
hard to see how P h i l l i p s attaches any meaning to the opening sentence of 
the traditional Anglican canon of consecration: 
"Almighty God, our heavenly Father, who of they tender mercy didst 
9. 1928 Prayer Book p.3*t6 
10. Op. c i t . p.63 
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give thy only son Jesus Christ to suffer death upon the cross for our 
redemption; wtyo made there (by his one oblation of himself once offered) 
a f u l l perfect sufficient, sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the 
sins of the whole world." 1 1 
Prayers of thanksgiving are also treated i n . a reductionist manner V 
by Ph i l l i p s . A genuine prayer of thankagfejing i s , he asserts, not 
thanking God for this or that, but thanking God for the whole of 
existence. This i s not the ordinary usage of thanksgiving i n prayer as 
12 
i s shown by the general thanksgiving where various features of 
existence are singled out as meriting thanksgiving, but i n particular 
"the redemption of the world by our Lord Jesus, Christ". 
A further problem about this analysis of thanksgiving i s , 'is i t a 
logically possible analysis of the concept?' I t i s clear what I mean by 
the word 'thank' when I thank John for the birthday present.he gave me. 
Similarly, I know how I am using the word 'thank' when I say that I am 
thankful to my parents for being firm with me, and sometimes punishing me 
for my own good, when I was young. But what does i t mean to. say, as 
Phi l l i p s does that I ought to thank God, not for this or that, but for 
everything for the whole of my l i f e ? Both Phillips and J.R. Jones 
suggest that this i s the most appropriate attitude to l i f e ; "For to be 
able profoundly to give thanks for existence i s the same as acceptance of 
the world,, acceptance of l i f e . And this what being happy means - being 
i n agreement with the world".1** The word 'thank' has a clear use when 
used of particular things an the world; but when i t i s applied to the 
world as a whole i t i s pushed beyond the bounds of i t s meaningful use. 
Just as the concept of cause becomes meaningless i f taken from i t s 
application to the relationships between particular events and applied to 
the universe as a whole, likewise a category mistake i s committed i f the 
11. 1928 Prayer Book; 
12. 1928 Prayer Book. p.l^L 
13- "In J.S. Jones "Love as the Perception of meaning." Phi l l i p s : Bsljgion 
and understanding, p. 152 
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word 'thank' i s applied to the universe as a whole rather than particular 
things for which we may be thankful. 
I t i s also hard to know what i t means to say that a person ought to be 
thankful to God no matter what happens to him; I f gratitude i s inapprop-
riate i n a particular situation (.e.g. i f a close relation at the height of 
his career i s dying, of cancer), to i n s i s t that, words of thanks be used to 
describe my response to the situation, i s to I n s i s t that the word 'thanks' 
be used vacuously: i f 'thanks' are appropriate to God no matter whether 
the world treats me justly or unjustly, why describe my attitude as one of 
thankfulness rather than unthankfulness? I f no situation occurs i n which f 
i t i s inappropriate to give thanks, i s i t meaningful to say that a 
situation occurs i n which i t i s appropriate to give thanks? 
Prayers which cannot be offered to a God who i s a logically 
necessary being, P h i l l i p s dismisses as superstitious. "3n the face of 
prayers which do not f i t readily into myc exposition, a l l I can do i s to 
note them and leave i t at that. I do not say that they are not prayers 
(who i s a philosopher to say that?) but simply that I do not understand 
Ik 
what i s involved i n them". 
The most obvious example of prayer which i s inappropriate to a 
logically neoessary being i s petitionary, or intercessory prayer. Ordinary 
language suggests that a large part of our public and private prayer i s 
intercessory: that i s ^ i t asks God to make some change either i n the state 
of a f f a i r s i n the world, or i n the spiritual state of ourselves or of 
others. For example the collect for the Fift h Sunday after Trinity runs: 
"Grant 0 Lord we beseech thee, that the course of this world may be so 
peaceably ordered by thy governance, that thy Church may joyfully serve 
thee in a l l Godly quietness, through Jesus Christ our Lord". Similarly, 
the Collect for the Sunday before Advent runs: " S t i r up, we beseach thee, 
0 Lord, the willsuof thyy faithful people, that they may plenteously 
Ik, Op. c i t . p.8 
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bring forth the fr u i t of good work, and.may of thee be plenteously 
rewarded."1^ As far as private prayers are concerned, I can only speak 
from my own experience, but I do find myself frequently praying for 
specific solutions to specific problems: for peace i n Vietnam, for an end to 
the cold war, for the safe journey of a friend, for a relation i n sickness 
and so on. 
Whatever the prima facie evidence of ordinary language may be 
Phil l i p s thinks that any form of petitionary prayer i s superstitious: to 
be genuinely religious i s to thank God. for everything there i s , whether i t 
i s good or bad. He claims that what we are really doing when we use 
petitionary prayer i s showing God the strength of our desires. "When 
deep religious believers pray for something, they are. not so much asking 
God to bring this about, but in.a way te l l i n g him of the strength of their 
1.6 
desires.'' But i f this i s so, why.has petitionary prayer not died out i n 
sophisticated Christian belief as a primitive superstition? How does 
Phill i p s explain the strength of the persistence of the use of petitionary 
prayer? Further why does he decline to present detailed examples of 
reformulated petitionary prayers i n which for every occurrence of 'Lord, 
w i l l you do X' a form of the statement 'Lord, I feel very strongly about X' 
i s substituted?. But any such move would surely commit a category mistake 
of supposing that a request for an active response i s nothing over and above 
an intense expression of desire? 
God for Phillips i s unchanging and omniscient. I t i s therefore 
impossible to t e l l God anything he doesn't already know. . Further, i f both 
God i s .an unchanging logically necessary being, and he knows everything 
that l a going to happen in the future, i s not the possibility of the 
existence of contingent events i n his creation ruled out? I f God has 
planned from eternity everything that i s going to happen i n the universe 
15. The Book of Common Prayer. Collects for Trinity 5, and the Sunday 
before Advent. 
16. Op. C i t . p.lZL 
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and God's nature i s unchanging what i s the point i n asking far an 
alteration i n the detail of the history of the universe? For a theological 
determinist, part of God's plan could be that people w i l l use petitonary 
prayers at certain points in the plan, and yes or no answers built into 
the course of events w i l l be part of the plan from the beginning. The 
difficulty about petitionary prayer i n this type of metaphpsic i s that 
the petitionary questions and answers are a l l engineered; because of God's 
pre-ordained plan, people have no choice but to ask certain things of God. 
But this i s not genuine asking and answering: part of the meaning of 
saying 'I.ask X' or * I grant X' i s that I needn't have asked i f I hadn't 
wanted to, and that my prayer need not have been answered. 
A remarkable feature of Phillips supposedly empirical analysis i s 
i 
his lack of discussion of the New Testaments notions, of prayer. The one 
quotation he does offer suggests a reference to Christ's words in the 
17 
garden of Gethsemene: "Thy w i l l not Mine be done". ' He goes on to 
suggest that Petitionary prayer i s in the end such a submission to the 
18 
w i l l of God. But here he i s paying attention to the surface grammar 
and not to the depth grammar of Mark. The whole of verse 36 reads 
(R.S.V. text): "And he said, Abba, Father, all.things are possible to 
thee, remove this cup from me; yet not what I w i l l , but what thou w i l t . 
"Christ addresses God not as a being who i s outside participation i n 
human language, or who i s a. being we cannot understand: Christ .as very 
man addresses God as Father, one of the most personal of terms. This 
verse seems to presuppose that had Jesus asked for the removal of the cup, 
for the removal of the necessity for his passion, God could have removed 
i t . What happened, 'how1 things are, was important for God's 
redemption of mankind. 'How' Jesus behaved was a crucial factor i n his 
redemptive action. This verse seems to contradict. Ph i l l i p s whole thesis, 
since the verse presupposes: a) God could have answered Christ's petition 
for the removal of the cup, i f Christ had insisted that he did. b) The 
history of the 'how' of the world depended on Christ's refusal to take 
TT. Mark. Ik : 3b 3 2 
18. Phillips Op. o i t . p.122 
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the easy way out, and not ask for God to deliver him from the passion. 
There i s a strong tendency of would be radical theologies i n both 
the Catholic and Protestant camps, to leave redemption to God and l e t the 
world go to the devil. This i s shown clearly i n P h i l l i p s view that God 
can never be said to act i n the world. God shows himself i n the fact 
that the world exists, not.in 'how' i t exists. P h i l l i p s leaves 
salvation to the naughting, or the s e l f negation of the individual, and 
ignores the importance to God of the social circumstances and obligations 
in which men find themselves. 
3. Religions Bependence 
The naturalistic fallacy i n religion i s the definition of the w i l l of 
God i n terms of natural events or phenomena. To say the world depends on 
God, i s not Phi l l i p s argues, to say that there i s any causal or logical 
relation between the world and God: the relation of the believer to 
God i s 'religious', i n that man loves God and accepts the world by 
continuing to remain faituful to God no matter what happens i n the world. 
"To see the word as God's creation i s to see meaning i n l i f e . This 
meaningfulness remains untouched by e v i l i n the world because i t i s not 
arrived at by inference from i t . " ^ 
P h i l l i p s argues that to say there i s a^ causal relationship between 
God and the world, or to say that there are logical relations between 
statements about God and statements , about the world i s to make belief i n 
God into an experimental hypothesis, or in. the case of Wisdom's H 
technique of connecting and disconnecting into a non-experimental 
20 
hypothesis. Be i n s i s t s that a l l fact claiming statements are some 
form of experimental hypothesis. Therefore to say that there i s any sort 
of logical or causal relationship between God and the world i s to make God 
19. Op. a i t . pp. 97 - 98 
20. Cf. p.2 Phi l l i p s "Wisdom's Gods" Philosophical Quarterly January 1969 
pp.15 
73 
into a hypothetical entity* 
But i s Phillips univooal view of fact claiming statements correct? • 
Are a l l fact claiming statements some type of hypothesis? I think not. 
When I say 'there i s a desk i n my room', I am not stating an experimental 
hypothesis, i n the way i n which I would be doing i f I offered an analysis 
or from any other sorts of entity that there.is a desk i n my room. I f 
I do^when and how do I perform the inference, and why am I never aware of 
making such an inference? I f this possibility i s ruled out, i s my 
belief that there i s a desk i n my room a non-experimental hypothesis? 
No. I t i s not a hypothesis i n any sense of this word. I f my belief 
about my desk i s a hypothesis, then I seem to be committed to saying 
that a l l beliefs about the material world are some sort of hypothesis. 
But the term 'Hypothesis* implies: a) that several similar phenomena 
are being related i n order that their common cause may be explained^ <u*J-
b) "ihat the relation of the phenomena to the common cause i s inferential* 
The desk i n my room i s a particular entity. Further I do not know i t as 
the result of an inference.... I see i t * Therefore I cannot see that 
there i s any ground for saying that my belief about my desk i s a hypothesis 
of any sort* 
Does the belief that the 'how' of the world counts against i t s 
creation by a good omnipotent God make the belief i n thiB God an 
experimental nypothesis? Phillips c r i t i c i s e s Flew, Mitchell and 
Gromble for supposing that e v i l i n the world counts against the existence 
of a good omnipotent God. This i s not surprising since Phillips'God 1B 
a logically necessary being who cannot be said to be related i n any way to 
the contingent particulars of the world. Phillips presses his argument 
by using a fork technique: Belief i n God i s either non-cognitive, or i t 
i s an experimental hypothesis. There i s room for no third al-fceraallxe. 
of the rectilinear propagation of lig h t . Mo not. infer from sense data 
r aau / 
7^ 
Apart from the assertion of his position, Phillips gives no reasons why 
there should not be factual beliefs ABout God which are not hypotheses* 
God, l i k e our perception of a material object i s not inferred from the 
nature of the world. Battier the nature of God and the nature of the world 
illuminate the factual content of each other. 
Hue major defect in Phillips 1 treatment of the possibility of 
cognitive belief, i s his refusal to allow the possibility of informal 
factual beliefs as well as the formal factual.hypothesis. Newman's 
21 
distinction between 'Notional' and 'real' assent i s surely pertinent 
here. Phi l l i p s makes a l l cognitive beliefs 'notional' i n the sense that 
he i n s i s t s they must be some type of hypothesis,, and thus, i f he i s 
consistent he must say that a l l beliefs about the material world are i n 
the form of general propositions, and are formally inferential i n 
character. Newman rightly i n s i s t s that most beliefs held i n ordinary 
l i f e are not so formalised; they are certainly factual, cognitive beliefs, 
but they are beliefs about particular objects and.are the.results of 
'direct' perception, rather than of any formal techniques, 
a) What sort of theodicy does Phillips use? ... 
What sort of alternative theodicy does Phillips non-cognitive belief 
have to offer? He seems to rest on the assumption that any theodicy i s 
more morally revolting than the acceptance of existence of e v i l i n the 
world. He quotes Ivan Earamazov: " I hasten to return my ticket of 
admission. And.indeed i f I am an honest man I'm.hound to hand i t back as 
soon as possible. And this I am doing. I t ' s not God that I do not 
accept, Alyosha. I merely most respectfully return him the t i c k e t . " ^ 
For Phi l l i p s theodicy must be a logically impossible sort of enter-
prise., because he allows no logical or causal relations to exist between 
God and the world. The fact that problems of theodicy arise for the 
21. The Grammar of Assent Ch. k pp. ^9 
22. Dostoevsky: The Brothers Karamazov. Penguin Vol. 1 Pt. I I Bk. ch.4-
p. 287 
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cognitivist he regards as a reason against accepting the cognitivist 
ppsition. 
What i s the cost of isolating the world from God i n this way? I t 
means that to love God i s to accept the world for what i t i s , and to accept 
suffering as the school i n which we learn to accept the world for what i t 
i s , and hence to accept God. "Love of God i s s a c r i f i c i a l ; i t involves 
a denial of the s e l f " ^ Again x "Man has the s p i r i t of God i n him to the 
extent that he negates himself 1 1^ 
ui> flUt i s hard to understand what i t means to say that we must thank God 
for everything, and thus accept what i s , no£ matter what i t i s * Suppose 
that there was much more physical e v i l i n the world than there i s . 
Suppose that each person was so built that he was bom suffering from a 
painful and incurable cancer, which lasted the whole of a person's l i f e . 
Around the age of seventy each person died i n severe pain. Stye only 
thing men could do would be to eat and keep themselves alive. Drugs were 
discovered to relieve the pain, so that men knew for short periods what 
a non-painful existence i s l i k e . But the only type of drugs which w i l l 
relieve the pain are such that i f they are used for more than two weeks 
at a time they act as a catalyst to the pain, and therefore cease to 
relieve i t . What would i t mean to accept God and to thank God for the 
fact that the world i s , i n this sort of situation? 
Phillips seems to ignore the possibility of metaphysical rebellion 
once a non-cognitive epistemology i s adopted. But i f Ivan's rebellion 
against the occurrence of e v i l i n a world supposedly created by a good 
God i s justified, why i s this rebellion not ju s t i f i e d i n the face of the 
same phenomena (the facts of e v i l ) i n a non£oognitivist interpretation of the 
tniverse? Why i s not rebellion as appropriate a response to the God we 
must thank for everything, as to the God who i s i n some way logically or 
23- Qp. c i t . p.100 
2k. Op. c i t . p.101 
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causally related to the world? . 
Phill i p s dismissal of the problem of theodicy i s no less morally 
revolting than the alternatives which he c r i t i c i s e s . Thus he adopts am 
attitude towards the existence of ev i l which might be called 'cosmic ~^ 
Toryism'. He thinks that once e v i l , and the suffering which results from 
i t are viewed aright, not only can we thank Qod for i t , as part of the fact 
that the world i s , but we can learn from what we suffer: the suffering can 
give us spiritual depth. "But suffering can also be used to teach one 
that one i s nothing just because i t does not tempt one to put oneself at 
the centre of one's c o n c e r n . . 
This statement raises two questions: 
F i r s t l y , i s i t true that suffering i s often spiritually beneficial? 
The word 'Suffering' covers a whole cluster of different types of entity 
from physical pain to an emotional and also an intellectual kind of 
suffering. A person i s as often completely crushed and immobilised by 
suffering as he i s spiritually benefited by i t . P h i l l i p s would reply 
that a person who i s crushed by suffering i s dust not religiously mature: 
he has not learnt to accept the world and to love God. But here J ^ i s 
j u st not taking the-phenomena of ev i l and the impulse f e l t , to rebel 
against i t seriously. After reaching a certain intensity, both ph^Lcal 
and mental suffering would seem to prevent any sort of thankfulness. 
Could a person being tortured day by day i n Auschwitz thank Qod for the 
fact that the world i s ? Surely many of the people who had to l i v e and 
fufftr i n concentration; camps were so affected by i t that existence lost 
a l l meaning: the meaning of the 'that' of existence. Even at a more 
ordinary level, suffering over something l i k e the death of a wife or 
husband, oan crush a person for years. To say, 'Your wife i s dead, 
l e t ' s thank Qod for i t ' , seems perverse. I f God understands human beings 
in their oreaturely state at a l l , he surely understands the appropriateness 
25m Op. c i t . p.K>2 
of sorrow at the loss of a loved wife or husband. Consider Jesus weeping 
before the raising of Lazarus, or at the thought of the future destruction 
of Jerusalem. 
Secondly, i s i t true for a Christian that man i s nothing? The 
doctrine of creation does or i s sometimes thought to imply that God created 
man ex nibile, but this does not mean that man when he i s created i s also 
nothing. Han once he i s created by God i s something, and has values and 
rights which make his act of rebellion against the fact of ev i l a 
possibility. Phillips' analysis allows man no autonomy: i f man i s 
nothing, i f man's ethical and social values are an unworthy substitute for 
direct obedience to the w i l l of God, then the world and the creatures i n i t 
seem to have no value i n their own right. The world, to quote the late 
Professor C.E. Raven i s a stage set for the. drama of redemption i n which the 
redemption i s a l l that matters, and the people, and creation as Buch are 
"What i s man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou 
him with glory and worship. 
The analysis of e v i l which Phillips provides removes man's actions 
from the sphere of responsibility: to say that man depends on God in the 
sense that man must completely negate himself, and obey God blindly, i s i n 
the l a s t resort to say that man has no obligationto try to alleviate 
suffering and to freely choose to obey the moral beliefs which he imposes 
on himself. Moral and spiritual responsibility presuppose a freedom which 
i s an impossibility i f the s e l f I s negated, and Qod i s obeyed, whatever 
God's w i l l may be. But may not man within the autonomous sphere of his own 
systems of moral and social values be under a moral obligation to try to 
improve the social conditions and therefore the 'how' of the world. Does 
not Christ's command to love your neighbour as yourself, entail an 
obligation to alleviate human suffering as much as ppssible? 
merely a means to the redemptive end. Phillips seems to deny the psalmist: 
v i s i t e s t him. Thou created him a l i t t l e lower than the angels to crown 
,,26 
26. Ps. 8 Prayer Book text 
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The concept of Prayer seems to suggest that the more suffering there i s , 
the more healthy the state of religion w i l l be, because then people w i l l be 
forced by circumstances to learn to negate themselves, and to love Qod i n 
and through suffering. A welfare state, which i s designed to reduce the 
amount of physical suffering through a.national health scheme, a sickness 
benefit scheme, an unemployment scheme, a pensions scheme, a mental health 
scheme, and so on, i s prima facie unacceptable to this type of cosmic Toryism. 
Phillips'position i s rather l i k e that taken by Bultmann in his essay, 'The 
significance of the idea of freedom in Western c i v i l i s a t i o n ' He claims 
that the p o l i t i c a l and social development of the present " i s everywhere 
l i k e an impending doom on Western c i v i l i s a t i o n , cultural l i f e being more 
and more subjected to organisation, while the state becomes more and more 
estranged from i t s original and real task of being a constitutional state, 
becoming a Kulturstaat, and a welfare state.•••• where mutual relationship 
i s regulated through organisation, trust ceases to be the bond between man 
and man. Where the sight of suffering i s taken away by the removal of the 
sufferers, the poor and the i l l from their families, and from the public, 
the feeling of security of living i s speciously brought before one, and the 
consideration of l i f e ' s actual insecurity and.exposure to threats i s 
glossed over Like gratitude, resignation, suffering, the power of 
enduring disappears.too. Modern man with his supposed legal claim to the 
good things of l i f e , feels need and suffering to be an injustice and rebels 
instead of submitting. The b l i s s f u l power of suffering to bring man to 
himself this power which Stoicism and Christianity both knew.... i s 
no longer experienced." 2^ 
Suffering and any unstable social order which fosters i t must be 
preserved i n order to promote a successful and prosperous ecclesiastical 
structure!ii The only reply to this i s that i f the price of having 
Christianity i n society i s unnecessary suffering and Injustice, this opium 
27- Essays Philosophical and Theological, p.315 f f . 
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of the people must be put to sleep at once. 
I t follows from Phillips account of e v i l that the individual must 
submit himself humbly before God, and in loving God accept whatever happens 
in the world. She danger i n the concept of humility which Phillips 
presupposes, i s that i t i s a.very ambignous concept. The danger i n 
saying "Be humble before God, and accept any suffering that comes i n love 
and trust" i s that this form of humility may be disguised aggression. An 
example of this from recent Anglican Ecclesiastical History i s the Bishop's 
of Leicester's (Dr. B.B. William's) comments on the Guildford a f f a i r . The 
circumstances of this incident are s t i l l not clear: Boltonrhaiizbeeit-PPGVOst i 
c&eatf*' Bolton had been Provost of Guildford before and during the building 
of the new Cathedral. He seems to have had certain defects i n the sense 
that he was a f a i r l y weak-willed person, and somewhat prone to spread 
gossip about the brightness of his own prospects. There are some reasons 
to believe that he was i n i t i a l l y offered the job as Dean of the New Cathedral. 
There seem also to be reasons to believe that he was unpopular with the 
local property owners and upper middle classes, because he condemned a l l 
forms of blood sports. Eventually the then Primate, Lord Usher, 
offered the Post to someone else. Protests occurred and the scandal got 
into the national press. The Bishop of Leicester then wrote a letter to 
a Sunday Newspaper stating that i t was a great pity that the closing years 
of Archbishop Fisher's primacy should be clouded by a petty squabble over 
Church Appointments. God works in.a mysterious way, and doubtless in the 
case of ecclesiastical appointments, God's w i l l i s done no matter what 
injustices are involved. Ve should therefore aooept God's w i l l i n humility. 
Here the notion of humility i s being used to cover a pernicious form 
of conservative aggression. I t i s almost a declaration of the 
i n f a l l i b i l i t y of the method of Anglican ecclestical appointments. 
8o. 
Human beings, including clergymen, axe i n the f i r s t instance responsible 
for any uncertainties and injustices which occur in Church appointments. 
God, however hard he t r i e s , cannot make injustice into justice. He may 
already have fitted the injustice into his.purpose for the world, but i t 
i s fitted into the purpose as an injustice, and never ceases to be thi s . 
Those who see the injustice for what i t i s , commit a sin against the Holy 
Ghost i f they refuse to condemn i t for what i t i s . Humility before the 
purported w i l l of God i s no substitute for that humility which i s willing 
to see and condemn injustice, no matter what the cost to the person who 
has to do the condemning. As D.H. MackLnnon has said: "What made the 
circumstances surrounding the appointment of the f i r s t Dean of the New 
of publicity which Bentham rightly discerned as the very atmosphere of 
just dealing. Justice may have been done: but i t remains unfortunately 
true that i t has not been seen to have been done except by the minority 
'in the know' and those who find themselves able to accept their actions 
without question"^ 
b) I s there a satisfactory Theodicy? 
I have tried to show in the above argument that P h i l l i p s ' acceptance 
of e v i l and his denial of the need for a theodicy i s a naive and unacceptable 
attempt to get round the problem of e v i l . . But i s the acceptance of what 
has traditonally been called the problem of e v i l , and an attempt to solve 
i t in any sense a more satisfactory move? 
I do not think the problem of e v i l can be solved in the sense that a 
reason can be given for any and every occurrence of an e v i l . A perfect 
theodicy explains the reason for every e v i l i n the world: but i f there 
i s a good reason for every e v i l in the world, then we cannot but end u§ 
with the claim that the world i s the best of a l l possible worlds, i n the 
way Leibnitz did. But the fact that we are constrained by the existence 
T1 Cathe at Guildford scandalous, was precisely the absence of the sort 
28. 'Justice': Reprinted i n the 'Borderlands of Theology! p.148 
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of evil to attempt the theodicy, indicates that this world i s not the best 
of a l l possible worlds. I f the phrase 'the best of a l l possible worlds' 
means anything, presumably i t means that, world i n which the possibility of 
e v i l exists, but i n which there i s no need for a theodicy. 
Phillips i s correct i n seeing that what has traditionally been called 
'the problem of e v i l ' presents one of the greatest obstacles to belief i n 
a Christian God. Philosophical discussions of this problem have been 
re-opened by A.G.N. Jl e w ^ and J.L. MackLe^0 Discussion of these papers 
i s important at this point, because they both represent a f a i r l y c l a s s i c a l 
positivist critique of religious language.; also both Slew and Mackie 
regard religious belief as some sort of.explanatory hypothesis, the view 
which Phillips discusses and c r i t i c i s e s . 
Flew and Mackie both present a jazzed up version of Hume's statement 
of the problem of e v i l (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Parts I and 
X I ) . The charge against. theism i s that the statements 'God exists and i s 
a l l go^ L and a l l powerful', and 'evil exists i n something he creates' are 
logically incompatible. 
"There i s no view of human l i f e , or of the condition of mankind from 
which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, 
or learn that infini t e benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and 
infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone."**1 
The objection to theism i s more, fundamental than the objection that none 
of the arguments for God's existence i s valid; a conclusion may be true 
even i f the arguments put forward to support i t are invalid, or the 
premises false. I f i t can be shown that the terms of the concept 
involved in the conclusion are logically s e l f contradictory, then no 
argument can ever support this conclusion. "God i s omnipotent; God i s 
wholly good; and yet e v i l exists. There seems to be some contradition 
29. In 'Divine omnipotence, and human freedom' Reprinted in New Essays i n 
Philosophical Theology, pp.lVf f f ' 
30. In 'Evil and Omnipotence' reprinted i n Pike! God and E v i l . pp. Miff 
31. Dialogues. Pt. X N.Kemp-Smith ed. p.202 
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between these three porpomitions, so that i f any two of them are true 
the third would be false. But at the same time a l l three are essential 
parts of most theological positions; the theologian, i t seems, at onee 
must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to a l l tbree"^ Hackle's 
claim i s that 'God i s omnipotent'/God i s a l l good' and 'evil exists i n 
the world' are, i f taken together, logically inconsistent, and this 
logical inconsistency can only be eliminated, either by denying one of 
the three propositions, or by shifting the ordinary meaning of the words 
contained i n them. I w i l l try to show that i f the terms omnipotence, 
goodness, and e v i l are analysed, the Christian concept of God can be shown 
to be logically self-consistent, although whether such a concept refers 
to an existent entity w i l l remain an open question, 
i ) God i s Omnipotent 
Hackle outlines what he considers to be the paradox of omnipotence. 
Thisj&rises from asking the question, "Can an omnipotent being make things 
which i t cannot subsequently control?", and "Can an omnipotent being make 
rules which then bind himself? I f an omnipotent being can make rules 
which then bind himself, the rules once made, reduce the omnipotent being 
to impotence i n relation to the rules. I f an omnipotent being cannot 
make rules which then bind himself, the omnipotaBt being i s not really 
omnipotent, for there i s at least one thing which he cannot do. Mackie 
suggests that the paradox i s cla r i f i e d by distinguishing f i r s t order 
.omnipotence (omnipotence I ) which i s the unlimited power to act, and 
second order omnipotence (omnipotence I I ) which i s the unlimited power 
to determine what powers to act certain things shall have. Mackie 
thinks that i f Omnipotence I , then nothing can act independently of God; 
but i f omnipotence I I , then God no longer possess omnipotence I . 
There i s thus an ambiguity in the notion of omnipotence: do we mean 
when we say God i s omnipotent that he can do anything whatever.... that 
32. Op. c i t . p.4-7 
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liis power I s totally unlimited. I f so then God can create male bitches, 
female husbands and round squares. But can even God do what i s logically 
impossible? Are we to say: a) God's inability to do what i s logically 
impossible limits his omnipotence, or b) that to be limited by what i s 
logically impossible i s not to be limited at a l l ? Hackie seems to think 
that God's inability to do what i s logically impossible limits God's 
omnipotence. "Ibis account of logic" i . e . (that God creates the laws of 
logic) i s clearly inconsistent with the view that God i s bound by logical 
33 
necessities unless i t i s possible for an omnipotent being to bind himself" 
Hackie seems to be working on a very crude model: he seems to assume that 
God exists for a time omnipotently, and absolutely independently of the 
laws of logic, and then decides to limit this omnipotence by creating 
logical laws. But the concept of God, or anything else existing i s imposs-
ible unless the laws of logic are presupposed. I f God existed for a 
time t before he created the laws of logic, then he could equally meaning-
fully be said to have hot existed for this period, or to have spent the 
time drawing square c i r c l e s . But to say God i s limited because any 
meaningful description of him presupposes logical limits, i s not necessarily 
to say that he i s limited at a l l . I f God were absolutely unlimited, he 
would be able to do and to be anything and everything; perfectly good and 
perfectly e v i l a l l the time; existent and non-existent a l l the time etc. 
But a being of such an unlimited nature, i s not this rather than that, and 
hence i s not anything. 
I wish to argue that by saying God i s omnipotent, I am saying not that 
God's nature and power are absolutely unlimited, but that God's nature i s 
such that the properties he does possess, are unlimited. Donald Hudson 
puts forward a similar view to this in "An attempt to defend Theism" 
"The all-power attributed to.God i s invariably a l l power in goodness. This 
i s a qualified sort of power, and one's conception of i t w i l l be determined 
33. Pike Op. Git. p.50 
by what one takes to be the highest good. Suppose.one takes that to be 
love. Then the a l l power which one claims for God, w i l l be the capacity 
to go on loving through a l l rejection and opposition. The claim w i l l be 
that nothing diminishes or destroys this love. The contention w i l l not be 
that God i s two distinct things viz., loving and powerful but that his 
love i s his power. 
I think that Hudson's point can be put more effectively, i f i t i s 
stated more formally. Power i s a predicate of a logically different type 
from predicates such as 'love', 'hatred', 'size'{quickness' and so on. 
To say something or someone i s powerful i s to say that they or i t are 
powerful i n respect of something. Thus the American army i s powerful 
in respect of the number of ground to a i r guided missiles which i t has 
i n readiness. Harold Wilson i s powerful i n respect of his office as ^ 
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Prime Minister. Cassius Clay i s powerful in respect of his size and 
physique. God i s powerful i n respect of being a l l loving, a l l merciful, 
completely just and so on. "Powerfulness" i s thus a second order 
predicate i n that i t states a quality of f i r s t order predicates. 
Hackle supposes that omnipotence i s predicated of God and then God being 
a l l powerful decides , which qualities from a l i s t of predicates he w i l l 
attribute to himself. Thus Maokie assumes that God i s a l l powerful i n 
respect of being able to attribute to himself any properties he l i k e s . 
But theism has never claimed God possesses this property. Hackle's 
paradox of omnipotence i s based.on a category mistake of supposing that 
power i s attributable to a person or thing in the same sense as the 
predicates i n respect of which the person or thing i s said to be powerful, 
i i ) God i s a l l good 
Hansel i n The limits of religious thought claimed that the fact 
evi l s occur " are reconollable we know not how,, with the infinite goodness 
54. Philosophy: January, 1964 
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of God, but which certainly are not to be explained on the supposition 
that i t s sole and sufficient type i s to be found in the finite goodness 
35 
of man."'' Hansel i s saying that the term 'good' has a different meaning 
when applied to God, that "in -imninc i t has i n ordinary use. In a 
similar way Phillips by stating that God does not participate in human 
language and that his w i l l cannot be questioned by a genuine believer, 
but only obeyed, i s saying that God in the end i s not really good: at 
least not i n any sense i n which we ordinarily use the word 'good'. J.S. 
H i l l said that "To say that God's goodness may be different i n kind from 
man's goodness, what i s i t but saying, with a slight change of phraseology, 
that God may possibly not be good?v.... I w i l l c a l l not being good, who 
i s not what I mean when I apply the epithet to my fellow creatures; i f 
such a being can sentence me to h e l l for not so calling him to h e l l I 
w i l l go." 5 6 
Thus to say God i s good, i s presumably to say that God i s good in 
an analogous sense to the sense i n which we can Bay that man i s good, 
but whereas God i s perfectly good, man i s at the best imperfectly good, 
i i i ) E v i l exists in the world God had created: 
The problem of e v i l can easily be solved by denying that e v i l exists. 
This can be done by claiming that e v i l i s only an appearance, which i s 
not 'real' i f the universe i s viewed as a whole, but seems real when 
part of the universe i s viewed independently of the whole. Phillips 
takes up a position very close to this by saying e v i l i s the ground for 
metaphysical rebellion i f the creator of the world i s inferred from his 
creation, but that i f we adopt a genuinely religious attitude we can 
meekly accept the evil.that there i s , and offer God thanks as much for the 
good things we reoeive, as for the evils we suffer. I s not this i n the 
end to say that e v i l i s not. r e a l for the religious believer? I do not 
35* Quoted in Pike, Op. o i t . p.4l 
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see how such a position can be held by anyone who takes their experience 
seriously. I f someone dying slowly of cancer i s not an example of e v i l , can 
the words " e v i l " and "good" have any meaning at a l l ? 
But i f God i s omnipotent and a l l good, and e v i l i s real, why i s there 
evil? I w i l l r e s t r i c t my discussion of this problem to what has been called 
the free-will defence, because i t i s at this point that the empiricist 
attaok of both Mackie and Flew has been directed. 
The free w i l l defence claims to explain the existence of moral e v i l i n 
a world created by an omnipotent a l l good God, by asserting that God gave a l l 
men free w i l l to choose between good and e v i l . Some men some times, and most 
men occasionally choose e v i l rather than good, but a world containing free 
moral agents and some e v i l , i s a better world than a world containing mere 
automata, beings who always do what i s right because God has so made them that 
they could not but perform actions which happen to be right. Mackie restates 
the case: "To explain why a wholly .good God gave men free w i l l although i t 
would lead to some important ev i l s , i t must be argued that i t i s better onthe 
whole that men should act freely, and some time err, than that they should be 
inocent automata acting-rightly i n a wholly determined- way."^ 
This defence i s sound i f : (a) What G.E. Moore called the theory of 
Organic Wholes i s an acceptable theory. (b) In order to be genuinely free 
moral agents, some men may abuse their freedom and act immorally. 
The theory of organic wholes does seem a plausible theory: there do seem 
to be instances of the value of a whole being greater than.the value of i t s 
constituent parts. The value of the parts may be neutral, or i n fact 
negative, but the value of the whole positive. Moore claims: "To be 
conscious of a beautiful object i s a thing of great intr i n s i c value; whereas 
the same object, i f no one be conscious of i t , has certainly comparatively 
l i t t l e value, and i s commonly held to have none at a l l . " ^ In the case of 
an organic whole, i t cannot be argued that a part i s of greater value than 
37. Pike- Op. c i t . p. 53-56 
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the whole: the positive value of the positive parts alone may be les s than the 
positive value of the whole containing the parts of negative value. The 
existence of the part of negative value, may be a logically necessary condition 
of the whole possessing the value i t does possess. To quote Wisdom's example: 
" I t i s not claimed merely that love i s sometimes caused by pain, but that 
sometimes a case of love contains pain and moral e v i l as an object and i s thus 
logically dependent upon that pain. I t i s claimed further that sometimes 
such a case of love i s good enough as a whole to compensate for the e v i l i t 
39 
contains." I t thus seems to be a logical possibility that moral autonomy 
plus some e v i l , i s better as a whole than moral theonomy plus no e v i l . 
The ELew-Mackie attack on the free w i l l defence consists in the 
assertion of tke theses: the compatibility thesis and the Utopia thesis. 
The compatibility thesis states that there is.no contradiction i n saying 
that a human action i s both predictable and caused, and yet at the same time 
the action was performed freely by the agent. Flew "demonstrates" the 
existence of free acts by means of his 'paradigm case argument'. 'Words which 
have no ordinary usage such as 'act freely,' 'free w i l l ' 'could have done 
otherwise', are taught ostensively by pointing to a given action which exempli-
f i e s a free act and hence unless at least one example of a free act occurs, 
the phrase could never have been taught ostensively, and therefore could not 
have got built into ordinary language. Slew believes that the term 'free-
w i l l ' has a referent, but what exactly i s this? He.asserts that a free act 
i s not an action which i s uncaused, or unpredictable, but an action which i s 
not externally compelled or constrained. "To say that Murdo was free to ask 
whichever eligible g i r l of his acquaintance he wanted, and that he chose to 
ask, was accepted by, and has now married Mairi of his own free w i l l , i s not 
to say that his actions and choices were uncaused or i n principle unpredictable 
but precisely and only that being of an age to know his own mind, he did what 
he did and rejected the possible alternative oourses of action without being 
39. "God and E v i l " Mind 1935 P-l^ 
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under any pressure to act i n this way." 
The Utopia thesis claims that i t i s logically possible that God might 
have created free moral agents who as a matter of fact always freely choose the 
morally right action. Thus Hackle " I f God has made men such that i n their 
free choices they sometimes prefer what i s good and sometimes what i s e v i l , 
why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good? 
I f there i s no logical impossibility of man's freely choosing the good on one, 
or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility i n his freely 
choosing the good on every occasion." 
One attempt to reply to the Flev-Mackie attack which I find wholly 
unsatisfactory i s that of John Hick i n 'Evil and the Qod of Love'. Hick 
grants most of the ELew-Mackie case: i t i s logically possible that God could 
create free moral agents who always freely choose to do what i s morally right. 
He writes: "So long as we think of God's purpose for man as Mackie does, 
exclusively in terms of man's performance i n relation to his fellows, as a 
moral agent within a human society, there i s no contradition in the idea of 
God's so making human beings that they w i l l always freely act rightly." 
But there i s the further question about men's relationship to God. I s i t 
logically possible for God so to make men that they w i l l freely respond to 
him i n love and trust? In the text of the f i r s t edition of E v i l and the God 
of love. Hick claims that i t i s logically impossible for God to cause man 
freely to respond to himself i n love and trust. He quotes with approval: 
" I t i s logically impossible for God to obtain your love - unforced - by -
anything - outside - you and yet himself force i t " . J In conversation over 
this passage Hick once assured me that he did not really , mean this was a 
logical impossibility. But i f this isn't what he means, I just don't know 
what sort of Impossibility he i s talking about. 
kO* New Essays. Bp. c i t . pp.1^9 - 150 
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I f Slew's analysis of free-will i s correct, I don't think that the Hick 
line w i l l work. I f in aniiordinary human situation a free action i s one 
that i s caused and predictable, but not externally constrained, why i s this 
not so in the case of my freedom before God? I f a free action i s an action 
which i s caused, and yet not constrained, surely God could cause his 
creatures freely to respond to him in love and trust, and the action of the 
creatures would be £»ee, provided the causal mechanism was not some kind of 
external constraint. Hick ought to be consistent: he ought either to 
reject Slew's analysis of freedom, i n the cases of both man's moral relation 
to his fellow men and his relation to God) or i t he i s going to accept 
Slew's analysis, he must admit that God could cause man freely to respond 
to himself i n love and trust. 
I think that the best way to handle the flew Mackie attack i s to deny 
their central claim outright. I t i s just not the case that i t i s logically 
possible that God could create free moral agents whom he caused always to 
act morally. Slew claims that just as a young married couple's marriage 
was a free action, because although caused, i t was not constrained, i n a like 
manner, a l l men could freely act morally, and yet be caused by God so to act. 
Slew has defined free w i l l in terms of a certain type of causality: this leads 
to a necessity to distinguish different types of causes. There i s a qualita-
tive difference between (a) Cause I : an event or action which i s caused, yet 
not constrained to happen; and (b) Cause I I an event or action which i s 
caused and constrained to happen. Compare two types of marriages. In the 
f i r s t two people f a l l i n love. The man proposes to the woman. The woman 
thinks about i t , hesitates, and finally acoepts. After a few months of 
engagement they marry. The causes of this marriage w i l l be diverse: their 
love for each other; the social strata i n which they l i v e and were brought up; 
parental lik e s and dislikes. Whatever the causes however, we wish to say in 
a case such as this that either the man or the woman could have done otherwise 
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at any point in the proceedings: the g i r l could have returned her fiancee's 
ring: the man could have refused to day ' I w i l l ' at the marriage service. 
In the second, a ohap makes his g i r l friend pregnant, and their parents 
belonging to a respectable upper middle class stratum of society force the man 
and woman to marry, even to the point of frog-marching them to the registry 
office. In this case the two people were constrained to marry each other. 
With the internal and external family pressures they could not have done other 
than they did. To deny the distinction between these two cases/ i s to go i n 
for a rigid determinism. 
The trouble i s Flew wants to have his cake and eat i t . God must be 
causally related to his creatures in the second sense, i f the creatures are to 
be i n such a situation that they cannot but^o freely what are morally good 
actions. But i f Flew wants to say that God causes his creatures always to do 
freely morally right action in sense one of my analysis, then this type of 
causality i s not strong enough to get Slew's argument working. Human beings 
actions are a l l caused i n some sense, yes, and they are i n some sense caused 
by God who i s their creator. But they are caused i n such a way that the human 
beings concerned could have chosen to act in other ways than they did, i f they 
had wished to do so. I f Flew denies this in the case of God, surely he has to 
say i n case one of the two married people, that they could have not done other 
than they did, but this i s to slide into sense I I of the notion of cause. A 
rigid form of determinism, may be the correct analysis of our supposed free 
action; but this i s not the analysis FLew intends to offer of the relation 
between Murdo and Mairi. FLew's case gains any plausibility i t may have from 
his interchanging the two sense of 'cause1 which I have outlined at any point 
wtyich suits his convenience. 
I am not suggesting that "whatever i s freely done must be sometimes not 
done: the power freely to choose the good presupposes the power to choose the 
bad, and this requires that the bad should sometimes be chosen." God could 
kj> J.L. MackLe: Theism and Utopia. Philosophy 1961 
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have created free moral agents who as a matter of fact always choose to do 
what I s morally right. I t I s logically possible that man might not have + 
fallen. Whether or not the free moral agents God has created do i n fact 
always act morally correctly i s up to the moral agents i n question, and not 
up to God. 
km Ethics and autonomy 
Phill i p s condemns the naturalisitic fallacy i n religion, which i s 
committed when God's w i l l i s defined i n terms of how the world i s . He i s 
only too keen, however, to commit^he naturalistic fallacy i n ethics, by making 
the re a l and the true ethic consist i n obedience to God's w i l l . "God's 
Mt-commands cannot become of secondary importance without being abandoned" 
Phillips makes ethical values internally related to the concept of God. The 
ontological proof of God requires that everything we know of God i s derived 
from the definition of this concept, and i s not arrived at from experience. 
He writes: "To understand then what i s meant by the religious conception of 
4-5 
duty, one must understand what i t means to believe i n God.1' 
(a) The problem of ethical autonomy 
" I f 'holiness' and 'what i s dear to the gods'meant exactly the same, 
then, since holiness was loved because i t was holy, what i s dear to the gods 
would have been loved because i t was dear, and holiness would have been holy 
because i t was loved. But... the contrary i s the case and the two things 
are entirely distinct. One i s loveable because i t i s loved, the other i s 
loved because i t i s loveable.•• When I asked what holiness was, you did not 
choose to show me i t s real nature. You could only t e l l me something that 
happens to i t ; and that was that i t i s loved by the gods: what i t i s i n 
i t s e l f you have not told me y e t " ^ 
Plato saw clearly the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n trying to discern the relation, i f 
there i s one, between theological statements and ethical assertions. What 
kkm 'Moral and religious conceptions of dtuy: an analysis.' Religion and 
Understanding, p.197 
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do we mean when we predicate goodness of God? Are we obliged to obey God's 
w i l l because he, the omnipotent sovereign w i l l s that we behave i n certain ways, 
or because what God w i l l s i s as a matter of fact good? I f what God w i l l s i s 
good because he w i l l s i t , then the statement 'what.God wi l l s i s good' means 
no more than 'what God w i l l s i s what God w i l l s ' . . . . a tautology devoid of 
ethical content. But i f God w i l l s what i s good because i t 1B good, then 
there must be some standard which i s independent of God's w i l l , i n virtue of 
which what he w i l l s i s good. Thus God ceases to be an omnipotent sovereign. 
(b) God omnipotent! but amoral 
One way out of the dilemma i s to adopt what might be called a 'naturalist' 
position. That i s goodness may be identified with one of God's properties, 
in a ^ .milarNyway/ tojiwhich a u t i l i t a r i a n might claim that goodnessbnd pleasure 
are identical. I t i s thus possible to claim that what God w i l l s i s good 
because He w i l l s i t : goodness i s therefore identified with what God w i l l s . 
I f this position i s carefully stated, i t can side-step what has been called 
the argument from t r i v i a l i s a t i o n . Granted that i f goodness i s identical 
with what God w i l l s , then the question, 'Is what God w i l l s good?' i s 
reducible to the question, 'Does"God w i l l what He w i l l s ? - ' ~ But does i t 
if? 
follow, as for example G.E. Moore would argue that the question, 'Is what 
God w i l l s good?' i s therefore a pointless question? I f a Theologian already '. 
holds this position, the question i s for him t r i v i a l ; but there are many 
people, including myself, who have not yet realised that goodness i s what God 
wills i s true by definiition, and the putting of such a question, or the 
assertion of an analogous statement, would be necessary to bring home to such 
people the fact that goodness i s what God w i l l s . Farther, the question, 
'Is what God w i l l s good?', i s significant i n the sense that i t can be used as 
a test or criterion of the definition 'Goodness i s what God w i l l s ' . A hard 
headed 'naturalist' theologian could claim, that what God wi l l s i s good i s 
not s t r i c t l y speaking an ethical statement, but a method of indicating what 
^7. In Principia Ethica 
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study i s to go under the name of ethics. •• i n fact this becomes the study of 
what God w i l l s , without any claim, that what God wi l l s has any goodness beyond 
being what he w i l l s . This amounts to the claim that there are no qualities 
over and above the w i l l of God to which the word 'good' can be applied. 
Perhaps the term ethics might be replaced by the term 'theodics'? 
Hobbes holds that God, l i k e a c i v i l sovereign, has the right to treat his 
creatures, or subjects i n any way he pleases, provided he possesses the power 
I-
to do so. He was convinced of God's i r r e s i s t i b l e power •hich gave 
sovereignty over a l l men, and the unquestionable right to use them as a means 
to any end he chooses. He attempts to reduce moral obligation to a form of 
po l i t i c a l obligation: God i s pictured as a c i v i l sovereign, but with unlimited, 
instead of limited power, with which to enforce his commands. For Hobbes to 
say what God w i l l s i s good, i s to assert that God has the power to enforce any 
command he w i l l s . I f God decided that murder, rape and incest were good 
from k a.m. tomorrow, these actions would become good at the specified time, 
provided God wi l l s that they should. But i f i n saying that God i s good, we 
do not mean that Tom i s good when we predicate goodness of him, do we mean 
anything at a l l ? To say that whatever God w i l l s i s godd, i n the end amounts 
to saying God i s not really good at a l l . Hobbes agrees: "for i n the 
attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of the 
philosophical truth: the the signification of pious intention, to do him the 
greatest honour we are able" In one passage he writes "Our faith consisteth 
not i n our opinion, but i n our submission.•• for the nature of God i s incom-
prehensible: that i s to say, we understand nothing of what he i s , but only 
that he i s . " * 
Hobbes gives scriptural support to his case, by a superficial exegesis of 
carefully selected passages from the Bible. In particular Romans 9:20 
seems to suggest that God's goodness must be sacrificed on the altar of 
48. Leviathan Molesworth ed. p.35^. Quoted Hobbes Richard Peters p.2&6 
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omnipotence.11 Who axe you, a man, to answer back to God? Will what i s 
moulded say to i t s moulder, 'Why have you made me thus?' Has the potter no 
right over the olay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty, 
another for menial use?" 
Here Hobbes touches on without discussing, the problem of analogy. How, 
i f at a l l , do the words which we employ in ordinary usage e.g. 'good', 
'powerful', 'loving' etc. refer to and describe, properties possessed by God? 
I s i t reasonable of Hobbes to suppose that the term 'power' can be analogously 
extended to describe God, and yet deny that the term 'goodness' can be so 
extended? Hobbes wants to wriggle out of the problem by denying that i t i s 
a genuine problem: He asserts that we cannot know what properties God 
possesses, but only that He exists. But i f this i s so, then we cannot know 
that God i s a l l powerful. I f , however ( i t i s meaningful to extend the usage 
of the word 'powerful' or 'sovereign' to describe God, why cannot the meaning 
of the word 'good' be extended i n a similar way? I f Hobbes appeals to the 
scriptures at this point, i t seems that the four gospels support the view 
that i t i s necessary to attribute goodness to God. Thus "Good teacher, 
what must I do" to inherit eternal l i f e ? " And Jesus said to him 'Why do 
you c a l l me good? No one i s good, but God alone'"^ 
Anyone who defines God's goodness in terms of his w i l l or power, cannot 
avoid concluding that the term 'goodness' can be eliminated from our 
description of God, because the same features of God can be equally 
adequately described in terms of w i l l or power. Hence Richard Price 
aggues: " I f there were no moral distinctions, eternally and unalterably 
right and wrong, there could be nothing meant by his eternal and unalterable 
rectitude or holiness.•• what can be more preposterous, than to make the 
deity nothing but w i l l ; and to exalt this on the ruins of a l l his attributes. 1 1^ 
Mark 10:1? R.S.V. text 
51. A Review of the Principle question of Morals ed. D.D.Raphael pp.86-87 
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D.Z. Phi l l i p s : God and Ought: 
"Many philosophers suggest that..... an acceptance of God's comaands 
must depend on my moral judgement. I want to deny this... What I am 
denying i s that the relation between God and what I ought to do i s necessar-
i l y parasitic on moral judgement. On the contrary, for believers 'good' 
52 
means 'whatever God w i l l s ' 
Phillips argues that i n the case of children's obligations to their 
parents an 'ought' statement i s implied by an ' i s ' statement, because he 
claims that from the fact X i s my father I can infer that I ought to obey 
him. "That status of being a father entails certain rights, which children 
of the father have obligations to satisfy. I t i s possible to argue from 
•He i s my Father' to ' I ought not to leave him destitute*""^ Phillips 
continues that i f one understands what i t i s for someone to be a Father, 
one w i l l understand why he ought to be obeyed; likewise i f one understand 
what i t i s to believe i n God, one w i l l understand why i t i s that he ought 
to be obeyed. There i s something about the institution of the family 
which bestows moral obligations on the members of the family; and likewise 
belief i n God bestows special obligations on those who accept i t . "This i s 
because i n rejecting God's w i l l , one i s not rejecting one claim among many 
within an institution such as a family; one i s rejecting the foundation 
of an institution. To reject God's claim i s not to reject one of many 
competing claims in a way of l i f e ; i t i s to reject a way of l i f e as such... 
Camus says: 'When man submits God to moral judgement, he k i l l s him i n his 
own heart.'"^ 
I find Phillips arguments very confused. 
F i r s t l y , I think i t i s false to say from 'X i s my father' I can infer, 
' I ought to obey X'. There are certain commands a father could give me 
which I ought not to obey. I f my father was a professional bank robber 
52. Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy ed. I.T. Bamsey, p.l33ff 
53- Phil l i p s Op. c i t . p.136 
5^. Op. c i t . p.139 
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taught me the trade, and the ordered me to 'do a job' on my own, surely, I 
would be justified i n refusing to train as a robber, i f this was i n my power, 
or i f not, to refuse to do the 'job' on my own. Phillips however does not 
wish to claim that I ought to obey my father i n every respect, but only in 
certain respects: unfortunately he doesn't t e l l us when we ought and when we 
ought not to obey our fathers. He offers the suggestion that ' I t i s 
possible to argue from 'He i s my father', ' I ought not to leave him destitute' 
But i f the notion of the fact of fatherhood implying moral obligation on the 
part of sons i s qualified, the analogy between the early and heavenly father 
i s weakened, for i n God's case i f I am under obligation to do what he w i l l s , 
I am under obligation to do everything he w i l l s . 
Secondly, I wish to deny that i t i s possible to argue from 'he i s my 
father' to ' I ought not to leave him destitute'. Suppose my father were a 
lazy oaf who had always been destitute because he was too lazy to do an 
honest days work. Heavy inflation occurs over a short period. My father 
can no longer manage to l i v e off my mother's earnings as a char woman, and her 
wages are not l i k e l y to increase. I f I plough more of my earnings into the 
family purse, my father w i l l remain i n his lazy stupor. I f I leave him 
destitute, for a period, he might decide to do the honest days work which he 
i s physically capable of performing. In these circumstances, ought I not 
to l e t him sink into destitution? 
Thirdly Ph i l l i p s f a i l s to see clearly that the term father may have both 
descriptive and prescriptive connotations. "No doubt I shall be accused by 
some Philosophers of having moved my argument from descriptive to evaluative 
55 
statements,11 he admits. Consider the word 'steal'. On the descriptive 
level, 'Thomas stole £5 from X' means 'Thomas removed from X's possession 
without X's permission a £5 note which X had a right to own'. But the word 
'steal' also has emotive, or i f a less subjectivist moral theory i s 
preferred, prescriptivist overtones. The notion of 'ought not' seems to be 
55. Op. c i t . p.135 
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built into the notion of stealing* This does not however imply that i t i s 
possible to infer from the fact that Thomas stole £5, that Thomas ought not 
to have stolen £5- The circumstances of the case might be such that Thomas 
ought to have stolen S5% e.g. i f this action was performed i n a period of 
economic depression, and high unemployment, and i t was the only way of his 
preventing his wife and children suffering from acute malnutrition. 
Fourthly the 'logic' of imperatives i s much more complicated and tricky 
than Phillips seems prepared to admit. Let us suppose that he means to say 
in saving that I can infer {I ought to do Y' from the fact that X i s my 
lather, that 'X i s my lather' materially implies ' I ought to do Y 1. 
Therefore ' I ought not to Y' materially implies 'X i s not my father'. 
Unless Phillips i s prepared to specify i n detail what logical relationship 
exists between certain factual statements and certain ethical statements, 
i t i s hard to see what he i s talking about, 
(c) Splendid Isolation 
Phillips seems to be remotely aware of the problems of the relationship 
between ordinary human ethics and the w i l l of God. He writes: n I am 
anxious to avoid a position i n which religious language seems to be a 
special language, cut off from other forms of human discourse. 
Religion would not have the kind of importance i t has were i t not 
connected with the rest of l i f e . Religious discourse has much i n common with 
moral discourse.•• on the other hand I also want to avoid the view that 
religious concepts can be accounted for i n moral terms. , K 
In P h i l l i p s ' philosophy, this statement i s no^ more than a pious 
intention which i s never put into practice. His account of ethics, for 
example, i s so religious, that i t i s cut off from the w i l l of God. But 
Phil l i p s ' concept of God i s i t s e l f completely isolated from ordinary 
discourse: i t resides i n i t s own self-justifying language game. Phillips^ 
method i s similar to Winch's insight that to follow a rule i s to act i n such 
56. "Moral and religious conceptions of Duty: an analysis" Religion and 
Understanding, p.196 
98 
a way that one's action.commits one to and i s a sign of, commitment to some 
further act i t portends, whose non-realisation would constitute the 
violation of a rule. "The notion of following a rule i s logically 
H u b b l e from the notion of making a mistake. A mistake i s a contra-
vention of what i s established as correct; as such, i t must be recognisable 
as such a contravention. That i s i f I make a mistake i n say my use of a 
word, other people must be able to point i t out to me Establishing a 
standard i s not an activity which i t makes sense to ascribe to any individual 
in complete isolation from other individuals. For i t i s contact with other 
individuals which alone makes possible the eternal check from an established 
57 
standard." Phillips and Winch thus place themselves i n the Kantian 
tradition of fixing a great gulf between pure and practical reason which no 
formal logical relations can cross. The price of such a move i s to create a 
total separation of religious statements from statements describing the world, 
or any aspect of i t . The problem about such a deep separation i s to know 
where i n the end God i s placed on the conceptual map, i f he has no place in 
and no relation to the categories of pure reason. Kant remarked i n the 
Grundlegung, that although we can never comprehend freedom, we can comprehend 
i t s incomprehensibility. Insofar as Phillips i s always telling us what 
parts of the conceptual map God does not occupy, and never the parts which he 
does occupy, his motto might well be that although we cannot understand God, 
we can understand his incomprehensibility. 
5* Conclusion 
Phillips i s a theoretical theist. He claims that he believes i n and 
prays to God. I wish to argue that because the religious language game he 
plays i s totally cut off and isolated from a l l other language games, he i s 
in practice an Afefteist. 
$t i s very hancL to pin Phillips down and show that this i s what he finall y 
commits himself to. This i s because although he says time and time again 
57- The Idea of a social science, p.32 
99 
what sort of knowledge, knowledge of God i s not, i t i s wholly unclear 
what does constitute knowledge of God. God cannot be referred to by any 
sort of descriptive statement, he cannot be referred to by any sort of 
non-cognitive human discourse... he i s 'sui generis', so presumably any 
statements which are i n any way related to him are 'sui generis'. But 
i f Phillips i s not using such words as 'true', 'real', 'genuine', 
'being* 'necessary' in some sense which i s at least remotely analogous 
to their ordinary usage, how i s he using them? What does i t mean to say 
' I am praying to the true God, but my use of 'true' i n this context i s 
totally different from any other sort of use i t has'? 
I f language used i n talking about God e.g. the language used i n 
The concept of prayer i s totally unrelated to any other sort of language, 
i t i s hard to see how Phillips concludes by means of the ontological 
argument that God i s a logically necessary being. The argument supposes 
that i t i s possible to infer the existence of God from the concept of God 
and nothing else. But the concept of God i s defined i n language which 
i s parasitical for any meaning i t has on ordinary usage. 'A being a 
greater than which cannot be conceived1 contains such words as 'being' 
'thought' and the relation 'to be greater than', which gain their meaning 
from the usage they normally have. I f therefore a l l ordinary language 
i s logically unrelated to God (GOB i s not a participant in human language) 
how can the ontological argument over get started? 
Phillips^book i s high flown idealist metaphysics: the cognitivist -
non-cognitivist dispute which i t raises, rests on an answer to the question 
what metaphysical concept of God i s the most adequate: Phillips^ answer 
reflects the Hegelian love for the ontological argument. The concept he 
chooses forces him to engage on a large scale programme of revisionary 
metaphysics, i n which he persuasively redefines the concept of prayer i n 
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non-cognitivist terms. I t i s easy to show that a descriptive metaphysic 
58. Stevenson: Ethics and language, 19kk 
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of the Christian concept of God indicates) that Ph i l l i p s i s wrong, and 
that the Christian language i s cognitive. But Phil l i p s could admit that 
there i s such contrary evidence, yet reply that a l l cognitive uses of 
religious language are superstitious, and are never implied by prayer to 
the 'true' God. Even i f we grant that the cognitive concept of God i s 
not worship worthy, whatever i s meant by this emotive phrase, neither i s 
Phillips 1 concept. This i s because to be worship-worthy the concept must 
at least be in t e l l i g i b l e : but I just do not understand what.sort of God 
this i s to whom nothing has any causal or logical relations, to whom 
npthing can be told and who cannot understand human language. 
Apart from not being a theist, Phillips i s not a Christian i n that 
the revelation of God in Jesus Christy i s something which his philosophical 
analysis can afford to dispense with. The criterion of faith i s 
determined for Phillips by the traditions inherent within the autonomous 
Christian religious language game. 
The Mew Testament preaches that God revealed himself in Jesus 
Christ. "And he asked them 'But who do you say that I am'. Peter 
answered him 'You are the Chri s t 1 . And he charged them to t e l l no one 
about him."^ Not only i s there no serious discussion of Christology i n 
The Concept of prayer, but the epistemology i t enunciates i s logically 
unable to handle a God who becomes flesh. "The fact that there should be 
anything, that there should be a world, survives these changes as a source 
of prayer and in so doing remains distinct from any contemplation of 
objects i n the world (cf. Wittgenstein: How the world i s completely 
indifferent for what, i s higher. God does not seveal himself in the 
world. Tractatus 6.4.32) Any aspect of the world which one contemplates 
could become an object of human understanding and utilisation. One 
cannot say of God, without talking nonsense, that He i s an object of 
60 
human understanding, or that He can be used" 
59. Mark 8: 29-30 
60. Op. c i t . p.76 
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The incarnation cannot be given a place on Phillips conceptual map, 
because the concept of God which Phillips uses i s that of a logically 
necessary being. Presumably the statements describing the existence of 
a logically necessary being are themselves logically necessary. The 
statements which describe the Word become flesh, the God who h^umbles 
himself to become man, i f they are to describe a being who genuinely 
enters the historical scene, amidst i t s ambiguities and uncertainties, are 
in the nature of the case, contingent. Leasing once remarked, " I f no 
historical truths can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated 
by means of historical truths. That i s , accidental truths of history/ 
can never be the proof of necessary truths of reason"**3' Equally, 
necessary truths of reason cannot be the proof of accidental truths of 
history. By making a l l the relations between assertions made about God 
internal Phillips has cut off the possibility of this God having any 
logical relations with the history of the world, with contingent partiou-
_ j — 
l a r s , of space and time. Phi l l i p s attempts what Barth condemned in j&hose 
who try to get from abstract concepts of God to the particular actuality 
of Christ. 
I admit that i n his chapter on 'God's voice and the concept of 
community' Phillips does stress the impossibility of understanding Christ's 
claim to be the Messiah, except against the background^ and traditions of 
the Jewish faith. But this i s an example of Phillips*habit of switching 
when he finds i t convenient, from the stronger meaning equals use UBeses, 
which makes religious language isolated and autonomous, to the weaker 
meaning equals used thesis, which stresses only the importance i n seeing 
each statement i n the context i n which i t i s made, and as not cut off 
from i t s history. I t i s true that Jesus' claim to be the Messiah 
cannot be understood apart from i t s context in Jewish eschatological 
expectations: but Christ's claim to both f u l f i l and transcend and modify 
61. 'On the proof of the s p i r i t af power'. Theological Writings ed. 
Henry Chadwick. 
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these expectations presetuposes a logical relation between statements 
about Christ's biography, and statements about the actions of God, which 
are ruled out by the concept of a God which i s that of a logically 
necessary being. 
Phillips denial of the possibility of intercessory prayer, i s 
j?. 
another example of his inability to cop^ with the particularity of God's 
action i n the world. The fact of the incarnation, the actuality of God's 
becoming a Galilean living i n Nazareth shows God's concern about the 
detail of what happens in the world. Christians believe that this 
concern of God 1B s t i l l present in His freedom to give us what we ask of 
him, when and how he sees f i t to do so. 
The crucial defect i n Phillips account of the logic of religious 
language i s that he assumes that i t i s single levelled. Once 'depth' 
grammar has revealed what the logic of God i s l i k e , this univocal logic 
can be applied to every religious statement, and any religious statement 
which does not f i t into this account, must be reduced to a statement which 
0 
w i l l , or be eliminated from religious discourse. Phillips uses 
Wittgenstein's insight that words and statements only have meaning i n the 
stream of l i f e , to prop up a doctrine which leads back to the dogma that 
to mean i s to name. Just as Jiogically proper names are entities which 
name one and only one thing, and have no internal logical relations with 
any other logically proper names, so the religious language game, as i t 
were names God, in such a way that there i s only one method of referring 
to God, and this one method of reference i s logically unrelated to a l l 
other uses of language. 
P A R T I I 
INFALLIBILISM 
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P A R T I I I 
INFALLIBILISM 
The i n f a l l i b i l i s t theory or definition of knowledge suggests that 
to know a proposition involves being able to prove that the proposition 
concerned i s true. For this theory, knowing i s self-authenticating and 
inf a l l i b l e because i t i s argued, we cannot know anything which as amatter 
of fast i s not the case. Thus according to this view, knowledge i s some 
sort of direct and indubitable acquaintance with re a l i t y . For unless 
there are some propositions which can be known in f a l l i b l y , there can be 
no such thing as knowledge; there can be only true opinion or belief, and 
thus an unending series of relative viewpoints. I f we know a proposition, 
we must know that we know i t , otherwise we do not really know i t at a l l . 
As Cook Wilson put i t : "The consciousness that the knowing process i s a 
knowing process, must be contained within the knowing process i t s e l f . " 
In this section, I w i l l discuss two theologians who I think would 
both deny that they hold such an i n f a l l i b i l i s t theory of knowledge, but 
both of whom adopt i t in a limited way i n their analyses of how God can be 
known. Both of these theologians adopt this i n f a l l i b i l i s t theory because 
of a misinterpretation of remarks made by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
F i r s t l y , I.T. Ramsey uses Wittgestein's remarks about the relation 
between meaning and use to try and show that the Anglican Attitude contain-
ed i n the Thirty Nine Articles i s the only means of ensuring that theology 
i s always tentative and so that i t reveals rather than conceals the nature 
of God. 
Secondly, John Hick uses the remarks about 'seeing as* in an attempt 
to show that the only situation in which we can be.really sure that the 
statement "God exists" i s true i s i n the a f t e r l i f e . 
1. J . Cook-Wilson: Statement and Inference: Vol. I . p.100 
10k. 
Both Ramsey and Hick evade the.problems raised for religious belief 
by the falsification challenge; Sot both make our knowledge of God 
either something which we cannot have, or something which we cannot be 
mistaken about, and which i s therefore i n f a l l i b l e . 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
MEANING AMD USE 
1. E a l l i b i l i t y and I n f a l l i b i l i t y : 
In his book On Being Sure i n Religion, I . T. Ramsey draws a 
distinction between being sure in religion, but ten€ative in theology. I t 
i s possible to be sure that the mystery whom we c a l l God i s revealed to 
man. Such sureness i n religious belief i s threatened and sometimes 
extinguished by theology. A theological system or dogma, although i t may 
at one time in history illuminate our understanding of God's mystery, may, 
i f during the course of time i t hardens and ceases to develop, obscure, 
hide, or even distort, God's revelation of Himself. In order to keep 
religion free from any such distortion, Ramsey suggests that theology should 
be subjected to systematic doubt: we must believe i n the mystery of God's 
revelation but remain ever sceptical of dogmatic or systematic theological 
formulations in which attempts are made to categorise, or systematise 
revelation. F.D. Maurice, Ramsey thinks, offers an antidote against 
theological diseases: "Maurice was suspicious of a l l theological schemes, 
of a l l systems whose verbal rigour concealed rather than revealed God. 
p 
Sure in religion - but suspicious of a l l theological pretensions." 
Sureness or certainty in theology tends to lead to prejudice, bigotry 
and fanaticism; for to be certain that a particular theological scheme of 
system i s correct i s to demand that we can know God's nature i n f a l l i b l y i n 
this world: but such an in f a l l i b l e knowledge of God's ways can be had only 
when we see God face to face. In this l i f e we see through a glass darkly; 
to pretend that the glass i s clear rather than frosted i s to deceive 
ourselves into beliefing that God has revealed more of Himself to us than 
He 1B fact has. To accept as sure and for certain any dogmatic 
theological system whether this be Neo-Thomism, or Existentialism or 
1. I.T. Ramsey: CM Being Sure in Religion: Athlone Press, 1963 
2. 0. c i t . p.^ to" 
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Modernism, i s an evasion of the responsibility of discovering for oneself 
the mystery of God's nature. Ramsey quotes with approval Maurice's 
rhetoric: " I fear that there.are not a few young men who are flying to 
belief i n an i n f a l l i b l e pope, because they have not the courage to ask 
themselves whether they believe in an Inf a l l i b l e God."^ 
Granted there i s always a danger of forming a theological system 
which embody and categgrisecGod's revelation, and therefore conceal^ i t , 
what practical measures can be taken to ensure that theology remains as 
tentative as possible? How can the purity of God's mjpstery be preserved 
against the repeated onslaughts of theological and philosophical systems? 
Ramsey, again following Maurice, suggests that subgoription to the 
Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of Eiigland i s an invaluable, indeed an 
almost indisponsible means of ensuring that theology remains tentative. 
This i s because the Articles, i f used in the correot context, can bring 
about the same disclosure of God's mastery which i s usually evoked by the 
Bible and the creeds. "In this way the Articles were ultimately to be set 
i n a context of worship. 'Theological Articles placed at the threshold 
of our studies, would seem by their very name to testify that God, and not 
Self i s to be the object of our studies as well as of our devotions'•" 
m 
Ramsey thus thinks that the Church of Ehgland deserves a pat on the 
back. Because the Articles are logically ambiguous, they reveal rather 
than conceal God's mystery. The Articles are consistent with the Bible 
and the creeds, but the theological scheme or system with which they are 
associated varies with the context in which they are interpreted. Thus 
the Articles about God and the Trinity were interpreted in Deia^ticaA 
terms by the Nineteenth century Deists, and the Articles about the 
eucharistic sacrifice, the real presence and the Councils of the Church 
were interpreted in Catholic, i f not Roman terms by the Nineteenth Century 
5. Op. c i t . p.77 
k. Op. c i t . p.67 
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Tractarlans. Therefore the Articles: "have a sufficiently loose f i t to 
conform to various contextual patterns. They were accepted by people 
as flifferent as a Vblberforce and a Newman. So the Articles at one and 
the same time encourage systematisation and make i t problematical."^ 
Hence the Articles of the Church of England define the "Anglican 
attitude"** An Anglican i s sure of God's mystery, but tentative, or 
rather, contextually tentative, about the theological scheme or system he 
uses to project or describe his knowledge of God. "So we solve the 
moral and intellectual problems of subscription by affirming verbal 
formulae which are only 'understood' when (a) they are linked unambiguously 
through the Creeds with the Scriptures, and (b) in this way succeed i n 
being evocative of Christian devotion, i n which (c) are then grounded 
contemporary Christian judgements and the possibility of genuine 
7 
theological development 
The question remains why, i f the Thirty Nine Articles safeguard God's 
mystery against systematises and dogmatists, so many people feel that 
assent to the Articles i s assent to an 'Anglican' system of theology? 
Surely, the Articles can be viewed as an attempt to systematise and 
retionalise Anglican theology^in the period during and for some years after 
the Reformation? Further, the motives behind such systematisation were 
the desire of politicians to ensure National unity, rather than a desire to 
search for the truth of the mystery of God's revelation, and in doing so 
to follow arguments wherever they may lead? 
Ramsey thinks that the Articles can only come to be viewed as such a 
fixed system of theology i f a mistaken philosophical interpretation of the 
notion of meaning id adopted. I f a word or a sentence i s regarded as 
meaning the thing i t names, then such a word or sentence can have meaning 
i f and only i f there i s some entity which i t names. I f the Thirty Nine 
Articles are meaningful in the sense that every word or phrase in each 
5» Op. c i t . p.70 
6. Op. c i t . pp.70, 71i 81, 83, 85, and 87 
7* Pp. c i t . p.&L 
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a r t i c l e names some entity, then they are turned into a restrictive theo-
logical system. In other words, i f the Articles are interpreted in their 
'plain and l i t e r a l * sense, which i s what Ramsey regards as 'the logic par 
o 
excellence of scientific discourse,' not only do the Articles become a 
set of theological dogmas, they encourage atheism. "Let no one blind 
himself to the sheer atheism to which a 'plain and l i t e r a l ' understanding 
o 
of theology may lead us." 
Thus for Ramsey, we might decide to take Article I I in i t s plain and 
l i t e r a l sense: "The Son, which i s the Word of the father, begotten from 
everlasting of the lather, the very and eternal God, and of one substance 
with the father, took man's nature i n the womb of the blessed Virgin of 
her substance 
But the plainand l i t e r a l sense of this a r t i c l e w i l l commit us to a 
certain theological doctrine as being certain and sure; that i s the 
doctrine of the homoousion: also, he suggests, such an interpretation 
would lead to atheism; for i f we regard the divinity of Christ as being 
a substance i n the same sense that matter i s a substance, we might conclude f .. 
that Christ's divinity was an individual material thin^ and that since 
this cannot be observed i n the way that other material things can be 
observed, Christ i s therefore not divine. 
But the Anglican Articles are theologically tentative, Ramsey believes, 
i f we learn the correct lessons from ccntenporary empiricism, and especially 
from the work of the la t t e r Wittgenstein. "Don't look for meanings, look 
for use" suggests that In theology, as anywhere else the meaning of a word 
or sentence depends not on some entity the word or sentence refers to, 
but on the context i n which the word or sentence i s used. The word 
'copper' for example, takes on different meanings i n different context 
of i t s use: "'Coppers were brisk' we read i n the Stock Exchange Reports 
when the context i s that of shares. 'Put i t on the copper' says the urchin 8. Op. c i t . p.64 
9* Op. c i t . p.65 
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in Hackney; 'Coppers only' says the maohine in the Tube StationJ" 1^ 
Similarly, the meaning of the Thirty Nine Articles depends on the 
context i n which they are put. In order to remain tentative i n theology 
the Articles must be given their 'general and f u l l 1 sense. This i s done 
i f the Articles are understood i n the context of the creeds, and behind the 
creeds the context of cl a s s i c a l doctrine and the Scriptures. Insofar as 
the logical connexions with these contexts are clearly traced, the Articles 
w i l l , i n a similar way to the Scriptures, lead to a vision of God's love 
and power in Christ. "They ( i . e . the Articles) give us... a specimen 
context, of reliable doctrinal development which, routed through the 
Creeds and Scriptures, i s grounded in the discernment of God.1^"1 
Subscription to the Articles, i s therefore not to accept every word i n 
each of them as being l i t e r a l l y true; subscription i s rather accepting 
the Articles as a set of guidlines or regulative maxims, by means of which 
any theological system can be perpetually modified and developed so as 
to project the mystery of God's being as accurately as the complex nature 
of_such a being permits. Therefore: t*Bx aaimo subscription^ commits us 
to one thing only - perpetual development, and i t i s this alone which 
j u s t i f i e s us i n subscribing exjudmo while being tentative i n theology."^ 
2. Use and Liturgical Revision 
The problem about interpreting what Ramsey i s saying when he applies 
the philosophical thesis that meaning i s closely connected with use to the 
Thirty Nine Articles i s that he gives no detailed and concrete examples of 
how his arguments affect the meanings that can be drawn out from the 
Articles. A more detailed application of the thesis of the l a t t e r 
Wittgenstein to theology i s offered i n an essay in which Ramsey discusses 
1ft. Op. C i t . p.62 
11. Op. c i t . p.66 
12. Op. c i t . p.8l 
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the merits and defects of the revised Anglican communion service: the 
13 
Series I I Liturgy. In the Durham Diocesan Magazine, Bamsey develops 
his argument about the relation of meaning and use, and applies i t to a 
doctrinal dispute about the revised Anglican Liturgy* 
This dispute centres around the use and meaning of the word 'sacri-
f i c e ' i n the communion service. The High Church and the Low Church 
parties i n the Church of England interpret this word to mean two different 
things. The High Church Party tend to follow the Roman use of the word, 
and to argue that to say there i s a sacrifice i n the communion service 
means that Christ himself, really present i n the bread and wine i s offered 
l*f 
by the Priest and people, through God's grace, to God the Father, 
The Low Church party on the other hand believe that there i s no 
offering of Christ to the Father: rather Christ i s s p i r i t u a l l y present to 
those who receive communion, and this s p i r i t u a l presence reminds the 
congregation of the sacrifice of Christ on calvary offered once only once 
and once for a l l . ^ 5 
There has been some theological disagreement over the revised 
communion service because some members of the High Church party thought 
that the prayer of consecration i n the revised service excludes the 
doctrinal beliefs which this party associates with the use of the word 
'sasrifice 1. Ransey summarises the arguments put forward by some of the . 
Proctors i n the Convocation from the Diocese of Exeter); " I t i s said that 
the new formula, 'with this bread and this cup we make the memorial of his 
13« "Some Reflections on current Liturgical Experiment: Holy Communion -
Series I I " The Bishoprick* November 19*67 
l * f . This i s the doctrine implied by that part of the Tridentine Canon which 
states: "We thy servants, Lord, and with us thy Holy people, offer to 
thy sovereign majesty, out of the g i f t s thou hast bestowed upon us, a 
sacrifice that i s pure, holy, and unblemished, the sacred bread of 
everlasting l i f e , and the cup of eternal salvation" Roman Missal: 
"Canon of the Mass", Laymen's Daily Missal; Burns and Gates 1962 £.875 
15. Thus according to the Anglican prayer of consecration Jesus Christ made 
on the cross, "by this one oblation of himself, once offered, a f u l l y 
perfect and sufficient, sacrifice, oblation and i isatisfaction, for ..the sins of the whole world" gook of Common Prayer "Communion service" 
I l l 
saving passion...' has no precedent earlier than 15^ 9« and that i t was then 
used i n a l l but t o t a l ignorance of earlier l i t u r g i c a l practice, and had 
the express purpose of circumventing the idea of objective eucharistic 
sacrifice." " I f this formula be compared with the earliest known 
l i t u r g i c a l texts, that of the Apostolic tradition, which has so largely 
influenced the euoharistic prayer of Series I I , i t w i l l be found that 
while i s might be said to correspond with 'doing the anamnesis of the 
passion' etc. i t stops short of the principal clause i n the Hippolytan 
prayer, viz. 'We offer to thee the bread and the cup'. Thus, 'We make 
the memorial' cannot be understood to mean 'we offer', and hence the 
offering of the eucharistic sacrifice i s now excluded by the new formula"^ 
Ramsey thinks that the Proctors from Exeter can only j u s t i f y their 
conclusion that 'the offering of the eucharistic sacrifice i s now excluded 
by the new formula', because they accept a mistaken belief about the 
meaning of words. I f the phrase, 'we make the memorial' i s set i n the 
context of the 15^ -9 Anglican Liturgy, then i t does exclude the phaase 
'we offer'; for Craamer and his colleague wrote the 15^9 l i t u r g y with this 
intention. But, he suggests, words and phrases do not have such a fixed 
meaning. The meaning of the word, 'sacrifice' or the phrase 'we offer' 
or 'we make the memorial' depends entirely on the context i n which they 
are used, just as the meaning of the word 'copper' depends on whether the 
context i t i s used i n i s that of a tube station, an urchin i n Hackney, or 
17 
a stock-exchange report. Thus: "Whether or not the new formula 
excludes the offering of the eucharistic aacrifioe depends entirely on 
whether the new formula can be given a 's a c r i f i c i a l use' i n some 
appropriate context of r i t e and ceremony, recognising that such a context 
must have some historical links and be routed i n one way or another back 
to the ma wrin-tntTY of our Lord Himself.1*1^ 
16. Bishoprick. Op. o i t . p.J 
1?. Ramsey here refers to his discussion of meaning i n the book: On Being Sure 
i n Religion; Bishoprick p.5 
18. Bishoprick p.5 
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la other words, just as the meaning of the articles depends both on 
the way they are jinked to the scriptures, and on the context i n whish they 
are used, so the meaning of the phrase 'with this bread and this cup we 
make the memorial' i s determined by the context i n which i t i s used* 
Presumably, i f the phrase i s used at an Anglican High Mass i t means, 
'we offer', i f i t i s used at a Low Church Communion service i t means, 
Hre remember Christ's sacrifice on calvary'• 
3« Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use! 
The main defect i n Ramsey's application of the later philosophy of 
Wittgenstein to the docttAaal disputes which surround the Thirty Nine 
Articles and the SerieB I I communion service i s the simplistic interpretation 
which he gives to Wittgenstein's discussion of the relation between meaning 
and use* Ramsey clearly sees that Wittgenstein rejects a l l univoeal 
theories of meaning, whioh suggest that the meaning of a word or statement 
i s a thing, whether this i s material or mental, which the word or 
statement names* But the analysis which Wittgenstein gives of the use 
of words i n the Philosophical Investigations i s one of the least clear and 
most complicated notions i n his philosophy* 
F i r s t l y , the word 'use' i s not the only word which Wittgenstein 
adopts to t a l k about how human beings manipulate languages* As, Q.Pitcher 
19 20 points out; he also speaks of the functions of words of the aims of 
21 22 23 2h words, of their purposes, their offices, their roles, and their 
25 
employements• He does not distinguish clearly anywhere how he thinks 
19* G* Pitcher: The Philosophy of Wittgenstein; p.229 f f • 
20* Philosophical Investigations. Sections 11,17,27^»556,559 
21* I b i d , Sections 5 and 21 
22. Ib i d . Sections 6, 8, 39* 
23- Ibid. Section 402 
2*t* Blue and Brown Books, pp.103, 108 
25* Philosophical Investigations. Section kZL 
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that these alternative phrases d i f f e r from his central concept of the use 
of words. 
Secondly, apart from a great diversity of phraseology, i n what sense 
i s Wittgenstein using the phrase 'use of words'; for this phrase can mean 
several different things. 
There i s the grammatical use of words: some collections of words are 
grammatically acceptable, others are not. I t i s permissible to say that 
' I drive a large saloon c#r' but not acceptable to say that ( I drive a 
malaria bed car*. Wittgenstein i s not unduly Interested i n the 
grammatical use of words. The grammatical use of words reveal only 
their 'surface' grammar. He i s much more concerned with 'depth' grammar. 
"In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth 
grammar.' What immediately impresses i t s e l f upon us i s the way i t i s 
used i n the construction of the sentence, the part of i t s use... one 
might say... that can be taken i n by ear. ...And now compare the depth 
grammar, say of the word 'to mean', with what i t s surface grammar would 
leadus to suspect. No wonder we find i t d i f f i c u l t to know our way about,"' 
Words are also used i n speech acts, that i s i n such things as issuing 
orders, making promises, naming ships, asking questions, giving commands 
27 
and so on. As J.L. Austin has pointed out, i t i s important to 
distinguish illooutionary speech acts from perlocutionary speech acts. 
IUocutionary speech acts are performed i n describing something, issuing 
an order, asking a question etc. I f I ask the question 'where are you?', 
I have performed a speech act which requires only the act of saying 
certain words i n order for the speech act to be performed successfully. 
Perlocutionary speech acts on the other hand are such actions as 
persuading someone to do something, making someone angry, making someone 
pleased, etc. Such a speech act i s not performed successfully, unless 
26. Ibid. Section 66*f 
27. J.L.Austin: How to do things with words, passim 
u.k. 
the words spoken produce some additional effect over and above the utterance 
of the i n i t i a l words. For example, i f I say to someone 'You swine' 
intending to make him angry, my speech act i s successful only i f he gets 
angry and perhaps loses his temper. Speech acts i n other words are 
actions i n which we use words to do things. Wittgenstein refers very 
infrequently to speech acts, and even where he does refer to the use of 
28 
words to produce an effect i n the person who hears i t he regards such 
acts as insignificant. 
The use of words can also mean the appropriateness of a set of words 
to a given context. This might be called the Semantic aspect of the use 
of words. Certain words or groups of words are appropriate i n certain 
contexts, but i n different oircumstances are quite inappropriate^ For 
example, 'Well done, s i r ' would be an appropriate remark to make to a 
jockey who had just won a horse race, or to a student who had just passed 
his examinations. But i t would be inappropriate to use thise phrase to 
a motorist who had just knocked down and k i l l e d four pedestrians, or to a 
man who had just been informed that he was suffering from incurable cancer. 
In order words, certain phrases or sentences go with or tend to be 
correlated with certain semantic conditions rather than others, 'V~ 
This Semantic aspect of the use of words i s considered to be of 
considerable importance by Wittgenstein. I f the meaning of a word or 
phrase puzzles us he suggests that we examine closely the way this word or 
phrase i s used, and the contexts i n which i t i s appropriate and inappro-
priate. Thus: "Let us see what use we make of such an expression as 
'this face says something' that i s , what the situations are i n which we 
use this expression, what sentences would precede or follow i t , (What kind 
of conversation i t i s a part o f ) " 2 ^ 
28. E.g. Philosophical Investigations. Sectionfi 
29. Blue and Brown Books, p.179 
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Finally, Wittgenstein's analyses the use of words i n terms of what he 
calls 'language games', and this i s perhaps one of the most central 
concepts i n his later writings. Language games are not merely those uses 
of language which consist of words, such as reporting an accident, recounting 
a dream, or t e l l i n g a joke. A language game can also include non-
ling u i s t i c elements as i n the case, for example, of obeying orders or 
and the action or deeds which take place whilst the words are spoken. 
" I shall also c a l l the whole, consisting of language, and the actions into 
which i t i s woven, the 'language game'."^1 
Language and behaviour are not two events t o t a l l y isolated the one 
from the other. Either language i s i t s e l f a type of behaviour and i s n 
closely related with non-linguistic types of behaviour. To use a language 
i s therefore to be able to employ certain techniques, to exercise correctly 
certain a b i l i t i e s . For example, to know how to use the word 'ball' 
consists i n more than the mere a b i l i t y to point to a b a l l and say 'this i s a 
b a l l ' . For an ostensive definition can always be interpreted i n more than 
one way. In saying 'this i s a b a l l ' and pointing to the b a l l , a person 
might be referring to the roundness of the b a l l , or the greenness of the 
32 
b a l l , rather than to the ball'' To understand the meaning of the word 
•ball' i s thus to be able to do various things with balls, to throw b a l l , 
to fetch balls, to distinguish balls from other toys, to draw balls and so 
on. An expression has meaning only insofar as i t i s used i n a mode of 
behaviour, only IbtBOiffrr. sj£ ±t i a employes i n a language game. For: "An 
Wittgenstein associates the meaning of a word with i t s use i n most 
cases, but not a l l , although he seems to regard the exceptions as of 
30. Philosophical Investigations. Section 23 
31. Ibid. Section 7 
32. Ibid. Section 28 
33- N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A memoir; p.93 
play a c t i n g ^ Thus a language game consists both i n the use of words 
a 
expression has meaning only i n the stream of l i f e . " ^ 
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l i t t l e significance*^ for apart from i t s use within some language game 
a word i s a corpse, i t has no meaning. "Every sign by i t s e l f seems dead. 
What gives i t l i f e ? I n use i t i s alive. I s l i f e breathed into i t there? 
Bamsey ignores the complexity of the discussion about the relation 
between meaning and use i n Wittgenstein, and concentrates on what I 
describe i n the last section as the Semantic aspect of the use of words. 
This i s brought out by the example he uses to i l l u s t r a t e the point he i s 
making about Wittgenstein's philosophy. The meaning of the word 'copper', 
Bamsey argues, i s determined by the contexts i n which i t i s used: i t s 
meaning changes from one context to another; from the tube station to the 
Stock Exchange, from the Victorian cook to the urchin i n Hackney."^ 
This point, that the meaning of a word i s determined by the Semantic 
conditions i n which i t i s used i s qdite unobjectionable by i t s e l f . 
Shsameaningndf the phrase 'turn i t o f f , obviously depends on the Semantic 
conditions i n association with which i t i s spoken. 'Turn i t o f f , may be 
shouted at me by my next door neighbour who i s disturbed by my radio 
receiver while he i s trying to sleep. The phrase may be a request for an 
over hot shower to be turned off, and the mixture of hot and cold water 
reset by a bathroom attendant i n a luxury hotel. The same phrase may be 
used i n an attempt to silence a Professor somewhat under the influence of 
drink, who i s spoiling a partywith his anecdotes about the days he studied 
under Wittgenstein. 
54. Cf. Philosophical Investigations. Section hj, 
35• Philosophical Investigations, Section k32 
36. ( I am greatly indebted i n this section to G. Pitcher's discussion of 
Wittgenstein's analysis of the relation between meaning and use i n his 
book The Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Chapter 10, page 228 f f . ) 
37. On Being Sure i n Religion p.62 
Or i s the use i t s l i f e ? " ,,35,36 
k. Bamsey's Use of Wittgenstein 
117 
Unfortunately, Ramsey does not develop this analysis of the relation 
between the use of words and the Semantic conditions which are normally 
appropriate to their use. For the use of some sets of words or phrases 
are appropriate i n some sets of Semantic conditions, but t o t a l l y 
inappropriate i n a different set of Semantic conditions. For example, 
under normal circumstances, the correct context i n which to use the 
phrase (many happy returns of the day' i s when some one i s celebrating 
his birthday. Suppose I hear a loud noise i n the house next door to me, 
I conclude that i t i s my next door neighbour's birthday party. I rush 
i n and wish him'many happy returns of the day' When I have done this I 
discover that the noise was not a birthday party, but a b i t t e r family 
argument. I have obviously used the phrase 'many happy returns of the 
day' i n the wrong context. Or suppose that an innocent EnglishmenI 
were to go to a certain social occasion i n West African Society. He 
might see everyone drinking quite heavily and conclude that there was a party 
going on, and that this was an occasion to propose the toast of the host 
and.other friends. Having said ' I propose the toast', he might discover 
that this was a funeral wake and not a party at a l l . The phrase, ( I 
propose the toast) would be used under the wrong Semantic conditions. 
In both cases, the a b i l i t y to use the relevant phrase correctly depends 
on knowing the facts of the case; for example, the social customs of 
West African peoples. I must i n the f i r s t instance know whether or not a 
birthday party i s going on. And i n the second instance I must know whether 
the heavy drinking takes place i n the context of a party, or a funeral wake. 
Now Ransey suggests that the meaning of the Thirty Nine Articles 
J 
depends on the context i n which they are set: i f they are related to the 
scriptures and Fathers i n one way they are capable of Newman's interpre-
tation i n terms of Roman Catholic Theology; i f they are associatadnwith 
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the scriptures and Fathers In another way the Articles can be interpreted 
i n terns of a Deisticaft theological system. But surely, just as i t i s 
possible to ask "which i s the correct context for the interpretation of the 
phrase 'many happy returns of the day', so i t i s possible to ask, 'which 
context i s the appropriate, the correct context for the interpretation of 
the Thirty Mine Articles?" Consider for example, the interpretation of 
Article XXXI "Of the one oblation of Christ finished upon the cross"^ 
Newman considered that this A r t i c l e was patient of an interpretation i n 
terms of Soman Catholic Theology. He argues i n Tract XC that the parts 
of the Council of Trent dealing with the Sacrifice of the Mass had not been 
written when this A r t i c l e was composed, and so i t could not exclude the 
Tridentine statement about the sacrifice of the mass. Further the phrase 
i n the a r t i c l e 'the sacrifice of the masses' referred to the popular 
Medieval belief that each mass was i t s e l f an individual sacrifice which 
added to the saving efficacy of Christ's sacrifice on Calvary; Article XXXI 
was not therefore intended tc exclude the Orthodox belief that Christ's 
sacrifice i s the only sacrifice for human sin, but each mass i n some sense 
participates i n this one sacrifice. Nawman concluded that the doctrine 
of the Sacrifice of the mass was thus not excluded by the Thirty Nine Articles 
But the important question here i s "has Newman put Article XXXI i n the 
right context?' Is the a r t i c l e really capable of such an interpretation? 
And this question i s one that can i n principle be solved by detailed 
historical investigations into the situations surrounding the framing of 
the Articles, and the purpose for which the Articleswere written. There 
would seem to be a very strong case for saying thatf Article XXXI was 
written with the express intention of excluding any interpretation, no matter 
how l i b e r a l , of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the propitiatory sacrifice 
38. Book of Common Prayer: Articles 
39. Cf. Ramsey: Oh Being sure i n Religion pp.57 and 58 
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of the mass* For "the offering of Christ once made i s that perfect 
redemption, propitiation and satisfaction for a l l the sins of the whole 
world, both original and actual; and there i s none other satisfaction for 
sin but that alone." 
The question "Which context i s the correct context for the inter-
pretation of the Thirty Nine Articles"? i s , however, a f i r s t order question. 
I t can be answered i n principle by historical investigation, even i f the 
findings of historians on this issue i s i n practice uncertain and ambiguous. 
The question i s not a second order philosophical question about the 
meaning of meaning: i t cannot be solved by the production of philoso-
phical theories about the uses of words. 
A similar point might be made about Ramsey's discussion of the use 
of the word 'sacrifice' i n the Series I I communion service. I t i s true 
that the word 'sacrifice' takes on different meanings i n different 
context of use: A priest saying the words i n the context of the 
communion: "Christ our paschal lamb i s sacrificed for us" does not mean 
the same thing ( I hope) as f i r s t world war memorials outside some of our 
Churches which have written underneath 'The great sacrifice*. But i t 
i s surely important to ask "What i s the correct the appropriate context for 
the use of the word 'sacrifice* i n Church worship?" And this i s a very 
d i f f i c u l t question to answer; but, i t i s a f i r s t order question, and can 
be answered i n principle by looking a^the truth values of the various 
Christian doctrines of the eucharist; and this i n turn depends, i n part, 
on historical investigations about what i s the structure of the earliest 
l i t u r g i c a l texts we possess, and what Jesus Christ himself believed and 
taught about the eucharist. I t i s not a second order question about 
philosophical theories of meaning. 
AO. Book of Common Prayer: Article XXXI 
120 
Unfortunately, Ramsey seems to ignore the constraints placed on the 
possible interpretations of the meanings of the Articles and the Series I I 
Liturgy by the origins i n history of the words and phrases which they 
contain. He admits that the uses of words and phrases do have contextual 
constraints: for example, the random use of a wordc or phrase does not give 
i t a meaningful role i n the language. The phrase, 'si laufen vous 
happen, aefmnsxqzg, Xaipos' does not acquire meaning just because I used 
i t at 2.00 p.m. today. He admits: "Whatever contextual setting i s given 
ko 
to a word or phrase, i t must not create arbitrary inconsistences." 
I t i s quite permissible for Lord Goddard to convict Jones of l e t t i n g 
i f we conclude that Lord Goddard might, i n some analogous way, obstruct 
the j u d i c i a l bench. 
Ramsey quite r i g h t l y stresses that there i s not a fixed context for 
the use of any given set of words or phrases which remains unalterable for 
a l l time: the use of words or phrases i a not l i k e the selection of a 
gramophone record: i f I select to play a gramophone record once I have made 
the selection the programme I w i l l hear i s fixed by what i s on the record. 
The context and the structure of sentences and phrasws i s varied by 
language uses to bring i n new overtones and meanings. I f we want to 
describe the sound of an organ, we don't always have to use the phrase 
'the organ played'; we might say 'the organ thundered' or even, 'he made 
the organ talk'; or i f we have as l i t t l e respect for the sound of the 
English language as B.B.C. sports reporters we might say: 'the organ 
pealed with a l l stops out'. Now Ramsey argues that the phrase, 'With 
this bread and this cup we make the memorial', can be given a use or 
context which does not exclude the belief that Christ i s offered to the 
8) . On Being Sure i n Religion; p.64 
his car obstruct the t r a f f i c ; 'arbitraryainconsistency' but we create an 
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father as a propitiation for our s i n s . Thus: "Whether or not the new 
formula excludes the offering of the eucharistic s a c r i f i c e depends e n t i r e l y 
on whether the new formula can be given a ' s a c r i f i c i a l use' i n some 
appropriate context of r i t e and economy, recognising that such a context 
must have some h i s t o r i c a l l i n k s and be routed i n one way or another back 
to the l i f e and ministry of our l o r d himself." 
One appeal to the contextujpal implications of the l i f e and ministry of 
C h r i s t are not very helpful here* What our Lord s a i d and did can only be 
s e t t l e d , i f i t can be s e t t l e d a t a l l , by h i s t o r i c a l research; and i f 
there had been no dispute i n the f i r s t place about the interpretation of 
the significance of the l i f e and ministry of Jesus, i t i s possible that 
doctrinal d i v i s i o n over the doctrine of the eucharist would not have 
a r i s e n . 
But can the phrase 'with t h i s bread and t h i s cup we make the memo-
r i a l ' be given a ' s a c r i f i c i a l use' i n the way we choose to worship. The 
d i f f i c u l t y i n t h i s suggestion i s that such a use would create j u s t the 
sort of a r b i t r a r y inconsistency which Ramsey deplores i n the suggestion 
that Lord Goddard might obstruct the J u d i c i a l bench i n the same way that 
Jones might obstruct t r a f f i c . The phrase 'with t h i s bread and t h i s cup 
we make the memorial' has a c l e a r and l o g i c a l l y possible use i n a Low 
Church Anglican communion s e r v i c e : i t then means that what the congregation 
are doing i n receiving communion i s reminding themselves of C h r i s t ' s 
s a c r i f i c e on calvary, by doing what he did shortly before he was c r u c i f i e d . 
According to Ramsey, i f the same phrase i s used a t an Anglican High Mass 
i t can mean not only that we remember that C h r i s t died on calvary, but 
a l s o that Jesus C h r i s t , r e a l l y present on the a l t a r i s differed to God 
the father. 
41. The Bishoprick; Cp. c i t . p.5 
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But surely the use of t h i s phrase i n a High Chjcrch Anglican 
t r a d i t i o n i s a r b i t r a r i l y inconsistent, because of the use given to the 
phrase, 'with t h i s bread and t h i s cup we make the memorial' i n the 
debate i n the convocations over the Se r i e s I I communion service* The 
original draft of the revised service contained the phrase from Hippolytus' 
Apostolic Tradition »We offer t h i s bread and t h i s cup'. But the Low 
Church party i n the Convocations considered that the use of the phrase 
'We offer t h i s bread and t h i s cup' i n the communion service committed the 
clergyman using such a r i t e to the High Church doctrine of the propitiatory 
s a c r i f i c e of the mass. The Low Church party therefore i n s i s t e d that the 
phrase 'We offer t h i s bread and t h i s cup' be deleted and replaced by the 
phrase 'With t h i s bread and t h i s cup we make the memorial' This was 
done with the n o i s i l y avowed intention of excluding from the revised 
service High Church b e l i e f s about the e y c h a r i s t i c s a c r i f i c e . 
The meaning of the phrase 'with t h i s bread and t h i s cup we make the 
memorial' i s determined by the use which e c c l e s i a s t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n s have 
chosen for i t to perform; and t h i s use can be discovered by ordinary 
empirical investigation. No second order enquiry into a philosophical 
theaggr of meaning can change the context i n which the use of t h i s phrase 
was coined and developed^ 
5- Tentative Theology and F a l s i f i c a t i o n i 
Ramsey thinks that the fa c t that the A r t i c l e s and S e r i e s I I can be 
interpreted i n dif f e r e n t ways i n different context of t h e i r use i s theo-
l o g i c a l l y u s e f u l . I t i s easier to be sure i n r e l i g i o n and tentative i n 
theology, i f the theological system you have to band i s l o g i c a l l y ambiguous. 
I t i s because thW A r t i c l e s (and one supposes likewise S e r i e s I I ) are 
l o g i c a l l y ambiguous that they are innoculated against being made into a 
theological system or dogma. Therefore: "For better or worse, the 
V 
*jr f  
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A r t i c l e s are l o g i c a l l y ambiguous... they have a s u f f i c i e n t l y loose f i t 
not guarantee of theological tentaifiveness. For example! many Anglican 
Bishops who have b e l i w e d that the A r t i c l e s are l o g i c a l l y ambiguous, 
have yet been w i l l i n g to persecute members of t h e i r own Church who have 
interpreted the A r t i c l e s i n a very High Church, or i n an extrame Low 
43 
Church fashion. ^ 
Oh the other hand, the adoption of one d e f i n i t e theological system 
i s i n i t s e l f no reason for saying that the person who adopts i t has ceased 
to be theologically tentative. I f , for example, I were to become a 
Conservative evangelical, I need not cease to be theologically t e n t a t i v e . 
I may hold very d e f i n i t e b e l i e f s about the nature of the B i b l i c a l 
i n s p i r a t i o n , about the i n v i s i b i l i t y ^ o f the Church, and about the use of 
the word ' s a c r i f i c e ' i n the eucharist; but a s long as I concede that there 
are c e r t a i n circumstances i n which I would admit that my b e l i e f s are f a l s e , 
and then cease to be a conservative evangelical, my theology i s s t i l l 
t entative. Theology ceases to be tentative only when a person i s prepared 
to c l i n g to h i s doctrinal b e l i e f s r i g h t or wrong, no matter what happens 
The problem with Ramsey's an a l y s i s of what i t i s to be tentative i n 
theology i s that he confuses tentativeness with l o g i c a l ambiguity. And as 
a r e s u l t of t h i s confusion, he uses the word 'tentative' i n a l o g i c a l l y 
odd way. Suppose a waiter offers me a cup of coffee and says: 'Black 
or White, s i r ? ' Feeling rather distracted a t the time I say, 'Thank you' 
My reply i s l o g i c a l l y ambiguous, but i t i s not tentative. My reply would 
62. On Being Sure i n Religion p.70 
4-3* Bishop Barnes of Birmingham i s reputed to have refused to i n s t i t u t e 
a High Church clergyman because of the P r i e s t ' s b e l i a f i n the r e a l 
presence and the eucharistic s a c r i f i c e . Lord Fisher, then Archbishop 
of Canterbury, i n v i r t u e of h i s o f f i c e as Primate of a l l England, 
inducted the P r i e s t . 
Mt. An example of t h i s unwillingness to be tentative was a Roman Catholic 
P r i e s t I once met who s a i d . ' I believe the Pope can't be mistaken; hut 
even i f he was I'd s t i l l believe him' 
to conform to various contextual patterns. But l o g i c a l ambiguity i s 
a p 
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have been tentative i f I had said * I think I ' l l have black, but I ' l l t e l l 
you d e f i n i t e l y a f t e r I've finished my cheese and b i s c u i t s ' . Or consider 
the s i t u a t i o n when I ask a g i r l friend, 'Do you love me?' and she r e p l i e s 
' I l i k e you very much'. This i s l o g i c a l l y ambignpus because i t might 
mean, 'You're nice, but I don't love you and don't want to hurt your 
feelings', or 'Yes, I love you, but don't want to t e l l you so j u s t yet' 
On the other hand she might reply to my question, 'Yes, I think I love 
you, but I want to be absolutely sure'. Here, she i s being tentative; 
she says she loves me, but wants to t e s t her feelings before she i s 
absolutely c e r t a i n . I n ordinary English usage a phrase or statement which 
i s tentative makes a de f i n i t e statement, but adds provisos that the 
si t u a t i o n may be modified by future circumstances or contingencies. But 
a tentative statement i s not necessarily l o g i c a l l y ambiguous^ 
In the same way a theology which i s genuinely tentative i s u n l i k e l y 
to be l o g i c a l l y ambiguous: i t w i l l be a theology which w i l l allow i t s e l f 
to be changed on the ba s i s of new findings i n h i s t o r i c a l research or 
sociological investigation. For example, i f my theological b e l i e f s 
about the incarnation are l o g i c a l l y ambiguous, then the chances w i l l be 
that. I am confused rather than tentative. My b e l i e f s about t h i s doctrine 
, w i l l be tentative on the other hand i f I admit that the way i n which I 
interpret the divine nature of Chr i s t ' s person i s i n some sense f a l s i -
f i a b l e . For example, suppose that I believe that the best way of 
describing the d i v i n i t y of C h r i s t i s the doctrine of the komoousion. 
I f my theology i s tentative, I w i l l allow that i t i s i n p r i n c i p l e 
possible that some other equally adequate system of desj^ibing the diving 
nature of C h r i s t ' s person may be produced; further I w i l l be w i l l i n g to 
admit that my own doctrinal solution may be shown to be f a l s e ; or even 
that i t may turn out to be h e r e t i c a l , i f our knowledge about the 
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development of doctrine i n the early Church were to be turned upside down 
by the discovery of hitherto unknown documents* In other words, whether 
a theology i s tentative or not does not depend on i t s l o g i c a l ambiguity, 
but on whether there are any factors that could show that i t i s f a l s e . 
Bamsey wants to be tentative i n the sense I have suggested} but chle 
l o y a l t y to the Thirty Nine A r t i c l e s prevents him from doing t h i s . Not 
only are the A r t i c l e s not to be revised hut they are a v i t a l means, 
perhaps even an indispensible means of preventing the development of 
theological systems, which conceal rather than reveal God, 
But why are the Thirty Nine A r t i c l e s almost the sole means to the end 
which i s a tentative theology? I think i t would be possible to use 
exactly the same arguments which Ramsey uses, to defend the t h e s i s that 
either the Council of Trent, or the Westminster Confession were the sole 
means of ensuring that theology remains tentative. A Catholic for 
example, might claim that the Council of Trent has allowed many different 
theological viewpoints to f l o u r i s h within the Roman Church, j u s t as the;! 
A r t i c l e s have permitted a v a r i e t y of theological opinions i n the Anglican 
Church. But the Council of Trent can i n p r i n c i p l e be brought up to date 
by l a t e r councils, such as, the Second Vatican Council; according to 
Ramsey, i t i s better for the Thirty Nine A r t i c l e s not to be revised. 
Ramsey i s i n f a c t a fundamentalist: for j u s t as the text of the Bible 
i s for a fundamentalist the i n f a l l i b l e word of God, so for Ramsey the 
attitude of tentativeness enshrined within the Thirty Nine A r t i c l e s i s a 
fjdidamental of genuine f a i t h which must not be tampered with. The Church 
of England, Ramsey suggests, must preserve i t s conceptual conservativism; 
for the meaning of a word or phrase i s determined by the context of 
i t s use, then the A r t i c l e s are l o g i c a l l y ambiguous and we can only remain 
theologically tentative, i f the guidelines for our attempts to do theology 
^5- On Being Sure i n Religion pp .83 f f 
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are l o g i c a l l y ambiguous. Ramsey quotes F.D. Maurice with approval: 
" I look upon (the A r t i c l e s ) as an invaluable charter, protecting us against 
a system that once enslaved us, and might enslave us again; protecting 
us against the systems of the present day - against •Records* and 'Times' 
newspapers, and Bishops of Exeter, and Heads of Houses"^ 
The A r t i c l e s may provide the protection against theological 
/• 
systematises which Maurice and Ramsey claim, but a t the p r i c e of making 
A 
the 'Anglican Attitude' which i s supposedly enshrined within the 
A r t i c l e s , i n f a l l i b l e . Ramsey nowhere makes c l e a r what exactly t h i s 
'Anglican Attitude' i s . He says that we must not be over concerned with 
the a r t i c l e s , but rather with the treasure they were designed to enclose. 
Therefore: "we must learn to be oure, to give ex animo assent when we can 
k7 
do no other, while a l l the time being theologically tentative." 
Sere I am a f r a i d that I think Ramsey i s being either confused, or 
j u s t i n t e l l e c t u a l l y dishonest. The A r t i c l e s may take on di f f e r e n t 
meanings i n di f f e r e n t contexts of t h e i r use. But t h i s r a i s e s several 
separate points. 
F i r s t l y , the A r t i c l e s cannot be treated as l o g i c a l l y a l l on the same 
l e v e l . Some are meant to be taken quite l i t e r a l l y , and cannot be given 
any other contextual position. For example, A r t i c l e VI 'On the names 
and numbers of the Canonical books' Some of them can only be taken 
l i t e r a l l y and are now f a l s e . For example, A r t i c l e XXXVIII. 'The Bishop 
Rome has no j u r i s d i c t i o n i n the realm of England* Other A r t i c l e s such 
as A r t i c l e I 'Of f a i t h i n the Holy T r i n i t y ' or A r t i c l e XXXI can be 
given di f f e r e n t meanings because they can be interpreted i n d i f f e r e n t 
contexts. 
Secondly, granted some of the a r t i c l e s can be interpreted i n 
^6. On Being Sure i n Religion, p .69 
Vj>. Op. c i t . p.89 
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different ways i n different contexts, we can s t i l l ask what i s the correct 
context for t h i s a r t i c l e to be interpreted. For example, i f h i s t o r i c a l 
scholarship could show that A r t i c l e XXXI 'On the one oblation of C h r i s t 
finished on the Cross' was i n f a c t meant to be a piece of C a l v i n i s t theo-
logy, designed to exclude every possible meaning that could be given to 
the doctrine of the s a c r i f i c e of the mass, then might not many people 
wish to say that t h i s a r t i c l e i s f a l s e ? 
Thirdly, i t i s presumably possible to draw up a l i s t of those 
a r t i c l e s which can be placed i n different contexts and be given different 
meanings. But there i s a limited number of meanings which can be given 
to any A r t i c l e or any c o l l e c t i o n of A r t i c l e s . A r t i c l e XXXI, for example, 
could be interpreted i n a C a l v i n i s t sense, a Tractarian sense, a Modernist 
sense, and sonon; but any such l i s t i n g of the various p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s 
f i n i t e . Further i t i s a l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y that a l l the various a l t e r -
native interpretations of any given a r t i c l e w i l l a l l be f a l s e ; or a t 
l e a s t i t i s possible to state what i n p r i n c i p l e would show that the 
C a l v i n i s t , Traotarian or Modernist interpretation of A r t i c l e XXXI are 
f a l s e . 
Now Ramsey does not seem to i d e n t i f y the 'Anglican Attitude' of 
tentativeness with either the p o s s i b i l i t y of the a r t i c l e s being true i f 
contextualised i n one way, or f a l s e , i f contextualised i n another; rather 
t h e i r t e n t a t i v e ^ consists i n t h e i r remaining l o g i c a l l y ambiguous, and i t 
i s t h e i r l o g i c a l ambiguity which preserves the purity of the mystery of 
God's revelation. But to see refuge i n such l o g i c a l ambiguity i s an 
attempt to evade the issue of the truth or f a l s i t y of the 'Anglican 
Attitude'; i t maj^s t h i s attitude i n f a l l i b l e and invulnerable to 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n ; but i t a l s o hides the p o s s i b i l i t y of God's revelation. 
Because i f what I say about God i s l o g i c a l l y ambiguous, I cannot be 
128. 
mistaken about the nature of God's revelation; but t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y i s 
bought a t the pri c e of not being able to say anything coherent a t a l l 
about the mystery we c a l l God. L e s l i e Stephen's words about Maurice 
f i t Ramsey's position over the A r t i c l e s equally w e l l . He i s 
'muddle headed f u t i l e u t t e r l y bewilding*. 
48. On Being Sure i n Religion; p.50 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
VERIFICATION: EHIS WORLD OR THE NEXT 
1. F a i t h aa Non-Praposltlonal: 
John Hick i n F a i t h and Knowledge and other writings on the same topic, 
claims that the uniform epistemological character of f a i t h can be l a i d 
bare; to know God i s not to hold or believe i n a s e r i e s of propositions 
such as 'God i s the Father of mankind', or 'Jesus C h r i s t i s the son of 
God'; to know God i s to experience Him i n a way epistemologically s i m i l a r 
to the way I experience a table or a c a t . Admittedly, the objects of 
experience i n the two cases, e.g. God and a cat, are described by statements 
which are of l o g i c a l l y different types, but the way the knower knows the 
two objects i s i d e n t i c a l . The major and the minor prophets of the Old 
Testament, the Apostles, and Ch r i s t himself, did not, Hick thinks, believe 
i n a set of propositions about God; they experienced for themselves the 
God the l i v i n g and the true. Hick writes: "Instead of assimilating f a i t h 
to propositions! b e l i e f whether such a b e l i e f be produced by reasoning or 
an a c t of w i l l , or both - we mftst assimilate i t to perception. I 
therefore want to explore the p o s s i b i l i t y that the cognition of God by 
f a i t h i s more l i k e perceiving something, even perceiving a physical 
object, that i s present before us than i t i s l i k e believing a statement 
about some absent object, whether the statement has been proved to us 
or because we want to believe i t . " ^ 
I wish to r a i s e two questions about Hick's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of f a i t h 
with some sort of immediate experience of God. F i r s t l y , i s h i s neat 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Aquinas' views about revelation as sol e l y prepositional 
adequate?^ Secondly, can experience which contains no prepositional or 
1. F a i t h and Knowledge: 2nd ed. 1967 
2 . John Hick; "Religious f a i t h as 'experiencing a s " 1 i n Royal I n s t i t u t e of 
Philosophy l e c t u r e s . Vol. I I 1967-68 Talk of God, p.21 
3 . I n F a i t h and Knowledge:Chapter 1, passim 
130 
cognitive element provide an adequate phenomenology of what i s s a i d and 
done i n the f u l l range of Ch r i s t i a n b e l i e f and worship? 
The only section of the Sunma Theologica Hick quotes and discusses 
i s F a r t I I . I I . Question 1 . f f . Here Aquinas writes "Accordingly the 
object of f a i t h may be considered i n two ways. F i r s t as regards the 
thing i t s e l f which i s believed, and thus the object of f a i t h i s something 
simple, namely the thing about which we have f a i t h . Secondly, on the 
part of the believer, and i n t h i s respect the object of f a i t h i s something 
it 
complex by way of a proposition." 
Here, Aquinas i s undoubtedly saying that f a i t h i n t h i s l i f e involves 
believing i n propositions: but does i t follow from t h i s a s Hick seems to 
imply, that for Aquinas f a i t h i s r e s t r i c t e d to, and i s never anything over 
and above the acceptance of propositions? I think that Hick i s following 
the popular Roman interpretation of what fi^uinas says rather than looking 
to see what Aquinas a c t u a l l y wrote. J u s t as the popular Roman i n t e r -
pretation of the Quinquae viae suppose that these arguments provide 
demonstrative proofs of God's existence, so the popular teaching about 
Aquinas on f a i t h suggests that he r e s t r i c t s f a i t h to nothing but the 
acceptance of a set of propositions. I think that Aquinas i s rather 
saying that because our knowledge of God i n t h i s l i f e , i s never and i n 
the nature of the case, can never be complete, f a i t h , i f i t i s to be 
cognitive, requires both a propositional and an experiential aspect. 
F i r s t l y , i t i s nonsense to say that the only model of f a i t h for Aquinas 
i s assent to propositions. There i s a ce r t a i n amount of common ground 
between Aquinas, and Protestant thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Brunner 
and Barth: they a l l i n s i s t that the New Testament doctrine of f a i t h c o nsists 
i n obedience to what i s divinely given, and therefore f a i t h i t s e l f i s a 
g i f t of God, and can never be i d e n t i f i e d with human nature, or any element 
4 . Summa Theologica: Part I I . I I Question 1 . English Dominican Translation 
1901. p.6 
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of i t , not even propositions. Thus: "We are directed by the help of 
divine grace to our ultimate end. But the ultimate end i s an open v i s i o n 
of the F i r s t Truth i n I t s e l f . .....therefore before i t comes to t h i s 
and man's i n t e l l e c t must be subject to God by way of b e l i e f , under the 
influence of divine grace which accomplishesthis."^ 
Secondly, Aquinas makes c l e a r that assent to propositions i s only 
one of the elements i n f a i t h . God i s i n the end 'the Unknown', 
and so transcends any propositions which may be used to describe His nature. 
Thus Aquinas claimed: "This i s the ultimate i n human knowledge of God: 
to know that we do not know Him"** But further, i n the Sumrna Theologica, 
he makes the point e x p l i c i t l y that revelation of God's mystery i s 
conveyed to us by means of our sense experience. For,"Holy Scripture 
f i t t i n g l y d e l i v e r s Divine and s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t i e s under bodily guises. 
For God provides for a l l things according to the kind of things they are. 
Now we are of the kind to reach the world the world of in t e l l i g e n c e 
through the world of sense, since a l l our knowledge takes i t s r i s e from 
sensation. Congenially, then, Holy Scripture d e l i v e r s s p i r i t u a l things 
7 
to us beneath the metaphor of bodily things. 
Thirdly, for Aquinas f a i t h i s primarily adhesion to God Himself, 
inasmuch as He di s c l o s e s Himself to us. Therefore i n t h i s sense f a i t h i s 
an immediate and personal knowing of God. "Since man can only know the 
things he does not see himself by taking them from another who does see 
them, and since f a i t h i s among the things we do not see, the knowledge 
of objects of f a i t h must be handed on by one who sees them himself. Now 
t h i s one i s God, who per f e c t l y comprehends Himself, and naturally sees 
g 
h i s essence. Indeed we get f a i t h from God," 
5- Summa Contra Gentiles. Book I I I Chapter 152 Trans. Vernon J . Bourke, 
Image Books, pp.236-237 
6. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei 7* 5% Ad.l*f 
7* Summa Theologica; 1 .1 .9 . New Dominican Trans, pp.33 and 35 
8. Summa Contra Gentiles: Book I I I , Chapter 154 Trans. Vernon J . Bourke, 
Image Books, p.239 
Hick a r r i v e s a t the conclusion that we can only have knowledge of God 
by experience by putting forward a dilemma: God can be known either by 
perceiving His presence or because He i s an inferred e n t i t y . God i s 
obviously not an inferred entity i n the same way that suboatomic p a r t i c l e s 
are inferred e n t i t i e s ; therefore knowledge of God can be by experience 
Q 
and i s never the r e s u l t of an infere n c e . 7 But does t h i s neat and 
compressed argument prove that we can know God only by having some sor t 
of experience, and that any i n d i r e c t i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge of God i s 
always i l l i c i t ? 
Why should there be one and only one way to get to know God i n t h i s , 
l i f e ? The phrase 'knowing God' seems to have a variety of divergent 
uses: I know God through the record of His revelation to and through the 
prophets, apostles and martyrs; I know God i n C h r i s t Jesus; I know God 
i n His presence i n the eucharist; I know God i n the works of His creation. 
I n a l l these instances and many others, I can claim that I 'know' God; but 
the various uses of 'know' cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with myiiexperiencing 1 
God and nothing e l s e . 
Consider the statement that Jesus died on the cross i n A.D.33. This 
statement 1B ce n t r a l to the Ch r i s t i a n b e l i e f that C h r i s t opened the way 
for the p o s s i b i l i t y of man's salvation by h i s atoning death on the cross. 
No death on the cross, no atonement. But do I know the h i s t o r i c a l 
statement that Jesus died on the cross i n A.D.33 by 'experience'? I t 
i s true that someone must have once experienced C h r i s t dying on the cross, 
or thought they had, and then recorded i t i n or a l , written, or perhaps 
p i c t o r i a l form, so that the information has been conveyed to me here 
and now. But I do not, and i n the nature of the case cannot experience 
C h r i s t being c r u c i f i e d , i n the way I can f e e l pain a t l i s t e n i n g to John 
Stfein e r ' s ' C r u c i f i x i o n ' , or the pleasure of l i s t e n i n g to J.S. Bach's 
9- John B a i l l i e i n Our Knowledge of God, demolishes the t h e i s t i c proofs by 
means of a s i m i l a r argument. 
'St. Matthew passion*. My experience of the c r u c i f i x i o n i s not immediate, 
and because the New Testament documents are written records I can know of 
the c r u c i f i x i o n by means of propositions. I t i s a contingent fac t that 
the record of the c r u c i f i x i o n i s propositional: i t might have been 
straightforwardly p i c t o r i a l , or i t could have been conveyed by means of 
some musical 'description'. 
The statement 'Christ died for me on the cross around 33 A.D.' i s not 
a straightforward h i s t o r i c a l statement. I t i s an autobiographical s t a t e -
ment describing what I think C h r i s t ' s death on the cross has done for me. 
The statement presupposes the h i s t o r i c a l truth of the proposition, 'Christ 
died on the cross', but i t a l s o describes part of my experience. I am 
claiming that t h i s death was d i f f e r e n t from any other c r u c i f i x i o n i n the 
same year; other c r u c i f i x i o n s may have been recorded or not; the 
records may have been kept or l o s t . But C h r i s t ' s death i s claimed to have 
significance for my present experience. This statement describing my 
present experience of C h r i s t i s of a different type from that recording 
. h i s t o r i c a l events about C h r i s t ' s early l i f e . But i t does presuppose a 
record of the h i s t o r i c a l event of C h r i s t ' s death; and that record i s 
stated i n propositions. 
To take another example, Hick i s q i i t e correct i n asserting that 
I s a i a h ' s inaugural v i s i o n ( I s a i a h 6) was a matter of what I s a i a h saw, 
heard, and f e l t . (Thus I s a i a h writes, ' I saw the Lord s i t t i n g on a throne' 
. . . ' I heard the voice of the Lord'...etc.) I n order to be communicated 
the v i s i o n was described i n propositions. And granted the fac t that 
I s a i a h wrote a book about h i s v i s i o n and did not describe i t i n p i c t o r i a l 
or other form, i f I am to come to know the God to which the Old Testament 
bears witness, I must read the propositions Isaiah wrote, and re-interpret 
them i n terms of how I can come to experience God. I s a i a h ' s experience 
I3*f. 
cannot be communicated to me as a sort of pure experience independently of 
some form of communication. 
Propositions then, were as a matter of fac t used to communicate God's 
revelation i n the Old and New Testaments. 
There do seem to be some uses of the word 'know' i n which what i s 
known i s not something d i r e c t l y experienced i n the sense that I am now 
d i r e c t l y experiencing a white blue, and yet i s not an inferred entity 
e i t h e r . I know that i n 191? the Bolsheviks staged a revolution i n Russia, 
but 3 did not experience the revolution i n the way for example, I 
experienced the Cuban revolution. I n the l a t t e r case, I saw pictures i n 
the paper and on t e l e v i s i o n , and I heard and read news reports and so on. 
again I did not experience the Cuban revolution i n the way I have exper-
ienced the student revolution i n Durham, I n 1968. I n t h i s case, I saw 
the ' S i t I n ' i n Old Shire H a l l . 
I n other words, there i s not an impassible gulf between inferred 
e n t i t i e s on the one hand and experience on the other: Such a r i g i d 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two cannot be upheld. The two extremes of sub-
atomic p a r t i c l e s and my seeing a red patch now are d i s t i n c t , but 
'experience' and e n t i t i e s supposedly inferred from such experience tend to 
become f a i r l y inseparable, i n knowledge of the past, i n knowledge of 
concepts, and i n knowledge of the future. But Hick confuses h i s whole 
an a l y s i s by pretending that 'experience' and e n t i t i e s inferred from 
experience are t o t a l l y d i s t i n c t and separate, and then extending h i s f i r s t 
use of the word 'experience' to cover what i s not i n any sense neat 
experience. 
Hick claims that there i s no difference i n p r i n c i p l e between learning 
to recognise a fork and learning to recognise God. He writes: " I s h a l l 
t r y to show while the object of r e l i g i o u s knowledge i s unique, i t s basic 
epistemological pattern i s that of a l l our knowing.^ The great 
d i f f i c u l t y i s to discover what exactly Hick means by experiencing a fork. 
To eludidate h i s b e l i e f that concepts are di s p o s i t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s , Hick 
uses examples drawn from Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing as ' i n the 
Philosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . ^ Jastrow's duck-rabbit can be seen as 
either the head of a duck or the head of a rabbit. 
Wittgenstein argues that i n the case of puzzle pictures the interpretation 
of the l i n e s and marks on the paper i s not an additional f a c t about the 
picture. The person who can distinguish nothing i n the above diagram, 
sees the same l i n e s and marks as the person who can see i t as a duck, or 
as a rabbit, or as both of these. The 'seeing a s ' element i n the percep-
t i o n of the puzzle pictures, adds no additional f a c t , and i s not produced 
by any additional f a c t i n the puzzle picture. Thus Wittgenstein writes: 
" but what I perceive i n the dawning of an aspect i s not a property 
of an object, but an i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between i t and other o b j e c t s . 1 1 ^ 
As applied to puzzle pictures, these points are quite acceptable and 
unexceptionable. Hick, however, extends the notion of 'seeing a s ' i n 
Two ways. 
F i r s t l y , he extends the notion of 'seeing a s ' to that of 'experienc-
ing as'. Just as I can see t h i s desk as a motor car i f I look a t i t 
from a certain angle, so I can hear the sound of my cat mewing as the 
whistle of my best friend, or smell the decaying of old f i s h as the 
fermenting of beer. The sense of sight has no monopoly i n providing 
information about the external world, and I think Hick i s quite j u s t i f i e d 
i n extending the idea of 'seeing as' to the other senses. 
10. F a i t h and Knowledge! p.97 
11. Part I I , Section XI 
12. Philosophical Investigations; Part I I p.212e 
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Secondly, Hick suggests that " a l l seeing i s 'seeing a s " ' and " a l l 
experiencing i s " 'experiencing a s t n Z Hick a s s e r t s : "The next point to be 
introduced w i l l considerably a f f e c t the upshot of what has gone before. 
This i s the t h e s i s that a l l experiencing i s experiencing-as..... not only, 
for example, seeing the t u f t of grass, erroneously, as a rabbit, but 
a l s o seeing i t c o r r e c t l y as a t u f t of g r a s s . B u t can a l l 
experiencing meaningfully be regarded as experiencing-as? 
Hick admits £hat i t i s necessary todraw the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
objects which we experience as something other than they are, (e.g. a 
t u f t of grass as a r a b b i t ) , and objects we experience as what we normally 
describe them as being (e.g. experience a t u f t of grass as a t u f t of 
gr a s s ) . There i s a type d i s t i n c t i o n between these two cases. I n the 
f i r s t case, ( i . e . when I experience a t u f t of grass as a r a b b i t ) , there 
are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : (a) I may be deceived by the appearance and 
believe that there i s a rabbit where there i s only a t u f t of grass; 
(b) I may know that the t u f t of grass i s not r e a l l y a rabbit, but see the 
likeness of a rabbit i n i t s appearance. Both these -instances d i f f e r 
from my seeing the t u f t of grass as what i t i s , a t u f t of grass. 
I t i s hard to see what Hick gains by h i s l i n g u i s t i c recommendation 
that we begin to regard a l l experiencing as 'experiencing a s * . I f 
everything we experience i s 'experienced a s ' then i t w i l l be necessary 
to introduce further terminology to distinguish those 'experiencing a s ' 
situations i n which something i s 'experienced a s ' other than i t i s , from 
those s i t u a t i o n s i n which something i s 'experienced as* what i t f a c t u a l l y 
i s . The l i n g u i s t i c recommendation only generates a more complicated 
terminology than the terminology i t i s recommended to replace. Hick 
c e r t a i n l y seems to be misinterpreting Wittgenstein i n making 'experiencing 
13- Op. c i t . Talk of God; p.Zk 
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as* do the job which the word experiencing normally does. Wittgenstein 
was quite categorical: "Seeing as...' i s not part of perception. And 
for that reason i t i s l i k e seeing and again not l i k e . 1 1 ^ 
What i s Hick trying to do with the notion of experience? He i s 
trying as I indicated earlier, to divorce 'experience' from any 
propositional element, or element of judgement. To experience X i s 
no guarantee that I w i l l logically be able to judge that X or state that 
X. But i f the possibility about making a judgement about an experience 
i s removed, i s not the possibility of my u saying:that a given experience 
i s trye or false also removed? Despite his claims to be an empiricist, 
Hick seems to be attempting to make the paradigm of experience, those 
experiences which can neither be said to be true or false, veridical or 
non-veridical. Thus, " l a i t h i s an uncompelled mode of 'experiencing as'., 
experiencing the world as a place i n which we have to do at a l l times 
with the transcenden^f God; and the propositional belief to which i t 
gives rise i s correspondingly non-coercive i n that i t i s not only 
presently unverifiable but also unable to be supported by arguments of 
prob a b i l i t y . " ^ But i f f a i t h i s the result of some sort of experience 
which i s neither? verifiable nor f a l s i f i a b l e i n this l i f e , what logical 
status does i t have? Is the experience whioh f a i t h gives us of the same 
status as my seeing a patch of red? The statement j[l see red now' may 
be incorrigible, but i t has to buy this i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y at the price of 
being uninformative about the world. Hick t e l l s us that "for the 
believer f a i t h i s not probability but a cer t a i n t y . " ^ We are never told, 
however, what sort of certainty f a i t h gives us, and i t very much looks as 
though^ i t i s that type of certainty i n which problems of ontology are 
submerged i n some sort of self-authenticating epistemology. 
l * t . Philosophical Investigations: Pt. I I , p.l97e 
15- Baith and Knowledge; p.151 
16. Op. c i t . p.53 
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This assimilation of experiencing to 'experiencing as' i s matched 
i n i t s obscurity by Hick's exposition of the theory that concepts are 
dispositional capacities* He i s quite correct, I think, to follow 
Wittgenstein, Byle, and Price i n affirming that there i s not necessarily 
some sort of ghostly mental a c t i v i t y going on, every time I recognise an 
object, or perform an action. I don't need to put every action I do 
to turn my oar to the right, I don't need to utter i n my head the Highway 
Code formula, "Mirror-signal-maiioeuvre", before turning r i g h t . Knowing 
what to do i n this instance i s being able to perform the necessary actions 
correctly. Similarly, inrecognising a pre-1958-Morris Minor, I don't 
need to perform an intellectual somersault, and run through the details 
in my mind of what such a car looks l i k e , before I do the recognising. 
I f I did, I would need to perform a second order intellectual act i n 
order to recognise the f i r s t one, and so on ad infinitum. I f questioned 
as to how I know that this car i s a pre-1958 Morris Minor, I can reply, 
because i t has a f l a t radiator g r i l l , a windscreen divided into two 
halves, a solid chassis, and so on. A thorough check of my act of 
recognition does involve the drawing up of this type of l i s t ^ But my 
i n i t i a l recognition i s not an intellaectual l i s t making of this sort. 
Hick seems to me correct i n affirming that recognising and thinking 
are not ghostly replicas of experiencing and sensing; and I do not 
wish to deny the value of his dispositional analysis of knowing God. 
But he i s wrong i n supposing that sensing and experiencing are i n no 
way connected with judging, and the use of propositions. As i n the 
case discussed above of 'experiencing as', Hick here also seems to wish 
to place whatever we do when we recognise and experience, beyond the 
range of cognitive empirioal checking, safely out of the way of the 
into a propositional form i n my mind before I perform i t . I Bant 
* 
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dangers of the demand for verification or f a l s i f i c a t i o n . 
There i s practically no discussion i n Hick of problems about 
misrecognising, and 'mis-experiencing as*. The fact that concepts are 
recognitions! capacities, provides no guarantee that I use the concepts 
I have learnt correctly. For example, when C.S. Lewis's book A Grief 
Observed f i r s t came out, I misrecognised the t i t l e , (despite the fact 
thftf I read the book from cover to cover) as A Grief Obscured. Sverytime 
I looked at the cover of the book, because I expected to see the words 
of the t i t l e I had invented, I saw that t i t l e and not the correct one. 
This mis-recognition went on for several weeks, u n t i l , when I discussed 
the book with a friend, my mistake was pointed out. Hick seems to be 
attempting to produce a theory of how we experience or recognise which at 
one and the same time avoids the appeal for verification, and i s s t i l l 
sturdy enough to provide us with knowledge about nature, man and God. 
The description which Hick provides of the processes by means of 
which we acquire religious belief may or may not be correct. But the 
truth content of a given set of religious beliefs i s not specified by 
means of such a phenomenology. To. say a l l concepts are recognitions! 
capacities, does not t e l l me which concepts are instantiated and which 
are not. The fact that i n seeing my desk, I see my desk, and not a 
experience are two separate and to t a l l y unrelated things. As G.N.A. 
Vesey put i t x "The look of things i s something phenomenal, not intellectual 
This i s not to deny that experience and judgement are connected; for what 
an object looks l i k e to a person i s what he would judge that object to be 
i f he had reason to gudge otherwise. 
proposition or set of propositions, does not mean that judgement and 
17. "Seeing and seeing as;" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
1955-56 
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Hick attempts to strip recongition of i t s proposition^, and 
intellectual elements, and leaves i t as a non-cognitive act. In 
Thinking and Experience, H.H. Price distinguishes between the 
recognition of individuals, and the recognition of characteristics. 
Individuals are such things as tiblee, cats and men, etc. Characteristics 
are blueness, heaviness, hardness, etc. Price regards the recognition 
of the characteristics as i n some sense fundamental, i n that the recognition 
of the individual i s i n the end, dependent on the recognition of the 
characteristic^ There i s a sense i n which the recognition of the 
individual i s inferred from that of the characteristic^ yet inferred i s 
not quite the right word. There i s no formal and or conscious process 
of inference, but rather an ' a l l at once character' of secondary 
recognition. But. Price claims "secondary recognition i s always subject 
to verification (that i s how i t s f a l l i b i l i t y i s discovered) and i n this 
respect i t really does resemble inductive inference. 
Hick seems to want to get r i d of this appeal for verification at an 
ordinary empirical level i n this world, i n order that he can.introduce 
his 'eschatological verification' at a later stage. 
Hick's claim that there i s "no difference i n principle between learning 
to recognise a fork and learning to recognise acts of God,"^ f a l l s to 
pieces at this point. I f I recognise that this i s a fork, I can also 
verify that this i s a fork here and now. But for Hick this i s not true of 
my recognition of God, because I have to wait u n t i l I die before I can 
verify that He i s God. I t i s not accidental that the notions of 
verification and f a l s i f i c a t i o n are hardly mentioned i n Hick's discussion 
18. Chapter 2. 
19» Thinking and Experience: p.51 
20. Notes on Hick's lectures, Cambridge 1967 
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of our knowledge of forks, rabbits and tufts of grass. But i l our 
acts of knowing material objects, and our acts of knowing God are to be 
shown to be epistemologically similar, then either there must be some 
verification procedure at least i n principle for verifying there i s a 
God here and now, or ordinary material objects which we know and recognise 
must not be verifiable i n principle i n this l i f e . Hick takes the 
la t t e r course, despite i t s utter counter-empirical emphasis4 
A further puzzling feature of Hick's phenomenology of religious 
belief i s his use of the puzzle picture examples. The religious inter-
pretation of the universe i s regarded rather l i k e Jastrow's duck-rabbit 
puzzle picture i n the sense that just as both- interpretations of the 
puzzle picture are equally valid, so the theistic or atheistic interpreta-
puzzle picture, the t o t a l l y ambiguous one, suitable as the model for the 
religious interpretation of the universe? Further, i f the duck-rabbit i s 
the correct model for religious epistemology, can I be said to know of God 
and to know of a fork i n the same way? A fork i s not ambiguously a fork 
and something else at one and the same time. 
The puzzle picture analogy i s illus t r a t e d by the parable of two men 
on a road, one of whom thinks that the road i s just "one damn'd thing 
after another", yet the other thinks i t i s a road to the celestial c i t y . 
Life " i n via" has this t o t a l ambiguity: only when they come to their 
journey's end w i l l they discover which guess at the way the road went was 
correct. Here Hick seems to be taking up the position of a hypothetical 
impartial observer; i f Hick's phenomenological analysis of religious 
belief i s correct, then there i s no rational way of choosing between the 
Christian and non-Christian view of the universe. But as Hick recognises, 
both Christians and non-Christians do claim to know that their beliefs are 
tions of the universe are e y valid But why i s only one type of 
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true. Bur further, Hick claims that he knows Christianity i s true: 
21 
"For to the believer f a i t h i s not a possibility but a certainty." 
The i n i t i a l scepticism about the Christian interpretation of l i f e i s not 
genuine. The use of the puzzle picture analogy as a model for religious 
belief does not i n the end help to evade issues of truth and f a l s i t y . 
Even within the puzzle picture universe of discourse, some interpretations 
of the puzzle picture are correct, others are incorrect. I can interpret 
the duck-rabbit as a duck, or as a rabbit, or as both, but i t would 
certainly be wrong to interpret i t as an elephant, or as a kangaroo. 
But Hick offers no c r i t e r i a for distinguishing the correct interpretations 
of puzzle pictures from incorrect ones. To quote G.N.A. Vesey again 
"To say ' a l l seeing i s 'seeing as',' i s to say that perceptions l i k e 
judgements are either true or false they are true when what the 
22 
object looks l i k e to somebody i s what the object i s . " 
2. The Impossibility of Alogical Probability: 
Most of what Hick has to say about the impossibility of applying the 
notion of probability to the universe as a whole, I am i n f u l l agreement 
23 
with. But one of his arguments seems to make impossible any type of 
Christian apologetic, i n this l i f e , or i n any other. In discussing 
F.S. Tennant's two volumned work on Philosophical Theology« he writes 
"The standard naturalistic theories do indeed display serious inconsis-
tencies and inadequacies under examination, and these can be exposed 
by arguments which are as valid for the unbeliever as for the religious 
believer. But i n the constructive apologetic, the method changes, overtly 
or covertly, from impersonal demonstration to personal persuasion, from 
argument to recommendation. For there are no common scales i n which to 
21. Faith and Knowledge: p.53 
22. Seeing and seeing as; Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
1955-56, p.UA 
23. Faith and Knowledge: Chapter 7 
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measure, for example, the evidential weight of apparent universal 
mechanism against that of the inpact of Christ upon his disoiples. 
There i s no objective measuring rod by which to compare the depth to 
which wickedness can sink with the height to which goodness can ri s e , 
and so to balance the problem of e v i l which challenges theism, against 
the problem of good which challenges naturalism. Looked at i n a 
completely neutral l i g h t , and through the spectacles of no philosophy, 
the face of the world would present a oheckboard of alternative black 
and white. I t can be seen either as white diversified by black - a 
divinely ruled world containing accidental pockets of ev i l ) or as black 
diversified by white - a godless world containing the incongruous factor 
of moral goodness 
This i s an interesting argument, but i f i t i s correct two moves 
Hick might want to make are ruled out. F i r s t l y , i t makes an Irenaean 
type of theolicy i n t h i s l i f e logically impossible, because I cannot 
weigh^ the value of soul making against the existence of the vast amount 
of e v i l there i s i n the world. Secondly, i f I logically cannot weigh 
the exLstenoe of e v i l against the fact of Christ and so on i n this l i f e , 
i t w i l l not be logically possible i n an eschatological world either. 
Now what God i s l i k e i s presumably determined i n part by what he i s 
allowing to happen i n th i s world here and now. But i f I can never weigh 
pp these inoomensurables, I can never know i n an a f t e r - l i f e whether the 
b«lng before me, whom others worship, i s an a l l loving God, or nothing 
but a devil. 
Hick gets round my f i r s t pount by doing at a level of theodicy what 
i n I h i t h and Knowledge he does at the level of epistemology: he places 
the resolution of the problem of suffering i n an a f t e r - l i f e , and not i n 
this one. This: " I f there i s any eventual resolution of the interplay 
24. Faith and Knowledge: pp.155 - 156 
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between good and e v i l , any deeisive bringing of good out of e v i l , i t must 
l i e beyond t h i s world and beyond the enigma of death. " ^ Shis 
invulnerability of belief i n this world can be brought only at a high 
price: "Experienced from within stresses of human existence, e v i l i s 
a sheerly malevolent r e a l i t y , hostile alike to God and His creation."^ 
Just as i n the case of epiatemology i n th i s l i f e , the evidence i s equally 
i n favour of the theist and the atheist, so i n the case of theodicy the 
evidenoe for and against the existence of a loving God i s t o t a l l y 
ambiguous. 
la the same paragraph as the l a t t e r passage however, Hick writes: 
"Seen.•... i n the perspective of a l i v i n g f a i t h i n the r e a l i t y of a 
great, on-going, divine purpose which enfolds a l l time and a l l history, 
e v i l has no status i n virtue of which i t might threaten even Qod Himself. 
••••• neither i t s beginning, i t s course, nor i t s end l i e s outside God's 
ultimate c o n t r o l . " ^ But, i f I can see the resolution of the problem of 
e v i l i n the a f t e r - l i f e only, how can I assert anything about God's 
ultimate purpose for, or control of the world from the standpoint i n which 
I as placed i n this l i f e ? Hiok's claim that i n this l i f e we don't know 
God because of the ambiguity of the evidence, again turns out to be a sham. 
Hiok's thodicy does presuppose, nevertheless, that when I die and l i v e 
with my resurrection body, I w i l l see that God's ultimate purpose, not 
only for me, but for the whole of mankind was and i s good. But t h i s 
presupposes that i n the a f t e r - l i f e I can weigh the pros and cons for and 
against God's goodness. I f I oannot see whether or not the fact of 
Christ outweighs the problem of e v i l and so on, my a f t e r - l i f e experience 
of religion w i l l remain as systematically ambiguous as i t i s at present. 
I f the pieces of evidenoe against and i n favour of God's goodness are i n 
25. Bvil and the Qod of love: p.375 
26. I v i l and the Qod of Love: p.395 
27. Evil and the Qod of love: p.395 
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principle incommensurable as Hick suggests, then no theodicy Is ever 
passible, aad cognitive knowledge of God i s logically impossible, i n the 
present and i n too hereafter. But i f evidence can be weighed i n the 
a f t e r - l i f e , why i s i t i n principle impossible that some of the weighing 
should be done i n this l i f e ? 
People as a matter of Fact can and do weigh the evidences for and 
against the existence of a good God against each other. The existence 
of the weighing process i s no guarantee that i t i s logically j u s t i f i a b l e . 
Hick however, seems to suppose that unless there i s a s t r i c t objective 
means of measuring the existence of e v i l against the fact of Christ 
and so on, no sort of measurement i s possible. But consider the 
u t i l i t a r i a n system of ethics. In this ethical system, there i s no s t r i c t 
and r i g i d measuring rod by means of which I can measure the pleasure I 
can get from a short sharp t i c k l e , against that which I get from a 
lethargic throbbing tranquility. Or more seriously there i s no metre 
rod provided for me to measure whether the t e l l i n g of l i e s w i l l cause more 
unhappiness for the greatest number, than t e l l i n g the truth. Most human 
beings are u t i l i t a r i a n s some of the time, and we manage to make rule of 
thumb calculations about what the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number w i l l be, without there being any need for what Hick would c a l l a 
s t r i c t objective measure. Likewise i n the ease of Hick's scales, 
people can and do i n their own consideration of their religious beliefs 
compare the fact of Christ with the existence of e v i l . Hick has a 
point i n suggesting that any system of weighing we employ i n t h i s world 
w i l l always be provisional and incompletex but i t i s better to use 
inadequate tools, when they are the only tools we have got, than no tools 
at a l l . 
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3» The Three Decker Universet 
'Experiencing as' i s not just a ehance recognition of individual 
phenomena. What wo 'experience' can, Hick suggests, be divided into 
three distinct but interrelated areas: the natural, the moral and the 
religious. In each of the three spheres I come to know about the 
material world, morals of religion by the same epistemologieal process; 
that of 'experiencing as'. The three spheres are not dlstinot and 
separate, but interpenetrate each other. Hick claims that the natural 
aspects of our environment are the most basic, they force themselves on 
us whether we want to believe i n them or not. I cannot help but believe 
except when for a few minutes I play the part of a sceptical philosopher, 
that there i s a room i n which I spend most of my waking l i f e , and that i n 
i t are a desk, bed, chairs, and many ^ ooks. The moral aspects of our ' 
environment presuppose the natural, i n that moral action always occurs 
so far as we know, within and through the natural world. I have 
relative freedom i n the moral sphere, i n that I can choose whether I want 
to steal or to be honest, to murder or to l i v e at peace with my 
neighbours. I f I am to l i v e i n a society of any sort, I have to adopt 
some moral code, however rudimentary, even i f i t i s only to preserve 
honour among thieves. In the religious sphere which presupposes both 
the moral and the natural, freedom i s the greatest. I can accept or 
reject God as I see f i t . Hick argues: "Has this episteaologioal paradigm -
of one order of significance superimposed upon and mediated through 
another - any further application? The contention of this chapter i s that 
i t has. As ethical significance interpenetrates natural significance, 
so religious significance interpenetrates both ethical and natural. The 
divina i s the highest and ultimate order of significance, mediating neither 
of the others, and yet being mediated through both of them."^ 
28. Faith and Knowledge: p. 113 
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What does Hlek mean by the metaphor 'interpenetrate'? what exactly 
are the relations between the three levels; the natural, the moral, and 
the religious? To say that 'interpenetrate' each other without unpacking 
what the word means i s to say nothing* What, i f any, are the logical 
relations between statements about the moral and the natural spheres? 
What are the logical relations between statements about the moral and 
the natural spheres, and statements should the religious spheres? Hick 
offers no answer to these questions; but i f the claim that a l l the three 
spheres are i n fact known i n the same way i s to be anything more than a 
statement about our psychology, isn't i t necessary to have at least some 
knowledge of how statements about the three spheres are logically 
related? 
But granted that i t i s the ease that the religious, the moral and 
the natural aspects of our experience do have a common epistemology, how 
do we know that the concepts we have been taught to use i n each of these 
three spheres do In fast refer to something actual. Even i f we grant that 
i n the natural and the moral sphere we have developed a set of concepts 
which we know how to apply reasonably correctly, yet the eonoepts are 
becoming progressively more and more general as we pass from the natural 
to the moral and then on to the religious, and i s there any guarantee that 
by the time we reach the religious sphere the concepts have not become so 
general that they eease to have meaningful application? I know what i t 
i s l i k e to see a table; I also know what i t i s l i k e to 'see' stealing i s 
wrong; I do not know nearly so clearly what i t means to say that I 'see' 
God. At t h i s more general level of recognition Hick s t i l l seems to 
evade the issue of how I can distinguish recognition from misrecognition. 
As I stressed earlier, I can be taught a whole series ofcoherent concepts, 
e.g. Medieval views about Witchcraft, which we know now don't apply to 
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anything. How, on Hick's analysis, do we know that the Christian 
conceptual system describing God i s not i n a similar position? 
km feohatological Verification: 
Hick seems determined to put a l l his eggs i n one basket; any possible 
solution both to problems about the verification of religious belief, and 
to problems of theodicy can, logically, be solved only i n some a f t e r - l i f e . 
The theory of eschatological verification takes the f i n a l step i n the 
attempt to reduce ontology to psychology. The logical and psychological 
factors involved i n verification and f a l s i f i c a t i o n are inseparable. 
That X has been verified or f a l s i f i e d , means that Z has been verified or 
f a l s i f i e d by someone. " I suggest that 'verify' be construed as a verb 
which has i t s primary uses i n the active voice: I verify, you verify, 
we verify, they verify, or have verified. The impersonal passive, 
i t i s verified, now becomes logically secondary."2^ I f meaning i s 
identified with the possibility of verification, this statement w i l l lead 
to phenomenalism of a very radical kind, and make the process of 
verification and f a l s i f i c a t i o n largely mind-dependent. Surely, i t i s 
perfectly meaningful to sayilthere i s a stone on Mars which no l i v i n g 
person w i l l ever see.' Further, i t i s meaningful to claim that 'there 
i s a stone on Mars which no human being could possibly see'; e.g. i n the 
sense that there may be so many stones on Mars that even a l l the human 
beings who eventually land on Mars a l l working together could not see 
every stone. These vno^ statements are verifiable i n principle however, 
i n the sense that we know what i t i s l i k e to see a stone, and by analogy \ 
can postulate what i t would be l i k e to see any given stone on Mars. 
Hick attempts to get round the charges that theological statements 
are not meaningful because they are not verifiable i n principle, by 
suggesting that i n one sense they are. Although we cannot, because of 
29. Faith and Knowledget pp.170 - 171 
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Sod's being God, 'see' God i n this l i f e , i n an a f t e r - l i f e we can expect 
to be confronted face to face with God, or at least with God as revealed 
i n Christ Jesus* The possibility of such a confrontation t e l l s us 
what i t i s l i k e to verify i n principle the statement 'there i s a God' 
But i s some sort of verification i n an a f t e r - l i f e a genuine suggestion 
about verification i n principle? 
Suppose someone says,'t believe the surface of Pluto consists of 
rook and stone.' This statement i s verifiable i n principle, i n that we 
know what i t would be l i k e to land a space ship on Pluto, and to send back 
television pictures from Pluto, and eventually for the men to return i n 
their space ship. The problem about verification i n principle, i s that 
i t i s an a f t e r - l i f e , and not i n this l i f e . 3n an a f t e r - l i f e , there i s 
notsending back of television pictures, no return to earth for the weary 
travellers. I do not think verification i n principle can be extended to 
apply to an a f t e r l i f e the nature of which we cannot specify clearly, but ;~ 
which might not exist. 3h the case of Pluto, we can at least verify 
that there i s such a planet i n which to look for stones; we cannot verify 
that there i s an a f t e r - l i f e i n whioh we are to look for God. 
Hick does offer some suggestions as to what the a f t e r - l i f e may be 
l i k e . He suggests the analogy of a man i n Princeton who suddenly finds 
himself i n Australia with the same body, the same memory contents and the 
same remains i n his stomach as the man who disappeared i n Princeton. 
But isn't part of what we mean by saying someone i s the 'same' person 
that this being lives i n space and time i n a certain way. Hick appeals 
to ordinary language and asserts that i f persons habitually changed 
inexplicably from place to place, or from this world to the next world, 
then our use of the word 'person', and the word 'same' would become enlarged 
i n such a way that we would say that a person who at one moment i s i n 
Princeton, and who at the next moment i s i n Sydney, would be referred to 
as the 'same' person. This claim about the development of ordinary 
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language i n this situation may be true; but only experience of such a 
situation can show that i t i s true. But the language change might go 
against Hick. I f frequent changes of place occurred to persons wo 
might decide to give them a new proper name every time such a change 
occurred. 
A d i f f i c u l t y which Hick acknowledges i n his position i s that even 
i f wo do survive death, the evidence fidir and against the existence of God 
may be as systematically ambiguous as i t i s i n this l i f e . My awareness 
of having survived death, l a and by i t s e l f , provides evidence for the 
statement that there i s l i f e after death, but i t provides no evidence _p 
for the existence of God. Saying what would verify the statement 
'Gos exists* i n some hypothetical a f t e r - l i f e i s as hard as making a 
similar specification i n this l i f e . The problem i s just pushed one 
stage further back. 
I t i s easy enough to assert a somewhat superficial summary of 
St. Paul's view i n I Corinthians that In this l i f e we have a material 
body, and i n some future state we w i l l have a resurrection body. But 
i f the resurrection body i s to be a means of verifying God's existence, 
I must know i n some detail what i t i s l i k e , and how i t perceives what i t 
perceives. Suppose that the resurrection body could perceive nothing 
but i t s own states of self-consciousness, the self being distinguished 
from the not self, by the memory of there having been a self.... non-
self distinction i n the material world. In such a situation I could 
know nothing except ( i ) that I once existed i n the material world; 
( i i ) now I exist, but can only remember what I once experienced, but 
can no longer experience any new data.'' Even i f we grant that a 
'resurrection' body i n some sense identifies and re-fcdentifies 
'resurrection'mobjects as things other than i t s e l f , the problem s t i l l 
ova 
30. See an analogous suggestion for a disembodied, as distinct from an 
embodied self I n P.F. Strawson; individuals; pp.115 - 116* 
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remains, what evidence would verify or f a l s i f y God's existence i n this 
state? This i s it question to which Hick seems prepared to offer no 
serious answer. 
I think that Hick cannot escape the charge of circ u l a r i t y of 
argument. I think Kai Nielsen stresses the wrong point i n saying that 
the ci r c u l a r i t y occurs when Hick suggests that God's existence i n the 
a f t e r - l i f e would be verified i f (a) we saw the completion of God's 
purpose as disclosed i n Jesus Christ In the New Testament; (b) an 
esehatologieal confirmation of Jesus and hence of his revelation of 
God?^ Surely, Hick's argument becomes circular at the point at which 
he starts discussing Paul's notion of a 'resurrection' body. The 
resurrection of the body i s not something according to Paul which we 
achieve for ourselves, or do by our own cleverness or Ingenuity. God 
raises us from the dead by His own gracious act, as He raised Christ 
from the dead. "But some one w i l l ask 'How are the dead raised? 
With what kind of body do they come?' You foolish man. What yo» sow 
does not come to l i f e unless i t does But God gives i t a body as He 
has chosen, and to each kind of seed i t s own body. ... But thanks be ta 
God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Chri s t . " ^ i f , 
however, i t i s God's gracious action which raises us Into a resurrection 
body, no part of thi s process oan be appealed to as evidenoe i n principle 
for the existence of God, without obvious c i r c u l a r i t y . 
5« Two Uses of the Phrase 'to know' i n Hick's Baistemology of Religion: 
Hick claims: " I t i s not being denied here that the religious man 
already enjoys a genuine knowledge of God; i t i s not being suggested 
that he has to wait u n t i l after death to find with certainty whether 
God e x i s t s . I wish to argue that the major problem i n Hiok's 
epistemology of religious belief i s that I am said to 'know' God In t h i s 
31. Nielsen: Canadian Journal of Theology. XVTH No. h 1960 
Also Hick: pp.196 f f . i n ffaith and Knowledge 
32. I Corinthians 15 v.35 + 36; 38, 57 
33. Faith and Knowledge p.193 
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l i f e i n a logically different sort of way from the way I am said to 
'know* God i n the l i f e hereafter. 
Hick i s making a valid theological point i n his statement of his 
theory of eschatological verification. This point that my knowledge of 
God i n this l i f e i s always and can only be provisional: or knowledge 
of God w i l l only start to become complete when i n the a f t e r - l i f e f a i t h 
i s changed into sight. 
I wish to take issue with Hick when he claims that our p a r t i a l 
knowledge of God i n this l i f e i s of a logically different order from our 
knowledge of Him hereafter. Our knowledge of God i n the present, and 
i n any future l i f e we may l i v e to experience, i s of logically the same 
type. Although Hick probably does not intend this to be the cat^se, his 
analysis of our knowledge of God i n this l i f e ^ seems i n the end to be 
non-cognitive. This i s shown by his repeated refusal to describe the 
c r i t e r i a for distinguishing between 'experiencing as' and 'mis-
experiencing as', between recognising and misrecognising. His refusal 
to allow what Price refers to as 'secondary identification', seems to 
force him to place the basic data of religious experience on the same 
logical level as that of sense data. I cannot doubt that I see a red 
blue, but this i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y i s bought at the price of this experience 
being unable to t e l l me anything about the outside world. Hick shows 
a desire to produce a set of basic experiences of religious awareness, 
which are beyond the pale of doubt and f a l s i f i c a t i o n * and yet an which 
can be b u i l t the whole complicated framework of Christian theology and 
worship. Hick attempts i n fact, to prise apart experience from 
judgement, concept recognition from concept verification. \ 
Faith and Knowledge looks l i k e an attempt to invert the popular 
notion of Aquinas' views on religious b e l i e f T h e crude popular 
Jhm Cf. pp.15 cf. above 
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Interpretation of Aquinas asserts that faith i n propositions i s the only 
sort of faith we can reach up to i n this l i f e } only i n an a f t e r - l i f e do 
we experience God. Hick comes very close to asserting that we have to 
wait unt i l the a f t e r - l i f e to have propesitional and therefore cognitive 
knowledge of Qod; i n this l i f e a l l we can get i s 'experiencing as*. 
Therefore, despite explicit denial, he produces a perfect example of an 
i n f a l l i b i l i s t theory of knowledge. We can really know God only 
when we find ourselves i n an a f t e r - l i f e : but this i s putting us i n 
a position where we cannot be mistaken. 
35* Cf. l a i t h and Knowledge: Chapter 9, p.200, passim 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
FAITH AND THE HBTHMT FHOM HISTORY 
One of the meet striking features of twentieth century Protestant 
dogmatics 1B the tendency to retreat on a l l fronts from any possible test 
of verification or falsification. Traditionally Christian apologists of 
a l l denominations hare defended their faith on the ground that Christian-
i t y i s a historical religion. By this claim was usually meant that the 
truth or f a l s i t y of the Christian religion depended on whether or not 
Jesus lived at a certain time i n the past, and whether or not he said 
and did certain things which the gospels and epistles record him as 
saying and doing. Thus Luther i s reputed to have rejected Zwingli's 
belief that the bread and the wine i n the eueharist are "bare signs", on 
the ground that the gospels record that Jesus said over the bread at 
the l a s t supper, "this i s my body", and not "this bread i s a bare sign 
for my body". Clearly, i f Christ never said "this i s my body" over 
the bread, Luther's appeal to Christ's authority f a l l s to the ground. 
To take another example, most Christiana believe that i n seme sense 
Christ died on the cross for the sins of the world. Many Moslems 
however, believe that Jesus never died an the cross; that some 
substitute was found for him at the l a s t minute. Now clearly whether 
the Moslems or Christians are right i s a matter of history, and can i n 
principle be settled by c r i t i c a l historical methods. I f there i s 
sufficient evidence that Christ died on the cross, then the Moslem claim 
i s mistaken. I f there i s good evidence to suggest that Christ never 
died on a cross, then the Christian claim i s obviously false. I f there 
i e insufficient evidence either way, then we can do nothing but remain 
agnostic. 
The problems presented by the claim that Christianity i s a 
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historical religion, does not differ In type from the claim Julius 
Caesar actually lived, or that Hitler sang "Bole Britannia" and then 
committed suicide. She truth or £818117 of these statements depends 
on the historical evidence i n favour of them or against them. Historians 
however, are not agreed among themselves about the correct analysis of 
how our knowledge of the past i s possible. I t i s therefore necessary to 
examine the more important philosophical discussions of how our knowledge 
of the past i s possible. Then i t w i l l be easier to examine now far 
some Protestant theologians are j u s t i f i e d in heavily reducing the 
importance many traditional Christian apologists attached to the claim 
that Christianity i s a historical religion. 
1. The problem 
I s there a problem about our knowledge of past events? At f i r s t 
sight we seem to know beyond doubt, that Thales correctly predicted an 
eclipse of the sun for the year 585 B.C., or that one of the onuses of 
the French Revolution was the failure of Louis XVI to introduce moderate 
reforms quickly and decisively, or that one of the causes of Mackonochie's 
i l l n e s s i n his later l i f e was h i s repeated persecution whilst he was 
Vicar of St. Alban's Holborn by the Church Association. Tet when we 
question how we know the truth of these claims with such certainty, our 
knowledge means to dissolve into opinion. 
The grounds for soeptioism about our knowledge of past events i s 
d e a r : I cannot know the events of the past i n the same way that I can 
remember having an appendieitus when I was ten. I t i s true, empirically, 
that I was not alive at the time when the French revolution occurred. 
I t i s logically true that I cannot remember what as a matter of fact I 
was not i n a position to perceive: to remember is i n the nature of the ease 
to remember something that I have experienced. Bow then, do I know 
of the occurrence of events which I neither experienced for myself, nor 
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know anyone who was alive and oan r e t e l l their experiences of the 
relevant events to me? 
The sceptical charge i s thus that there i s a logical gap between 
the evidence for past events and the past events themselves* This 
scepticism i s of a similar sort to that which occurs for those who hold 
the sense-data theory of perception, i f a l l I can ever perceive directly 
are sense-data, how oan I ever know that there are any such things as 
material objects, l e t alone what they are like? Similarly i n the case 
of events i n the past, i f a l l I can ever know about past events i s the 
present evidence for them, hew can I ever get from such evidence to a 
knowledge of what actually happened i n the past? l e t to claim that we 
have historical knowledge i s surely i n the end to claim that certain events 
happened i n the past rather than certain others: for example that Shales 
did i n fact predict an eclipse of the sun rather than an eclipse of the 
moon: yet we logically cannot gar back to an experience or a memory 
of such past events* How then, i f a t a l l , can the logical gap between 
present evidence and past events be bridged? 
2. The posjtivist answert 
Perhaps the simplest and most clear cut solution to this question 
has been given by the logical pssitivists-, and their l a t e r followers I n 
linguistic analysis* Ayer, Hempel and Popper i n s i s t that there can be 
only one paradiga.for historical knowledge, and this i s that provided by 
the physical sciences* History i s a form of science, which, given time, 
can be shown to employ the characteristic features of the one universal 
s c i e n t i f i c method* Thus Hempel insistedx 
"General laws have quite analogous functions i n history and i n 
the natural sciences'1* 
She use of such fpneral Haws i n providing us with knowledge about the 
1* "The function of general laws i n history** i n Beadinga i n Philosophical 
Analysis ed* H. Feigl and V. Sellers 
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paat can be interpreted i n several ways* Ayer, for example, thinks 
that statements about the past are gained on the basis of general laws 
from which i t i s possible to formulate and predict historical 
experiences which could verify theau Be writes without being aware 
of some strangeness i n what he says: ttI do not find anything 
excessively paradoxical i n the view that propositions about the past 
are rules for the prediction of those historical experiences which are 
commonly said to verify them, and I do not see how else our knowledge 
of the past i s to be analysed. 1 ( 2 Eempel similarly claims: " I f f u l l y 
and explicitly formulated, an explanation i n history would state 
certain i n i t i a l conditions, and certain probability hypotheses such 
that the occurrence of an event to be explained i s made highly 
probably by the I n i t i a l conditions, In view of the probability 
hypothesis*' 
The positivist answer i s not the clear cut solution which i t 
appears to be at f i r s t sight. Differences between Ayer and Eempel 
are already shown i n the above quotations: what i s even harder i s to 
unpack exactly what the positivists are saying about the nature of 
historical explanation. 
Ayer'a claim that statements about the past are rules for the 
predaojtion of historical experiences which might verify them i s 
puBzling. He seems to mean that statements about the past are i n some 
sense translatable Into statements about some aspect of the present, 
and these translated statements can be verified. Does this mean that 
the statement "Dales predicted an eclipse of the sun1* can be translated 
without any loss of meaning Into the assertion that there are statements which 
accurately describe Greek texts which refer to the prediction of the 
2. Language. Truth and Louie p.102 
3« The Junction of General Laws i n History. Op. C i t . p.465 
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eclipse by Thales. 
I f Ayer i s making this claim he i s proposing a form of historical 
reductionism; he i s recommending that the meaning of any statement about 
the past i s reducible to the evidence for that statement. But this i s 
an odd claim: i t rules out the possibility of any distinction between 
good and bad evidence. I f "Thales predicted an eclipse of the sun" i s 
reducible to "Herodotus, Diogenes Laertius, and Dercyllides say that 
Thales predicted an eolipse of the sun", then what Thales actually did 
becomes irrelevant to our so called knowledge of the pasts the distinction 
between what actually happened, and what i s stated to have happened 
collapses. 
Ayer solves the problem of the logical gap between what happened i n 
the past and the evidence for what happened In the past by eliminating 
one of the terms. Thus: " I suspect, moreover that those who object to 
our pragmatic treatment of history are really baaing their objection on 
a taci t or explicit assumption that the past i s somehow objectively there 
to be corresponded to... that, i t i s real i n the metaphysical sense of 
the term."'' 
Whilst I do not wish to assert that history i s "there" i n an 
objective metaphysical sense; that i s , that the past has some sort of 
objective reality, here and now, I find Ayer's claim that the past i s not 
re a l , i n the sense that i t s reality to i t s contemporaries i s of the 
same sort as contemporary events to us, contrary to ordinary Biglish 
usage. I t seems perfectly correct to iay, "The Battle of Waterloo 
happened i n 1&15" or "Gladstone was not prime-minister i n 1832", and their 
use does not seem to be logically any different from "Bigland l o s t the 
World Cup match against Brazil l a s t night" or "British troops failed to 
**" iB's* H a r o d o t u s Zf Diogenes Laertius I , 23; Dercyllides ap. Theon 
Smyrn p.198, 14. 3h Kirk and Raven: The Presocratic Philosophers. PP. 79-80) 
5- language. Truth and Logic, p.102 
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keep peace In Northern Ireland this morning1'. 
In the Introduction to the second edition of Language. Truth and 
Logic. Ayer retracts his claim that statements about the past are 
reducible to present evidence for them. At f i r s t he i s tempted to be 
sceptical about our knowledge of past events: " I do not think that 
the truth of any observation statements which refer to the past or 
future i s a necessary condition of the truth of any statement about the 
past"^ 
Ayer moves i n the same paragraph to a form of historical phenomenalif 
T h i s does not mean that propositions referring to the past cannot be 
analysed i n phenomenal terms} for they can be taken as implying that 
certain observations would have occurred, i f certain conditions had 
been f u l f i l l e d ; for they require of the observer that he should occupy 
7 
a temporal position that ex hypothesi he does not" 
Ayer does not regard this as a problem restricted to our knowledge 
about the past; a l l contrary to fact conditionals require that an 
observer be i n a different spatial position from the one he i n fact i s 
i n . But i t i s s t i l l logically possible that an observer might have been 
i n a spatial position relevant to make observations about the past, and 
therefore any oontxary to fact conditional i s verifiable i n principle. 
Shis solution evades the issue I n question: 
F i r s t l y , i t commits what Patrick Gardiner has nick-named the time-
o 
machine fallacy. In asking the question about how I know that a given 
•went happened i n the past, I am not asking the very different question 
of how I would have known the event had occurred i f I had been there. 
I f for example I had heard Thales Predict the eclipse of the sun, and 
then observed the eclipse on 15th March 585 B.C., the problem about 
knowledge of past events would not a r i s e . i f as a matter of fact I 6. Cp. c i t . p.19 
7. Op. c i t . p.19 
8. cf• The nature of historical explanation 
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could observe the past as I observe the present, the problems of c r i t i c a l 
philosophy of history would a l l really be problems about the philosophy 
of perception and of remembering. 
Secondly, a l l historical statements do not take the form of contrary 
to fact conditionals, and cannot be analysed into contrary to fact 
conditionals. In the ordinary ttigUsh meaning of the words 'know', 
'be probable 1, 'be uncertain 1 some historical statements can be said to 
be 'known', others to be 'probable', and yet others to be 'uncertain'. 
I know, for example, that Louis Tfl was king of France at the time of 
the French revolution. I think i t was probable that one of the main 
causes of the revolution was the King's failure to implement the reforms 
his finance ministers advised him to Introduce. On the other hand i t 
i s improbable, and a pious Marxist fancy, to suppose that the French 
revolution was organised and carried through by the working classes i n 
the interests of the working classes. There i s i n fact adequate 
evidence to show that the leadership and organisation of the revolution 
came from the middle-classes, and that the course of the revolution 
was directed i n the interests of this class. But the assertion that 
Louis XVI was King of France i n the year 1?89, i s not a contrary to fact 
conditional. I t i s not a statement of the type, " i f a stranger man had 
been king of France, there would have been no revolution". The 
possibility of making such a contrary to fact conditional depends on 
our knowing the truth of some categorical statements about the past, such 
as, "There was a monarchical form of government i n France both before and 
during part of the revolution i n France". I f a l l statements about the 
past are reducible to counter-factual statements, i t i s hard to see how 
anything can be known about the past at a l l . To j s f " I * I had been 
alive i n 17&9, I could have seen Louis XVI" presupposes some 
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knowledge of categorical statements about the period i n question. 
Ayer has again solved the sceptical challenge by stealth: he has 
tried to make the past i n some sense a part of the present; i t becomes 
what I might have observed i f only I had been there* But i f I had 
been there I would not have seen the past* The past has vanished i n the 
middle of Ayer's analysis of i t * 
Hempel's approach i s more subtle than Ayer's; he argues that 
historians use general laws i n a similar way to that In which they are 
used by natural scientists; just as natural scientists can predict from 
a general law how particular phenomena w i l l behave next week, so a 
historian oan retrodict from a general law how some particular event occurred 
i n the past, One problem about this claim i s that few professional 
historians f i l l their books with deductions from general laws* Hempel 
does not find this dlquieting: f i r s t l y , because the universal hypotheses 
used by historians are so obvious to everyone that under normal conditions 
they do not need to be stated; secondly, because the laws historians 
use are so general that they are often d i f f i c u l t to square with a l l the 
relevant empirical data* Statements about the past iSe, Hempel suggests, 
explanation sketches. Such explanation maps, oan, given time, be f i l l e d 
out into a f u l l blown general law from which the relevant particular 
details may be deduced. He writes: "In trying to appraise the soundness 
of a given explanation, one w i l l f i r s t have to attempt to reconstruct as 
completely as possible the argument constituting the explanation, or 
o 
explanation sketch" 
There i s a difference, however, between making an abstract metho-
dological plan for the use of historians, and showing that this plan 
contains the methodological principles which a l l those who claim to 
provide us with knowledge about the past logically must use. I do not 
wish to deny that general laws are used i n historical reasoning, but I 
9* Op. c i t . p.466 
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do not think that they are employed In the way Hempel suggests. 
The problem results from Hemp el's failure to draw distinction between the 
two possible meanings of the word 'history'• F i r s t l y , 'history' can 
refer to the knowledge that a given event i n the past has occurred; for 
example, the knowledge that the Bolshevik revolution occurred i n 1917 • 
Secondly, 'history' can refer to an attempted explanation of why some 
event known to have happened i n the past occurred when and In the way i t 
in fact did, rather than at some other time, or i n some other way* For 
example, attempts may be made to explain the Bolshevik revolution i n 
terms of the war wariness of the Russian people, and the ineffectiveness 
u 
of the Henshevik government. Now i n the case of history as knowledge 
that a past event has occurred, I do not need to bring i n general laws: 
for general laws are unnecessary to discover whether or not a particular 
event i s or has been i n existence. I f I want to explain why the 
Bolshevik revolution occurred when i t did general laws w i l l prove very 
helpful; for the historian can then compare the features of the French 
revolution and the other revolutions i n Nineteenth century Europe which 
were inspired by i t , and then go on to draw a pioture of the general 
features of revolutions i n modern European states. 
Hempel*s analysis of the explanation of events of the past i n terms 
of explanation sketches and general laws, presupposes the reality of the 
past i n the ordinary senses of these wards. In order to formulate a 
scie n t i f i c law, I must know of the existence of some particular events 
In relation to which the law provides some sort of explanation. For 
example unless I can observe the behaviour of some gases, I can logically 
never be i n a position to produce a falsi f i c a t i o n instance for Boyle'B 
law. Similarly, unless I know that some events really happened i n the 
past, there can be no past at a l l which requires explanation i n terms of 
general laws and explanation sketches. 
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Hempel, unfortunately, baa vary l i t t l e to say about how general laws 
are formulated i n the ease of.hiatorioal explanations.. There i s not a 
clear parallel here with the physical sciences, for.experimentation i n 
history i s not possible* I cannot repeat the French revolution i n order to 
see more clearly what the causes were. Further, although each revolution 
in , for example, Nineteenth century Europe, has points of similarity and 
comparison with any other revolution i n Burope i n the same period, they 
also haw many points of dissimilarity. Gases, on the other hand, 
although they differ numerically, are very similar to each other and are 
therefore much more easily assimilated under.one s c i e n t i f i c law, than 
say the Trench revolution and . the Russian revolution. 
Hempel could try to get out of making the verification or falsification 
of explanation sketches about past events depend on the. actual occurrence 
of Individual past events by arguing that we can somehow frame general-
isations from present experience, and go on to deduce from this detailed 
particulars about the past. For example i f I.bad lived through the Cuban 
revolution which brought Fidel Castro to power, I might abstract from my 
experience general features about revolutions. These general features about 
the causes of revolutions could then be used.as explanations for the French 
Revolution, the Russian revolution and so on. But, i f any such deduoation 
were valid, the truth of the conclusion about the past would have to be 
oontained within the truth of the premises which are.about a present event. 
I f he chose to adopt this position, Hempel l i k e ayer,. would be solving the 
problem of the logical gap between statements about the past and statements 
about our evidence.for the past, by eliminating the possibility of their 
being anything which could In the ordinary sense of the word be described 
as "the past" 
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3. The idealist.answer 
. Whilst posltivists claim that history i s a somewhat recalcitrant 
branch of the natural sciences, Idealists tend.to.insist on the autonomy 
of history. History i s not a sub-department of . some.other subject, i t has 
a methodology and criterion of knowledge which are equally as good, i f not 
better, than those of the physical sciences. History i s not the search 
for general laws, from which I can retrodict the necessary conditions of sets 
of events i n the past. I t i s not the. passive collection of general laws from 
an observer ion of a set. of brute facts. Bather, history i s the study of 
what i s particular: Groce and Dilthey even went so far as to say that i t i s 
the study of what.is unique; but their efforts to show exactly what this 
uniqueness consisted i n i s far from satisfactory. 
Collingwood claims, that, this distinction .between .history and the sciences 
i s one of quality and not merely-of quantity.. The sciences are ooneerned 
merely to observe the external world, and record causal relations between 
events within i t . A historian, however, i s not concerned with 'brute facts' 
and their causes, and i s never a mere spectator. 
"To the scientist nature i s always merely a phenomenon, not i n the sense 
of being defective i n re a l i t y , but t i n the sense of being a spectacle 
presented to his intelligent observation; whereas.the.events of history 
are. never mere phenomenon, never mere spectacles for contemplation, but 
things the historian looks not at, but through, to discern the thought within 
them."*0 
The point .Collingwood i s making here i s ambiguous. I t . i s quite true 
and .unobjectionable to suggest, that history i s not just a catalogue of 
events that , have happened i n the past, but i s .an .attempt to explain the 
past events, and therefore.the historian looks not just at, but through 
past events to try and discover their explanation. But this point by 
10. The Idea of History. p.214 
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i t s e l f does, not .help to .substantiate Collingwood.'.s belief that there i s a 
difference, i n type between historical and. physical method, or the point 
that, the past must, be relived. ..Even.Hempel would concede that history i s 
not a sort of telephone directory of past events;., i t involves for Hempel 
the construction of explanation.sketches, and therefore cannot be just 
the passive observing of past events. .... 
In saying that history has a method of i t s own which i s distinct i n 
kind from the physical sciences,. Collingwood means to say that however 
much causal explanation may be involved i n historical explanation, 
teleologlcal. explanation i s always involved as well. This i s because 
history i s essentially an account of the past action of human beings and 
not of phenomena. 
To come to understand the.past actions of human beings we do not 
need to observe what they did, but we have to re-enact their thoughts i n 
our own mind. Because human beings i n . the. present and those who lived 
i n the past, have a common humanity, and a common.type of intellectual 
apparatus, I oan 'get.inside' figures of the past, and hence come to 
understand their motives and reasons, for acting as they did. 
The historian i s not concerned with events as such at a l l . . . To the 
historian, the a c t i v i t i e s whose history he i s studying, are not spectacles 
to be watched, but experiences to be lived through in his own mind; they 
are objective or known to him, only because they are also subjective 
a c t i v i t i e s of his own."^" 
In other words, my knowledge that Mackonochie was persecuted by 
the Church Association for his supposedly 'Papish' r i t u a l practices whilst 
he was Vicar of St. Alban's Holborn, i s not a mere matter of brute fact, 
rather l i k e the fact that my t i n of instant shaving cream i s almost empty. 
The story about Mackonmoohie does not become, history u n t i l I .'relive' or 
11. The idea of History p.p.217, * 218 
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•reenact' what he. thought. For example I can. think, what i t would be lik e 
to be brought before the court of. the Arches and. charged with the betrayal 
of Protestantism on the ground that I genuflected, before the eueharistic 
elements and also elevated them at appropriate points i n the communion 
service. Or again, I can understand the thought of someone l i k e 
Maokonochie, who when forbidden by the court of the Arches to elevate the 
- f i -
nest and ohalice above his head, proceeded to elevate the host and chalice 
12 
to the height of the.last wrinkle on his forehead. 
She re-enactment, or reliving of the thoughts of those mho lived i n 
the past i s not a mere intuitive guess at what such people may possible 
have thoughti the historian, i f he i s to be.critical, must put the 
documentary, archaeological, or other evidence.on the basis of which he 
formulates his picture of the past, to the question. History i s not the 
sort of discipline where newspaper cuttings on one.issue are stuck beside 
each other to form a harmonised narrative. The evidence must be sifted 
and questioned: this putting of the past to the question w i l l draw out 
how to relive here and now, the thoughts of those who are being studied. 
CoUingwood i n s i s t s : "The scissors and paste historian reads them ( i . e . his 
sources) i n a reoeptive s p i r i t to find out what they said. The scien t i f i c 
historian reads them with a question i a mind, having taken the i n i t i a t i v e 
by deciding for himself what he wants to find out from them.**'' 
thus for Collingwood, the relation between the evidence for the past and 
past events i s f i l l e d i n by an 'a p r i o r i ' historical Imagination, which by 
putting the evidence to the question, enables the historian to relive, 
and re-create the thoughts of the people i n the past whom he i s studying. 
The historian i s l i k e an a r t i s t i n the sense that both the historian and 
the a r t i s t imaginatively create a new picture from the materials they employ. 
The historian however, has three restrictions on his technique which do not 
12. Cf. Michael Reynolds: Martyr of Ritualism 
IJn Oft Opt e l l . p»£fr6 
13. The Idea of History: p.269 
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apply to the a r t i s t . F i r s t l y , the historian's picture must be localised 
i n space and time. . Secondly, a l l history ..must..be. .consistent with i t s e l f . 
Thirdly, the historian's world i s related to evidence i n a way an a r t i s t ' s 
Ik 
world is.not. . .. 
But, what about periods, or events, i n history which.a historian 
finds i t d i f f i c u l t to relive, or reenact? For example, i s i t possible 
for us to relive the thoughts of the members of a primitive African tribe 
who believe that their future safety and security depends on the monthly 
performance of a human sacrifice? Collingwood states: 
"Certain historians find i n certain periods of history nothing 
in t e l l i g i b l e , and c a l l them .dark ages: but such phases t e l l us nothing 
about these ages, though they t e l l us great deal, about the persons who 
use them... namely that they were unable to rethink the thoughts which 
were fundamental to their l i f e . " 1 ^ 
Here Collingwood i s coming close to the views expressed by F.H. Bradley, 
i n h is early paper "The presuppositions of oritioal history". I t i s a l l 
very well for Collingwood to say "such phases t e l l us nothing about these 
ages themselves, though they t e l l us a great deal about the persons who 
use them", but i f a l l history i s i n some sense the history of thought, 
then i f the thoughts of a past age cannot be re-enacted, nothing can be 
known about that age. Similarly Bradley proclaims; "The experience of 
others has no meaning for us, except and insofar as i t becomes our own; 
the existence of others i s no existence for us, i f i t i s not i n our world 
that they l i v e . " 1 6 
Bradley does not . mean that knowledge of the. past depends on the limits 
of any given individual's experience: he is.not advocating a sort of 
historical.solipsism. Bather: "Testimony go$s beyond individual 
Ik. Cf. pp. Cat. p.246 
15. Qp. C i t . pp.218-219 
16. "The Presuppositions of c r i t i c a l History" In Collected Essays 
Vol. Ip .19 
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experience, but not beyond our experience; or i t takes us beyond our 
experience, i f i t takes us with i t . " ^ 
In other words, i n order for someone.to understand any historical 
statement, that statement must i n principle be capable of cohering with 
the contemporary structure and presuppositions of human knowledge. Thus: 
"The past varies with the present, and.can never do otherwise, since 
i t i s always the present on which i t rests. This present i s presupposed 
by i t , and i s i t s necessary pre-conception."^ 
I s the Idealist solution to the sceptical challenge, any more 
adequate than the positivist answer? 
The f i r s t problem about the idealist approach i s that i t attempts to 
eliminate the logical gap between the past and the evidence for the past 
by assimilating the former to the l a t t e r . Ve cannot confront the past 
i n the way we can be confronted by the . present. So, i f the past i s to 
be known at a l l , the idealists suggest, i t can only be known i f i t can 
i n some sense, be translated Into some aspect of the present. In the 
cases of Dllthey, Crooe and Collingwood, this translation of statements 
about the past Into statements about the present rests on the a b i l i t y to 
relive and re-enact, the thoughts, intentions and motives of those who 
lived i n the past. Oakeshott saw even more de a r l y than Collingwood the 
tendency of Idealist philosophers of history to make the past a part of 
the present. 
" I f the historical past be knowable, i t must belong to the present 
world or experience; i f i t be unknowable, history I s more than f u t i l e , 
i t i s impossible." 1 9 
Secondly, Collingwood's recommendations about the nature of historical 
explanation r e s t r i c t what can be counted as history. I can understand 
17; Op; C i t . Collected Essays^ Vol. I p.30 
18. Op; C i t . p.20 
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what i t i a l i k e to re-live the. thoughts of a general before and during a 
battle, or the thoughts of a master diplomat i n negotiating a p o l i t i c a l 
alliance, or the thoughts, of a martyr as he faces death. But what do we 
re-live when we read or write economic or social history? I s economic 
history nothing over and above the theories of great sociologists? 
Thirdly, Collingwood rules out the possibility of true statements being 
made about the past. Thus he wrote: 
flThe s c i e n t i f i c historian never asks himself, 'Is this statement 
true or false?'.... but, 'What does this statement mean?'"2*5 
Any ide a l i s t theory of history which i s committed to the view that 
a l l history i s the history of thought, must rest on a coherence rather 
than a correspondence theory of the nature of true statements. Although 
our knowledge of the past cannot rest on the naively r e a l i s t correspondence 
theory of truth, because we cannot bring back the past i n order to compare 
our evidence for what happened i n the past, with what i n fact happened i n 
the past yet, surely the evidence for what happened in the past i s not as 
neatly severed from what i n fact happened i n the past as Collingwood 
demands. 
I f our knowledge of the past depends on our a b i l i t i e s to re-enact, and 
relive the past, then what happened i n the past which we cannot re-enact 
or relive, cannot be known to us. In other words, the possibilities of 
past existence are limited by Collingwood's epistemology. His theory 
seems to amount to the view that history i s one big innate idea, or that 
we cannot learn anything from the past which isn't i n seme way incapsulated 
in our present mental and intellectual capacities. 
But surely ve want to say that what we learn from the past may, on 
occasions correct and improve our present outlook, or world view. For 
s-
example, those of Hitler's advisors who recommended that he did not invade 
20. The Idea of History p.275 
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Russia, and march his armies deep Into Eastern Europe saw that the 
oonsequenoes of such a campaign might be as. dieasl^jous to Hitler as they 
were to Napoleon. As the events turned out Hitler's refusal to learn from 
a previous Russian campaign led to his eventual loss of the war, and the 
destruction of the cream of his armies by the Russian winter. I f the 
past, as Collingwood's view seems to implyjOan t e l l us nothing except 
what i s incapsulated i n our present experience, i t i s hard to see how 
mankind can ever learn from his long range past knowledge. Colllngwood 
seems to endorse Hegel's view that man learns nothing from the past except 
that he learns nothing from the past. 
4. Parallels i n the positivist and. Idealist answers 
At f i r s t sight the positivist and the idealist versions of a c r i t i c a l 
philosophy of history seem to be diametrically opposed: the former claims 
that history consists of some sort of brute facts from which we can deduce 
causal generalisations; the latter that i t consists i n an empathetlc re-
living of past events. Both c r i t i c a l analyses of our knowledge of the 
r 
past provide similar stresses and sjajna i n their answer to the sceptical 
insistence that there i s a logical gap between evidence for past events 
and the past events themselves. F i r s t l y , both Ayer and Collingwood try 
to bridge the gap between the past and the evidence for the past, by 
denying that there i s really any gap at a l l . In different ways they 
assimilate the past to the present, and so remove one of the terms 
between which there i s supposed by the sceptic to be a logical gap, 
She positivists make either the past reducible to the present evidence 
for the past, or make i t dependent on someone's a b i l i t y to have been in 
a position to perceive i t ; the idealists reduce past events to our 
abil i t y to relive them. 
Secondly, both philosophical positions make the present the criterion 
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of what may have happened i n the. past , and so place an 'a p r i o r i 1 
restriction on what .may have happened. The occurrence of a miracle such 
as the resurrection, for example, i s ruled out by loth Ayer and Collingwood. 
Both philosophers appear prima facie to be open minded: anything goes 
that can be relived by my thought processes, or which I might have perceived, 
could I have been there. The shades of the prison house close in on this 
pristine openness however: some features of the past cannot be relived i n 
my thought; also I could i n principle only have been i n a position to 
experience an event which could have been deduced from some sort of 
universal generalisation. The tension over what might have happened i n 
the past which i s clear both i n the positivist and Idealist viewpoints, 
reflects the tension between empiricism and rationalism i n B^ me. In his 
more empiricist moods Hume was willing to concede: 
"What i s int e l l i g i b l e , and can be distinctly conceived, Implies no 
contradition, and can never be proved false by any demonstative argument 
or reasoning a p r i o r i . " ^ 
Yet when he comes to discuss the notion of miracle, Hume adopts a 
coherence theory of truth based on the . belief that our present experience 
builds up i n us customary expectations, which limit the range of the 
possibilities of our experience. What customary experience forordains, 
reality cannot modify. Thus: "As a uniform experience amounts to a proof, 
there i s here a direct and f u l l proof from the nature of fact against any 
miracle. 
Thirdly, both Ayer and Collingwood deny that truth can be attributed 
to statements about the past: Ayer because he thinks this i s to hypostasize 
the past into some sort of metaphysical entity, Collingwood because the 
notion of a true statement about the past becomes redundant, i f the past 
i s nothing hut my reliving of thoughts that occurred i n the past. Yet 
21. The Enquiry, et. Selby-Bigge. p.35 
22. Enquiry, ed. Selby-Bigge. p. 115 
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the ordinary .use of such words, as. ..'.history' .and. 'the past' seems to imply 
that there i s in.some objective sense a past about which history can be 
written; that i s to say there i s something over and above the evidence 
for statements about the past, which even i f i t i s largely unmeasurable 
and unavailable to us, i f the ultimate criterion for the truth of the 
accounts historians give us of past events. 
Pt. H THEOLOGY AND THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
A great deal of modern Protestant theology looks very much l i k e an 
attempt to conduct a salvage operation which is.designed to make clear how 
i t i s possible to retain belief i n Jesus Christ, and at the same time remain 
intellectually honest. For the same sceptical challenge which faces the 
secular historian also faces the theologian. I f Christians are correot 
In ^rguing that the locus of Cod's revelation to man i s in Jesus of 
Nazareth, then i n order to know about this supposed revelation, i t i s 
necessary to know about a period of time in the past; i t i s necessary to 
know the history of this man's l i f e and actions.. Theologians are therefore 
faced by the question: how, i f at a l l , i s i t possible to bridge the logical 
gap between statements describing what Jesus of Nazareth said and did, and 
statements describing the.evidence, for what Jesus of Nazareth said and did. 
The solution found to this question by theologians tends to be determined 
by their conscious and unconscious philosophical presuppositions; just as 
i t did in the examples discussed above of secular c r i t i c a l philosophies 
of history. 
(a) Theology and the retreat from the appeal to history 
One characteristic feature of some recent Peotestant dogmatic theology, 
i s the tendency to try and evade the question "How i s i t possible to infer 
statements about what happened in the past from statements about the present 
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evidence for what happened i n the past??* In fact, i t i s frequently asserted 
that historical evidence t or lack of evidence about the words and actions 
of Jesus, a*e logically quite Irrelevant to faith in Jesus as the Christ. 
Thus Rudolf Bultmann states: 
" I t i s important to bear i n mind that i f the fact should be established 
that Jesus was conscious of being.the messiah or the son of man, that would 
only establish an historical fact, not prove an a r t i c l e of faith. Bather 
the acknowledgement of Jesus as the one in whom God's Work decisively 
encounters man i s a pure act of faith, independent of the historical 
question whether or not Jesus considered himself to be the Messiah. Only 
the historian ca answer this question — so far as i t can be answered 
at a l l — and faith being a personal decision cannot be dependent on the 
historians • labour. 
Again Karl Barth, when he was writing the early volumes of the Church 
Dogmatics, seems to have been i n complete accord with Bultmann i n stressing 
the logical irrelevance of historical evidence to faith i n Jesus as the 
Christ. Thus he argues: 
"But the (Easter) stories are couched i n the imaginative and poetic 
style of historical Saga, and are therefore marked off by a corresponding 
obscurity. For they are describing an event beyond the reach of historical 
research or depiction. Hence, we have no right to try to analyse them or 
harmonise them."^ 
The reasons Bultmann and Barth give for.this divorce between historical 
evidence for the doings and saying of Jesus, and faith i n him as Christ are 
very similar, and are reducible to three main arguments. 
F i r s t l y , i t i s argued that i f faith in Christ i s logically related to 
historical evidenae for particular events i n the past,, then faith becomes 
23* Budolf Bultmann. Theology of the New Testament. Vol. 1 Big. trans.p.26 
24. Karl Barth: Church Dogmatics Vo. I l l Pt. i i Eng. trans, 
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dependent on the present state of the evidence i n favour of such past 
events. For example, suppose I believe that Jesus instituted the Holy 
Communion on the f i r s t Maundy Thursday as a means of graoe through which 
a l l men can find salvation. I f this belief depends an the evidence of 
historical investigations two consequences seem to follows (a) I can 
never been absolutely certain that Christ Instituted the Holy Communion 
because* being a historical statement, i t depends on empirical evidence, 
and such evidence i s never one hundred per cent certain. New historical 
evidence may be discovered which w i l l overthrow my belief; and even i f no 
such evidence i s actually discovered, the logical possibility s t i l l remains 
that at some date i t may be discovered; (b) As a eonsequenee of (a ) , I 
can never be certain that Christ instituted the Holy Communion un t i l the 
l a s t l i v i n g historian has examined the evidence and given his verdict. 
In fact faith becomes dependent on the work of academic historians. 
80, i f I am not a professional historian myself, the content of my faith 
w i l l have to await the deliberations of historians. Thus academic 
historians, i n this situation w i l l takv the place of the Papacy as the 
main authority i n matters of faith. And furthermore, the immediate 
aooess of the believer to God becomes impossible. 
Secondly, i t i s argued that i f historical statements can verify or 
f a l s i f y statements of faith, then believers are ju s t i f i e d by the ingenuity 
of historians and no longer by God's grace. Bultmann makes this point 
very oogentlfcwhan he writes: 
"There i s no difference between security built on good works, and 
25 
security built on objectifying knowledge." 
Bultmann i s applying the principle of justification by faith alone 
to the mode of our knowledge of the deeds and sayings of Jesus. I f the 
Christian believer i s ju s t i f i e d by God's graoe, and not by any morally good 
25. B. Bultmann. Jesus Christ and Mythology. p.l84 
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actions of his own; then, a forti o r i , the believer cannot be justified 
by his own historical works, such as producing good evidence for the 
that his faith i n Christ i s something which (Sod's grace alone can achieve. 
In fact to search for historical evidence for particular events i n Jesus's 
l i f e i s a sin; i t i s to try to grasp for ourselves something Ood has 
offered as a free g i f t . 
Thirdly, and following from the above arguments, i t i s suggested that 
statements about faith i n Ood, and statements about the past are two logi-
cally different types of statements, and there are no logical relations 
between them. Bultmann makes this point clearly by drawing a 
distinction between historisch and geschichtlich. Bistorlsoh i s any 
set of events or facts which occur at a specific place, on a specific date, 
and can be verified or f a l s i f i e d by ordinary historical evidence. Thus 
the death of Jesus on the cross i s historisch; ordinary historical 
investigation can confirm whether or not this event happened. Such an 
event, being historisch has no religious significance, for many other men 
have died unjustly on a cross. I f Jesus' death were only such an 
historical event, we should pity Jesus, as we might pity any man unjustly 
executed, but we would not through this past event eome to regard him as 
our Lord and Saviour. 
Bultmann thinks that the crucifixion i n order to be of religious 
value, must have Qosoblchtlich significance: and i t has this i f i t i s 
stated that Jesus died for my sins. This deschlichtlioh statement i s a 
belief which cannot be referred to a particular date or place, and cannot 
be empirically verified or f a l s i f i e d . Thus the religious significance 
of the crucifixion i s not that Jesus of Nazareth died on a h i l l outside 
Jerusalem around the year 33 A.S.: I t i s rather that Jesus Christ died to 
oecurrmno ie of a particular event i n Jesus' l i f e , but only by accepting 
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save me from my sins. A further point i s that to i n s i s t on searching 
for the historisju aspect of a religious belief may end by destroying i t s 
qjesehidtlieh aspect. As Bultmann states s 
"faith i n Qod, l i k e faith i n justification refuses to single out 
qualified and definable actions as holy actions. Correspondingly, faith 
i n Qod l i k e faith i n creation, refuses to single out qualified and 
definable realms among the observable r e a l i t i e s of nature and history. 
Barth draws a similar distinction between faith i n Christ and 
historical evidence about Jesus' doings and sayings, when he uses the 
concept of the "saga". In the early volumes of Church Dogmatics he i n s i s t s 
that God i s nothing over and above his acts, and God being God i s free to 
act when and how Be chooses. Barth i n fact adopts an ambiguous view about 
the importance of the historical evidence i n i t s relation to faith I n 
Christ. On the one hand Barth argues that God's revelation i s both a 
veiling and an unveiling. Even In Jesus Christ, God's communication with 
man i s Indirect, i n the sense that Jesus of Nazareth cannot be seen to be the 
Son of God merely by a close scrutiny of his body and actions. Thus Barth 
i n these early volumes, tends to regard the Bible as consisting of "sagas" 
a saga being a story which may or may not be historically true. The 
historical truth or f a l s i t y of a saga, i s quite irrelevant to the question 
of whether a particular saga contains the Word of God. For any given 
saga i n the Bible w i l l only contain the Word of God when and where God w i l l s 
i t to do so. God's presence i n His Word cannot be pinned down or 
restricted by anything, least of a l l by man's verification and/or 
falsification procedures. For: 
"Revelation i s nothing but the freedom of God's grace1*2'' 
On the other hand, Barth i n s i s t s that the doctrine of justification 
by faith must be taken seriously. This doctrine he believes, implies the 
26. R. Bultmann Op. c i t . p.84 
27* K. Barth Church Dogmatics Vol. I F t . I Bag. trans. p.lJ2 
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aotual historical occurrence of the virgin birth and the empty tomb. 
Indeed, i n his debate with Brunner about natural theology, Berth goes 
as far as to say that Brunner's denial of the historicity of the Virgin 
birth i s a symptom of his denial of the sola fide* i t amounts to a 
denial that God alone i s responsible for the salvation of man through 
the incarnation. At f i r s t sight, Barth seems to be saying that i f the 
doctrine of justification by faith only i s true, then the tomb was empty, 
and Jesus was born of a virgin. But i f Barth were asserting that 
justification ^ p j a ^ ^ materially implies the empty tomb and the virgin 
birth, then he would have to admit that i f the tomb was not as a matter of 
historical fact empty on the third day or i f Mary was not born of a virgin 
28 
then the doctrine of justification by faith only i s false. 
Thus the non-occurrence of an event i n the past would f a l s i f y the doctrine 
of the sola fide. 
unfortunately, Berth's argument i s not as straightforward as t h i s , 
l a the early volumes of the Church Dogmatics Barth wants to have his cake 
and eat i t over the historicity of the l i f e of Jesus. For example, his 
claim that the historical occurrence of the empty tomb i s a necessary 
condition of the presence of Jesus i n our time/ Implies that historical 
evidence could show that the story of the empty tomb i s probable, or lack 
of such evidence could show that the story i s an unlikely fable. But 
Berth's argument appears to be entirely "a p r i o r i 1 1 . He argues that the 
doctrine of justification by faith only i s true, therefore the empty tomb 
and the virgin birth must have happened. He solves the problem of 
historical scepticism by eliminating i t s possibility. I f we cannot i n 
any ordinary sense of the word "know" whether the tomb was empty, i f the 
doctrine of justification sola fide can, by i t s e l f , guarantee the 
actuality of the past, I n a way that hiatorioo-critioal methods cannot, 
E8. ( p 3 q. -q) •"• -p 
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then no room i s l e f t for doubt about the occurrence of these past events* 
The meaning of the phrase "knowing the past 1 1 has been stealthily redefined. 
For to say that we know the tomb was empty by the eye of faith alone, i s 
a different sort of knowing, from knowing that Peter wept after he 
betrayed Jesus, or knowing that Charles I I had several mistresses. 
There i s an interesting point of contrast between Barth and 
Bultmann and the c r i t i c a l philosophers of history such as Hemp e l and 
Collingwood. The l a t t e r philosophers assume that i t i s possible to know 
what happened i n the past: the task they set themselves i s to provide a 
correct philosophical analysis of what the phrase "knowing the past" means. 
Barth, and particularly Bultmann, start from a position of scepticism 
about the possibility of knowing very much of the l i f e of Jesus. The 
question they attempt to answer appears to be: since there i s so l i t t l e 
evidence for what Jesus did and said, how i s i t possible for theology to 
o 
manage without such historical knowledge. They both appeal to the 
doctrine of justification sola fide, and with i t s help, try to make from 
the whore of their historical scepticism, an honest woman of faith.' 
This scepticism about the knowability of the l i f e of Jesus i s plainly 
illustrated by the picture Bultmann draws about what can be known about 
Jesus. He thinks that Jesus called on men to decide for God here and now 
29 
because God was going to introduoe a new age very soon. But, Bultmann 
thinks, ffosus was obviously mistaken i n this belief; the new age never 
30 
came. Jesus, did not believe God's reign was present i n his own 
31 
person' Furthermore, he did not believe himself to be the messiah, nor 
the eschatologieal son of Man, nor that He himself was the Messiah designate, 
32 
whose coming was expected very soon Jesus was mistaken again i n this 
expectation. The early Church on the other hand, thought that Jesus was 
29- B. Bultmann Hew Testament Theology Vol. I Sag. trans, p.21 
30. Bultmann. Op. c i t . p.22 
31. Bultmann. Op. c i t . p.22 
32. Bultmann. Op. o i t . p.9 
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the Messiah and the son of Man; they also thought that he had risen from 
the dead. In a l l these beliefs they were mistaken. The correct inter-
pretation of the gospel, Bultmann thinks i s that through the preaching of 
the death of Jesus, 0od offers man salvation, and a new future with their 
faith i n him. What Jesus was really l i k e i s unimportant for P a u l ^ 
so there i s no good reason why we should speculate about i t . For "Only 
the historian can answer such questions, and faith, being personal decision, 
cannot be dependent on the historians' labour"^ 
The solution offered to how i t i s possible to know what happened i n 
the past; how, i n the case of Christian theology, i t i s possible to know 
what Jesus actually said and did, has been influenced by the conscious 
and unconscious philosophical presuppositions which Bultmann and Earth 
accept. The presupossitions they adopt are not drawn purely from either 
the Logical Positivist or the Idealist camp but tend to be a strange 
combination of both sets of assumptions. 
Bultmann^views differ from those of Barth i n that Bultmann at one 
point comes close to allowing the sc i e n t i f i c outlook to hold a place of 
equal importance with the doctrine of justification by faith. Just as 
the Logical Positivists believed that a l l the statements of history can, 
35 
sooner or l a t e r be subsumed under some sc i e n t i f i c generalisation so 
for Bultmann the possibility of an event happening i n the past i s dependent 
on whether or not the event i n question i s compatible with a known 
scie n t i f i c generalisation. Thus the modern world view formulated on the 
basis of a s c i e n t i f i c outlook i s incompatible with the New Testament view, 
based as i t i s on the possibility of the miraculous. As Bultmann makes 
the point: " I t i s impossible to use the electric light and wireless and 
to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the 
33* Bultmann Op. c i t . p.293-4 
3<fr, Bultmann Op. e i t . p.26 
35, Thus "General laws have quite analogous functions i n history and in the 
natural sciences" cf. Hempel. Op. e i t . p.^ 59 
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same time to believe i n the New Testament world of s p i r i t s and miracles. 
We may think we can manage i n our own l i v e s , but to expect others to do so 
i s to make the Christian faith unintelligible and unacceptable to the 
modern varld""^ 
One of the presuppositions adopted by both Barth and Bultmann i s held 
i n common with both the Logical Positivists and the Idealists. A l l agree 
that an a priori criterion can be l a i d down which w i l l specify what can have 
happened i n the past. For the Positivist only those events oould be 
conceived to have happened i n the past which can be deduced from some sort 
of universal generalisation. For the Idealists, only those events can be 
considered as having a re a l i t y i n the past which can be relived i n my 
thought. For Barth and Bultmann, the only events i n the past which can ; 
have theological significance are those which are compatible with the 
doctrine of Justification by faith. Thus for Barth, the virgin birth must 
have actually happened i n the past, no matter how good or bad the evidence 
for i t i s , simply because he lays down the arguable a priori principle that 
the doctrine of justification by faith requires i t . On the other hand 
Bultmann tends to argue that the miracle stories of the gospels, cannot be 
intended to provide evidence for the divinity of Christ's person, for 
man must be saved by God's grace and not by any volume of the evidence to 
suggest that Jesus was the Son of God. 
There i s also an Idealist presupposition behind the arguments of 
Barth and Bultmann. This i s made dear I n the emphasis they both place 
on the presence of Jesus Christ i n the preaching of his Word. Barth 
argues that the words of the Bible and hence any historical statements 
that may be contained i n the Bible, are God's Word only when God chooses to 
make himself present i n his word. What i s important i s not whether a 
particular passage i n the Bible i s historically true or false; what matters 
36. Bultmann. "New Testament and Mythology" Bug. trans, i n Kerrmaa and Myth 
Vol. I p.5 
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i s whether the "saga" in question i s being used by God as a medium for 
oommunieating His word. Thus, just as for the Idealists, no event i s 
historical which cannot be relived in my thought, so for Barth, no event 
can have theological significance unless i t i s relived i n the present by 
Qod making the words describing this event His word. Bultaann at times 
i s even more radical than Barth, and i s willing to identify the purported 
reality of a past event with the fact that certain people relive, or 
re - c a l l the past event. Thus i n one of his discussions of the 
resurrection, Bultmann identifies the occurrence of the resurrection with 
the fact that the f i r s t disciples came to believe i n the resurrection. 
Thus he writes: The resurrection i t s e l f i s not an event of past history. 
A l l that historical criticism can establish i s the fact that the f i r s t 
disciples came to believe i n the resurrection"^ 
(b) Can Christian theology dispense with the past? 
A rigid divorce between faith i n Christ, and the knowledge of what 
Jesus of Nazareth said and did, such as that suggested by the early 
Barth and Bultmann removes the belief that Qod revealed himself i n Jesus 
Christ from the possibility of empirical refutation. I f Christ's presence 
to the believer has theological significance only when the Word i s 
preached, and the words preached have no logical relations with the 
statements i n the gospels which describe what Jesus said and did, then 
the findings of c r i t i c a l historians are logically irrelevant to faith i n 
Jesus as the Christ, and can never verify or f a l s i f y any statements of 
faith that Jesus i s the Christ. 
This rigid divorce of statements of faith i n Christ from statements 
describing the earthly l i f e of Jesus can only be made at a prioe: the 
price of denying that God revealed himself through the earthly actions 
and words of Jesus Christ. For to say that God revealed himself through 
37* B. Bultmann Kerygma and Myth. Op. e i t . p.42 
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the words and actions of a historical person means that the deeds and 
actions of that person are relevant to the content of that revelation. 
Furthermore, i f what can be discovered about the words and actions of 
Jesus by historical investigations i s not logically relevant to what God 
i s revealing through Jesus, then i t cannot be the ease that God's 
revelation i s through a historical person. 
The early Barth and Bultmann have i n fact been aeoused of Doeetism 
on the ground that they deny that the earthly l i f e of Jesus of Nazareth 
has any connection with faith i n Christ as Lord. The early Barth did 
this by concentrating so much an Christ's presencecin the Word, that he 
ignored the Word made flesh. For i f the Bible consists of "sag&Js" the 
truth or f a l s i t y of which i s irrelevant to whether the "sagas'1 contain 
the Word of God, then the l i f e of Jesus of Nazareth becomes something 
quite separate from, and isolated from the presence of Christ i n the Word. 
Bultmann i s more radical and tends to argue that l i t t l e can be known of 
the l i f e and words of Jesus, apart from what was preached about bin by the 
early Church. But i f the Biblical narratives provide us with a good 
account, not of what Jesus said and did, but what the early Church said 
he said and did, then the locus of God's purported revelation appears to 
have been pushed back one stage. I t i s no longer Jesus of Nazareth 
through whom God reveals himself, but what the early Church thought about 
Jesus of Nazareth. The Word i s no longer directly linked with the doings 
and sayings of one particular man who lived i n the past. 
One of the most powerful arguments i n favour of the irrelevance of 
historical evidence to faith i n Christ, i s that historical Investigations 
can provide us with only probable conclusions, whereas a statement of 
faith i s always certain, for a faith which amounts to a probability i s not 
genuine faith. This argument however seems to be based on a mlsmonoeption 
about the nature of knowledge. I t bears similarities to the insistence of 
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rationalists that knowledge i s not really knowledge unless i t i s imppssible 
to be mistaken about what i s known. This definition of knowledge led the 
l ? t h century rationalists to conclude that mathematical knowledge alone i s 
the only genuine type of knowledge, and any statements which do not have 
the formal perfection of mathematical statements cannot be knowledge i n 
any sense. Similarly the argument we are examining suggests that faith 
to be real faith must be certain beyond any possibility of doubt; and 
of course i t follows from this that faith cannot have any logical connexions 
with the empirical statements of history which oan never be more than 
probably true. 
The assumption that faith must by definition be certain, i t i t i s to 
be faith at a l l seems highly questionable. I f faith i s to be faith i n 
the revelation of Qod i n and through a historical person, then i t would 
seem inappropriate to demand this type of certaintly. For, i f God has 
o 
chosen to reveal himself i n a particular series of events which are part 
of the past, then the empirical aspects of these events oan be known only 
by means of historical investigation, and can never be anything but 
probably true. Many of the claims made by historians would seem to be as 
probable as the beliefs we hold about our everyday l i v e s . For example 
we a l l know that Keble preached his Assise sermon i n 1833 as reliably mm 
we oan know that Mr. Heath i s Prime Minister of Britain. Not a l l histor-
i c a l claims made about the past are as reliable as this one; there are 
clearly degrees of probability. The questions raised by the gospel 
narratives are such questions ass i s there sufficient evidence to suppose 
that Jesus instituted the Holy Communion? or i s there sufficient 
evidence to suppose that he died on a cross? and so on. I f the occurrence 
of the events i s improbable, then the believer who wishes to retain his 
intellectual honesty can do no other than abandon his belief that these 
events happened i n the past. 
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The above argument i a closely related to the argument that i f faith 
depends on the findings of historians, then faith becomes subject to the 
Papacy of professors: the believer can never be certain that what he 
believes about Jesus i s true, for his present beliefs may be overthrown 
by new historical findings the week after next. He can never be sure 
what he should believe about the earthly l i f e of Jesus until every 
possible piece of evidence has been uncovered, and until every historian 
who w i l l ever l i v e has passed his verdict on i t . 
This argument i s defining historical knowledge so rigidly that i f 
i t were s t r i c t l y applied i t would be impossible to know anything about 
h i At 
the past. I f i n order to know/an event i n the past has happened i t i s 
necessary to present a l l the evidence that w i l l ever be discovered about 
the event i n question, and also the evaluation by every possible historian, 
then there w i l l never be sufficient evidenoe to say that we know a partic-
ular event occurred i n the past; even an event which occurred i n the 
recent past such as the performance of Gladstone as Prime Minister. In 
the case of historical events i n the distance past, the ordinary man has 
no choice but to rely on what the majority of professional historians are 
saying on the issue; theme i s no other way of obtaining historical 
knowledge. Similarly someone who i s not a professional historian can 
only rely on what professional historians say about the r e l i a b i l i t y and 
credibility of the New Testament documents; and where the authorities 
disagree he has to examine the arguments of the opposing sides and decide 
for himself which arguments are the most persuasive. 
The reliance on the findings of • r i t i c a l historians w i l l mean two 
things. F i r s t l y , that some mistaken beliefs w i l l be held from time to 
time about the l i f e and ministry of Jesus. I t i s Inevitable that as 
fresh evidenoe comes to light we w i l l find that some of the things that 
were believed about the l i f e of Jesus turn out to be mistaken. Secondly, 
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our picture of Jesus w i l l change from age to age, because the historical 
certainties of one age, often become the points of scepticism for the next* 
Each generation of historians and New Testament scholars tend to rewrite 
history to bring i t into line with new discoveries and with their own 
interests and presuppositions* But we cannot but depend on historians 
to assess the r e l i a b i l i t y and adequacy of the evidence we possess for the 
doings and sayings of Jesus* This i s surely part of what i t means to say 
that the locus of God*a revelation was a particular person who lived i n 
the past; i t i s part of what i t means to say that the Word was made flesh. 
The doctrine of Justification by faith i s , as we have Illustrated 
above, often given as a reason for saying that the findings of c r i t i c a l 
historians are irrelevant to our faith i n Jesus as the Christ. For i f 
we are justified by God's grace given i n Christ, then any appeal to 
historical evidence represents man's attempt to justify himself 
epistemologioally, and i s therefore a rejection of God's grace. The 
logical consequences of this argument seem to lead to irrationalism. I f 
I am j u s t i f i e d by God's grace, and this means that historical evidence 
for what happened or did not happen when God revealed himself through past 
events i s irrelevant, then a believer could i n s i s t that his eertaintynof 
God's grace guaranteed any and every event a particular religion required. 
Barth as we have shown suggests that the doctrine of justification by faith 
guaranteed the fact of the empty tomb and of the virgin birth. Could i t 
not equally plausibly be argued that this doctrine guarantees the immaculate 
conception: i f Jesus bad to be born of a virgin because man's salvation 
came from God and not from man, then must not Mary have been bora without 
sin, to show that even the Mother of God was formed by God's grace and not 
by any power of man? Any belief i n fact that can in some way be logically 
deduced from the doctrine of Justification by faith seems to have i t s 
historicity guaranteed by this argument. 
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More seriously i f God revealed himself in and through the actions 
and sayings of a particular person who lived i n the past, then, to say 
that we know this means that there i s historical evidence to indicate that 
this person did and said the things attributed to him. God's grace 
cannot change the course of the past: i f particular sayings and doings 
are attributed to Jesus, then the only way of knowing whether these are 
genuine or fictitious i s by the ordinary processes of historical 
investigation. God cannot by divine f i a t make something that has 
happened i n the past not to have happened, or make something that did not 
happen i n the past have happened. Not even God can rewrite the course 
of history for the benefit of the faithful. 
But i f both Barth and Bultmann are mistaken i n suggesting that 
there are no logical relations between statements about the past doings 
and sayings of Jesus, and Christ as the Lord of faith? what exactly 
i s the logical relationship between the two? 
Barth and Bultmann both rightly stress that statements containing 
the word "God" cannot be conclusively verified, or f a l s i f i e d . For i f any 
statement containing the word "God" could be strongly verified or 
fa l s i f i e d then God would no longer be in any sense transcendent; he would 
be identical with some observable natural sequence. As A.J. Ayer has 
written: " I f the sentence" 'Gad exists' entails no more than that certain 
types of phenomena occur i n certain sequences, then to assert the existence 
of a god w i l l be simply equivalent to asserting tfhat there i s the requisite 
regularity in nature"^ 
But although statements describing God are never identical with 
statements describing the world, thvre do seem to be logical relations 
between these two types of statements. For consider the two following 
statements:-
38. language, truth and logic. 2nd. ed. p.U5 
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1 Jesus died on the cross to reconcile the world to God. 
2 Jesus died on a cross* 
I f i t i s to be true that Jesus died on a cross to reconcile the 
world to God, then i t must be historically true that Jesus died on a cross. 
Furthermore, i f there i s good historical evidence to show that Jesus was 
neverfcrucified, then i t cannot be true that Jesus died on a cross to 
reconcile the world to God. The theological claim i n this instance 
depends for i t s truth on the truth of the historical claim. I w i l l 
attempt to elucidate the consequences of this relationship i n the 
concluding chapter. 
P A R T V. 
CONCLUSION. 
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C H A P T E R S E V E N 
CONCLUSION 
I . The relevance of the verification principle 
How far i s the Logical Positivist challenge to the meaning of 
religious statements a logically appropriate challenge? Are theological 
statements the sort of statements which differ so greatly i n their 
logical status from a l l other types of statements that i t i s inappropriate 
to i n s i s t that they should be verifiable or fa l s i f i a b l e by sense experience? 
This demand i s logically inappropriate i n the form i n which i t was 
f i r s t put forward by the Logical Positivists. I mentioned i n Chapter I 
that the Logical Positivists, despite their denials, were engaged i n 
putting forward a metaphysical programme; they Insisted that a l l 
genuine knowledge i s sc i e n t i f i c knowledge, and so any statement which i s 
to be counted as part of the body of human knowledge, must be of the 
same logical type as a sci e n t i f i c statement, and also verifiable or 
falsi f i a b l e i n the same way as any scie n t i f i c hypothesis, Thus 
Neurath demanded: " A l l laws whether chemical, climatical or sociological 
must be, therefore, conceived as constituents of a unified science.•••• 
what i s essential i s that only physicalistmeally formulated correlations 
be employed i n the description of living things, whatever may be observed 
1 
i n these things•" I t follows from this that any statements which 
cannot be included In the system of unified science cannot have cognitive 
meaning. Theological statements were therefore classified along with 
poetry and music; they express emotional reactions to l i f e , but do not 
state anything about what i s the case; they do not communicate 
information. 
In reaction to the demand of the Logical Positivists that 
1. Otto Neurath "Sociology and physicali8m n Erkenntnis 
Vol. I I 1951/2 Ayer Op. c i t . pp.284 and 298/9 
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theological statements most either be capable of assimilation into the 
system of unified science, or must lack any cognitive import, theologians 
such as Barth have insisted that theological statements are autonomous „ 
For i f theological statements could be assimilated to the system of 
unified science, statements referring to God would be reducible without 
loss of meaning to sc i e n t i f i c statements referring to the natural world. 
This would identify God with the natural world and so deny his transcen-
dence of the world, and his creation of a l l things visible and invisible. 
Barth quite rightly i n s i s t s that theological statements are of a 
logically different type from scie n t i f i c statements and cannot be reduced 
to them. Thus he asserts that the world of man i s that "in which every-
thing i s problematical, everything must f i r s t be tested, and certainly 
nothing i s to be tested with the result that i t i s identical with God"2 
But he takes a more radical step than merely stressing the difference i n 
logical type between sc i e n t i f i c statements and theological statements: he 
suggests that theological statements are completely autonomoust the 
truth or f a l s i t y , meanlAgfulness and meaninglessness of theological 
statements are determined by c r i t e r i a determined by the nature of God 
Himself, and applicable only to theological statements. No c r i t e r i a 
drawn from non-theological statements can be appropriately applied to 
the theological statements; such statements are "std. generis" and have 
nd^ logical relations with non~theological statements. 
The Logical Positivists were also mistaken to assume that i t i s 
possible to lay down the c r i t e r i a for the meaningfulness and meaninglessness 
of a l l statements no matter what context i n which they are used. D.Z. 
Phillips i s quite correct i n 'stressing that no a j ^ r j w i rules can be l a i d 
2. K. Berth. Church Dogmatics. Vol. I p.I p.5LJ 
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down In advance to determine whether statements, even theological 
statements, are meaningful or not. Meaning i s not identical with 
verification, as wa saw i n Chapter I . For i n order to discover the 
meaning of a statement i t i s necessary to examine the oontext i n which the 
statement i s used. Phillips however spoils his argument by Insisting not 
merely that the meaning of a statement can be discovered by examining i t s 
context of use; but also that the truth of a statement can be identified 
with i t s public use. Thus he argues that; i f the language game of 
religious belief i s played, i f theological statements have a use, not only 
do such statements have a meaning, but they must in some sense be true. 
The problem in this identification of usage and truth, i s that i t implies 
that every living religion^ which uses a language coherently must be true. 
But the beliefs of a l l the religions practised at the present time are not 
logically compatible. For example, the Moslem belief i n one God only i s 
not logically compatible with some t r i b a l religions which practice the 
worship of many gods. I t cannot be true at one and the same time that 
there i s only one God and that there i s more than one God. So a l l these 
religions cannot be true at one and the same time. 
Berth and Phillips therefore have both, consciously or unconsciously, 
made good points to counter the attack o^ the Logical Positivists on the 
meaning of religious language: they have made the point that statements 
containing the word "God1* are logically unique, and cannot be reduced 
without remainder to non-theological statements. In the very action of 
doing this, however, they have conceded too much to the Logical Positivists. 
For In insisting on the autonomy of theological statements, they have 
logically isolated them from a l l other types of non-theological statements. 
Tet an examination ofmost of the statements contained i n the Christian 
creeds suggest that some theological statements are statements very 
similar i n logical type to fact^daiming statements. For example the 
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Apostles creed states of Jesus Christ that he was born of the virgin Mary, 
suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died and was buried. He 
descended into Hell. The third day he rose again from the dead. He 
ascended into heaven, and so on. I f such theological statements are i n 
some sense making factual claims, are not the Logical Posltivists, and 
their successors such as A.Q.N. Flew justified i n Insisting that they should 
be verifiable or falsiflable? For to make a factual claim i s to exclude 
certain possibilities; i t i s to assert that one state of affairs has 
occurred rather than any other; that he suffered under Pontius Pilate 
rather than Herod; that after his death he descended into he l l and did 
not go straight to heaven. 
2. Statements of faith and statements of fact 
I f some fact*-claiming statements and some assertions of Jfelth are 
closely connected i n Christian belief and practice then how are these two 
types of statement logically related? This question can best be answered 
by considering examples of such statements. 
Consider St. Paul's claim i n the epistle to the Bomans "But God 
we 
oommendeth his love toward us, i n that, while/were yet sinners Christ died 
for us"' This statement i s making a factual claim that Ood behaved i n a 
certain way: that is^he showed his love by allowing his son to die for men's 
sins. This statement taken i n the context i n which i t occurs i n the 
epistle to the Banana entails a historical statement which i s either true 
or false. I t entails the statement that Jesus Christ died. For i f God 
showed his love to man through the death of Christ, then Christ must have 
died. I t i s not logically possible for Christ not to have died and for 
God to have shown i s love through the death of Christ. 
Or consider the claim sometimes made particularly by Christians i n 
the Catholic tradition, thai; i t i s more important to attend communion than 
3. Bomans 5:8 
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any other service of Christian worship, because the communion service i s 
the only service Christ himself ordered his followers to perform. For 
according to the f i r s t epistle to the Corinthians Jesus said: "Take, eat 
this i s my body which i s broken for you: do this i n remembrance of me" 
I f i t i s correct that the reason for the importance of attending communion 
i s that Jesus himself ordered Christians to do so, then i t must be the 
case that Jesus himself gave some fa^Ly explicit instructions about the 
significance of communion. He need not have said exactly what the gospels 
and I Corinthians attribute to him; and i n any case there i s great 
disagreement as to the correct interpretation of the passages which recount 
the institution of the Holy Communion. But i f the claim i s to be true 
that the reason why a Christian should receive communion i s that Jesus 
ordered him to, then i t must be the case that as a matter of fact Jesus issued 
such an order. For the statement "You must attend communion becauses 
Jesus himself told you to" entails the statement, "Jesus told you to 
attend communion" and i t i s therefore not logicallyupossible for the 
la t t e r statement to be false, and the former one true. 
This close relationship between statements of faith and statements 
of fact does not apply only to the historical claims of Christianity. 
Any theological belief which places the locus of God's revelation in, with 
and under a factual occurrence i n the worid, places i t s claims i n the same 
relationship. For example suppose a man asserts HX was cured by Qod 
through the agency of the Virgin Mary of cancer, at 12 am yesterday" This 
statement dearly entails the statement "X was cured of cancer at 12 am 
yesterday" For i t i s logically impossible for X to be cured of cancer by 
God, through the work of the Virgin Marg, and at the same time for X's 
cancer not to have been cured. The non-occurrence of the cure w i l l 
f a l s i f y the claim that God performed the cure, 
if. I r . n ^ r , + M a n B xx:2if 
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3* Theology i meaning and falsification 
The Logical Positivists were mistaken i n insisting that i f theological 
statements are to be meaningful they must be verifiable and/or falsifiable 
For i f the meaning of a statement i s not identical with the possibility of 
i t s verification and/or falsification, but i s determined by whether or not 
the statement has a use, then any statement or set of statements which has' 
a use In a p u b l i c i t y spoken language, must have some sort of meaning. 
Many different systems of theology are i n use, i n many different publioj^ly 
used languages, and therefore they are meaningful i n some sense. Further-
more an unbeliever can come to understand any set of religious beliefs he 
studies which i s logically consistent, i n much the same way that i t i s 
possible to understand the world of the Hobbiss or a piece of science 
fiction; just because i t i s possible to understand any consistent series 
of statement, i t does not follow that one or any of them are true. 
Theological claims are not however isolated from the possibility 
of being f a l s i f i e d . This because theological statements i n many of the 
world religions entail factual statements which are either happened or 
did not happen, and so are verifiable or f a l s i f i a b l e . Thus many of the 
more important theological statements such as the doctrine of the 
atonement are fal s i f i a b l e , i n that we can specify at least some of the 
circumstances under which this doctrine would be false - that i s i f 
Christ was never crucified. 
Thus some theological statements are f a l s i f i a b l e : the f a l s i t y of 
a given factual statement w i l l f a l s i f y the theological statement which 
entails this particular matter of fact. The truth of a given factual 
statement w i l l not entail the truth of any theological statement however. 
Even i f Jesus i n fact died on the cross i t does not follow from this 
that in dying on the cross he reconciled the world to himself ( i . e . to 
God) for to verify the statement that God reconciled the world to 
1<&. 
himself an the cross, I t i s necessary to verify an action of Ood -
and obviously i f God i s transcendent then his actions are not 
reducible without loss of meaning to statements about the world, 
that i s statements that can be verified. This problem of how i f 
at a l l a consistent set of statements about God's action could be 
verifiable i s one to which I can at present see no satisfactory 
solution. 
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